Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The language of thought hypothesis.Murat Aydede - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A comprehensive introduction to the Language of Though Hypothesis (LOTH) accessible to general audiences. LOTH is an empirical thesis about thought and thinking. For their explication, it postulates a physically realized system of representations that have a combinatorial syntax (and semantics) such that operations on representations are causally sensitive only to the syntactic properties of representations. According to LOTH, thought is, roughly, the tokening of a representation that has a syntactic (constituent) structure with an appropriate semantics. Thinking thus consists in (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • Where the regress argument still goes wrong: Reply to Knowles.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):321-327.
    Many philosophers reject the Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOT) on the grounds that is leads to an explanatory regress problem. According to this line of argument, LOT is invoked to explain certain features of natural language, but the language of thought has the very same features and consequently no explanatory progress has been made. In an earlier paper (“Regress Arguments against the Language of Thought”, Analysis 57.1), we argued that this regress argument doesn’t work and that even proponents of LOT (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Does intentional psychology need vindicating by cognitive science?Jonathan Knowles - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (3):347-377.
    I argue that intentional psychology does not stand in need of vindication by a lower-level implementation theory from cognitive science, in particular the representational theory of mind (RTM), as most famously Jerry Fodor has argued. The stance of the paper is novel in that I claim this holds even if one, in line with Fodor, views intentional psychology as an empirical theory, and its theoretical posits as as real as those of other sciences. I consider four metaphysical arguments for the (...)
    Direct download (15 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Can There Be Ineffable Propositional Structures?Krasimira Filcheva - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Research 45:149-164.
    Is it possible for there to be facts about reality with a logical structure that is in principle unrepresentable by us? I outline the main motivations for thinking that this question should receive a positive answer. I then argue that, upon inspection, the view that such structurally ineffable facts are possible is self-defeating and thus incoherent. My argument is based on considerations about the fundamental role that the purely formal concept of an object plays in our propositional representations and its (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Can there be a feature‐placing language?Krasimira Filcheva - 2023 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):655-672.
    The aim of this article is to argue against the real possibility of languages without subject‐predicate structure, so‐called feature‐placing languages. They were first introduced by Strawson (1959/1990), later given formal expression through Quine's Predicate Functor Logic (Quine, 1960, Quine, 1971/Quine, 1976, Quine, 1992), and further elaboration in (Hawthorne & Cortens, 1995). I argue that, on the presumption that feature‐placing languages are not mere notational variants on first‐order languages, the idea of such languages is incoherent. The argument for this view rests (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•