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  1. Hume, Humans and Animals.Michael-John Turp - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (1):119-136.
    Hume’s Treatise, Enquiries and Essays contain plentiful material for an investigation into the moral nature of other animals and our moral relations to them. In particular, Hume pays considerable attention to animal minds. He also argues that moral judgment is grounded in sympathy. As sympathy is shared by humans and some other animals, this already hints at the possibility that some animals are morally considerable, even if they are not moral agents. Most contributions to the literature on animal ethics assume (...)
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  • Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places.Earl W. Spurgin - 2004 - Business Ethics Quarterly 14 (2):293-313.
    In recent years, many business ethicists have raised problems with the “ethics pays” credo. Despite these problems, many continue to hold it. I argue that support for the credo leads business ethicists away from a potentially fruitful approach found in Hume’s moral philosophy. I begin by demonstrating that attempts to support the credo fail because proponents are trying to provide an answer to the “Why be moral?” question that is based on rational self-interest. Then, I show that Hume’s sentiments-based moral (...)
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  • Hume on the Cultivation of Moral Character.Philip A. Reed - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):299-315.
    This paper attempts to give a complete and coherent account of how Hume’s moral psychology can explain the cultivation of moral character. I argue that the outcome of a fully formed moral character is an agent who strengthens her calm moral sentiments into settled principles of action. I then take up the question of how the process of strengthening moral sentiments might occur, rejecting the possibilities of sympathy, “reflection,” and “resolution” because either they are too weak or else they make (...)
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  • Impartiality through ‘Moral Optics’: Why Adam Smith revised David Hume's Moral Sentimentalism.Christel Fricke & Maria Alejandra Carrasco - 2021 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 19 (1):1-18.
    We read Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments as a critical response to David Hume's moral theory. While both share a commitment to moral sentimentalism, they propose different ways of meeting its main challenge, that is, explaining how judgments informed by sentiments can nevertheless have a justified claim to general authority. This difference is particularly manifest in their respective accounts of ‘moral optics’, or the way they rely on the analogy between perceptual and moral judgments. According to Hume, making perceptual (...)
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  • Dirty hands and the romance of the ticking bomb terrorist: a Humean account.Christopher J. Finlay - 2011 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 14 (4):421-442.
    On Michael Walzer's influential account, "dirty hands" characterizes the political leader's choice between absolutist moral demands (to abstain from torture) and consequentialist political reasoning (to do what is necessary to prevent the loss of innocent lives). The impulse to torture a "ticking bomb terrorist" is therefore at least partly pragmatic, straining against morality, while the desire to uphold a ban on torture is purely and properly a moral one. I challenge this Machiavellian view by reinterpreting the dilemma in the framework (...)
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  • Authority as a contingency plan.Carla Bagnoli - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):130-145.
    Humean constructivists object to Kantian constructivism that by endorsing the constitutivist strategy, which grounds moral obligations in rational agency, this position discounts the impact of cont...
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  • Stability and Justification in Hume’s Treatise, Another Look- A Response to Erin Kelly, Frederick Schmitt, and Michael Williams.Louis E. Loeb - 2004 - Hume Studies 30 (2):339-404.
    The symposiasts press from a number of directions. Erin Kelly contends that Hume’s stability-based sentimentalist ethics cannot do justice to our considered normative moral judgements. Schmitt and Williams criticize my account of Hume’s epistemology proper. I will have to give ground: my book does overstate the extent to which Hume reaches a destructive result, in large part because I overlook significant variants of a stability account of justification. I make other concessions—in regard to the country gentlemen passage and Hume’s 1.3.9 (...)
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  • Trusting our own minds.Dennis Kalde - 2019 - Dissertation, Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
    When it comes to the metaethical task of explaining and making sense of what it is that we are doing while doing ethics, the subject of moral objectivity occupies an important and special place within that task. Thus, it is often agreed that being able to explain and justify the objective features of common moral practice is one of if not the most important task for any metaethical theory to undertake. In this dissertation, I tackle the issue of ethical objectivity (...)
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