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30. there is no good reason to be an academic skeptic

In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. pp. 299 (2003)

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  1. Prospects for A Levinasian Epistemic Infinitism.J. Aaron Simmons & Scott F. Aikin - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (3):437-460.
    Abstract Epistemic infinitism is certainly not a majority view in contemporary epistemology. While there are some examples of infinitism in the history of philosophy, more work needs to be done mining this history in order to provide a richer understanding of how infinitism might be formulated internal to different philosophical frameworks. Accordingly, we argue that the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas can be read as operating according to an ?impure? model of epistemic infinitism. The infinite obligation inaugurated by the ?face to (...)
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  • Desafios céticos e o debate internalismo versus externalismo em epistemologia.Alexandre Meyer Luz - 2009 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 54 (2):74-95.
    Neste ensaio, pretendemos (1) sugerir algumas vantagens da apresentação do ceticismo na forma de um argumento cético geral, (2) discutir o princípio de fechamento utilizado neste argumento, (3) mostrar que o confiablismo externalista é incapaz de explicar as implicações deste argumento geral e (4) defender uma posição internalista cancelabilista como a mais adequadamente munida de ferramentas para avaliação dos desafios céticos.
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  • Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning.Peter Klein - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17.
    The purpose of this paper is to explain how infinitism—the view that reasons are endless and non-repeating—solves the epistemic regress problem and to defend that solution against some objections. The first step is to explain what the epistemic regress problem is and, equally important, what it is not. Second, I will discuss the foundationalist and coherentist responses to the regress problem and offer some reasons for thinking that neither response can solve the problem, no matter how they are tweaked. Then, (...)
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