Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Consciousness: Individuated Information in Action.J. Jonkisz - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
    Within theoretical and empirical enquiries, many different meanings associated with consciousness have appeared, leaving the term itself quite vague. This makes formulating an abstract and unifying version of the concept of consciousness – the main aim of this article –into an urgent theoretical imperative. It is argued that consciousness, characterized as dually accessible (cognized from the inside and the outside), hierarchically referential (semantically ordered), bodily determined (embedded in the working structures of an organism or conscious system), and useful in action (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Consciousness Without Attention.Carolyn Dicey Jennings - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (2):276--295.
    This paper explores whether consciousness can exist without attention. This is a hot topic in philosophy of mind and cognitive science due to the popularity of theories that hold attention to be necessary for consciousness. The discovery of a form of consciousness that exists without the influence of attention would require a change in the way that many global workspace theorists, for example, understand the role and function of consciousness. Against this understanding, at least three forms of consciousness have been (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Solely Generic Phenomenology.Ned Block - 2015 - Open MIND 2015.
  • Validating and Calibrating First-and Second-Person Methods in the Science of Consciousness.T. Froese, C. Gould & A. K. Seth - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2):38.
  • Immediate and Long-Term Priming Effects Are Independent of Prime Awareness.Jolien C. Francken, Simon van Gaal & Floris P. de Lange - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1793-1800.
    Subliminal primes are assumed to produce weaker and short-lived effects on subsequent behavior compared to clearly visible primes. However, this difference in priming effect may be due to differences in signal strength, rather than level of awareness. In the present study we manipulated prime discriminability by using metacontrast masks and pseudomasks, while keeping the prime strength equal. This manipulation resulted in large differences in discriminability of the primes. However, both immediate response priming and long-term response priming was equal for the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • The Perception‐Action Model: Counting Computational Mechanisms.Thor Grünbaum - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (4):416-445.
    Milner and Goodale's Two Visual Systems Hypothesis is regarded as common ground in recent discussions of visual consciousness. A central part of TVSH is a functional model of vision and action. In this paper, I provide a brief overview of these current discussions and argue that there is ambiguity between a strong and a weak version of PAM. I argue that, given a standard way of individuating computational mechanisms, the available evidence cannot be used to distinguish between these versions. This (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Intrinsic Activity of the Brain and Its Relation to Levels and Disorders of Consciousness.Farisco Michele, Laureys Steven & Evers Kathinka - 2017 - Mind and Matter 15 (2):197-219.
    Science and philosophy still lack an overarching theory of consciousness. We suggest that a further step toward it requires going beyond the view of the brain as input-output machine and focusing on its intrinsic activity, which may express itself in two distinct modalities, i.e. aware and unaware. We specifically investigate the predisposition of the brain to evaluate and to model the world. These intrinsic activities of the brain retain a deep relation with consciousness. In fact the ability of the brain (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Know Thyself: Metacognitive Networks and Measures of Consciousness.Antoine Pasquali, Bert Timmermans & Axel Cleeremans - 2010 - Cognition 117 (2):182-190.
  • Partial Report is the Wrong Paradigm.James Stazicker - forthcoming - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences.
    Is consciousness independent of the general-purpose information processes known as ‘cognitive access’? The dominantmethodology for supporting this independence hypothesis appeals to partial report experiments as evidence for perceptual consciousness in the absence of cognitive access. Using a standard model of evidential support, and reviewing recent elaborations of the partial report paradigm, this article argues that the paradigm has the wrong structure to support the independence hypothesis. Like reports in general, a subject’s partial report is evidence that she is conscious of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Explaining What?Elizabeth Irvine - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):95-106.
    The Hard Problem is surrounded by a vast literature, to which it is increasingly hard to contribute to in any meaningful way. Accordingly, the strategy here is not to offer any new metaphysical or ‘in principle’ arguments in favour of the success of materialism, but to assume a Type Q approach and look to contemporary consciousness science to see how the concept of consciousness fares there, and what kind of explanations we can hope to offer of it. It is suggested (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Neurophysiological Effects Associated With Subliminal Conditioning of Appetite Motivations.Micah Amd & Sylvain Baillet - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Fata Morgana of Unconscious Perception.Marjan Persuh - 2018 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 12.
  • Understanding Visual Consciousness in Autism Spectrum Disorders.Tal Yatziv & Hilla Jacobson - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
  • Visibility Is Not Equivalent to Confidence in a Low Contrast Orientation Discrimination Task.Manuel Rausch & Michael Zehetleitner - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Evidence of Weak Conscious Experiences in the Exclusion Task.Kristian Sandberg, Simon H. Del Pin, Bo M. Bibby & Morten Overgaard - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • On the Use of Continuous Flash Suppression for the Study of Visual Processing Outside of Awareness.Eunice Yang, Jan Brascamp, Min-Suk Kang & Randolph Blake - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Seeing and Windows of Integration.Ned Block - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):29-39.
  • Exploring the Visual Conscious.Bruno G. Breitmeyer, Markus Kiefer & Michael Niedeggen - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 35:178-184.
  • Cognitive Access and Cognitive Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Issues.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):188-204.
    The well-known distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness has moved away from the conceptual domain into the empirical one, and the debate now is focused on whether the neural mechanisms of cognitive access are constitutive of the neural correlate of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I want to analyze the consequences that a negative reply to this question has for the cognitive phenomenology thesis – roughly the claim that there is a “proprietary” phenomenology of thoughts. If the mechanisms responsible (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Can You Perceive Ensembles Without Perceiving Individuals?: The Role of Statistical Perception in Determining Whether Awareness Overflows Access.Emily J. Ward, Adam Bear & Brian J. Scholl - 2016 - Cognition 152:78-86.
    Do we see more than we can report? Psychologists and philosophers have been hotly debating this question, in part because both possibilities are supported by suggestive evidence. On one hand, phenomena such as inattentional blindness and change blindness suggest that visual awareness is especially sparse. On the other hand, experiments relating to iconic memory suggest that our in-the-moment awareness of the world is much richer than can be reported. Recent research has attempted to resolve this debate by showing that observers (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Measuring Consciousness: Task Accuracy and Awareness as Sigmoid Functions of Stimulus Duration.Kristian Sandberg, Bo Martin Bibby, Bert Timmermans, Axel Cleeremans & Morten Overgaard - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1659-1675.
    When consciousness is examined using subjective ratings, the extent to which processing is conscious or unconscious is often estimated by calculating task performance at the subjective threshold or by calculating the correlation between accuracy and awareness. However, both these methods have certain limitations. In the present article, we propose describing task accuracy and awareness as functions of stimulus intensity as suggested by Koch and Preuschoff . The estimated lag between the curves describes how much stimulus intensity must increase for awareness (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Shades of Awareness on the Mechanisms Underlying the Quality of Conscious Representations: A Commentary to Fazekas and Overgaard ().Anna Anzulewicz & Michał Wierzchoń - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (6):2095-2100.
    Fazekas and Overgaard () present a novel, multidimensional model that explains different ways in which conscious representations can be degraded. Moreover, the authors discuss possible mechanisms that underlie different kinds of degradation, primarily those related to attentional processing. In this letter, we argue that the proposed mechanisms are not sufficient. We propose that attentional mechanisms work differently at various processing stages; and factors that are independent of attentional ones, such as expectation, previous experience, and context, should be accounted for if (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • On a Confusion About Which Intuitions to Trust: From the Hard Problem to a Not Easy One.Miguel Sebastián - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):31-40.
    Alleged self-evidence aside, conceivability arguments are one of the main reasons in favor of the claim that there is a Hard Problem. These arguments depend on the appealing Kripkean intuition that there is no difference between appearances and reality in the case of consciousness. I will argue that this intuition rests on overlooking a distinction between cognitive access and consciousness, which has received recently important empirical support. I will show that there are good reasons to believe that the intuition is (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Phenomenal Consciousness, Representational Content and Cognitive Access: A Missing Link Between Two Debates.Hilla Jacobson - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):1021-1035.
    Two debates loom large in current discussions on phenomenal consciousness. One debate concerns the relation between phenomenal character and representational content. Representationalism affirms, whereas “content separatism” denies, that phenomenal character is exhausted by representational content. Another debate concerns the relation between phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access. “Access separatism” affirms, whereas, e.g., the global workspace model denies, that there are phenomenally conscious states that are not cognitively accessed. I will argue that the two separatist views are related. Access separatism supports content (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Block's Overflow Argument.Peter Carruthers - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:65-70.
    This article challenges Block's ‘overflow argument’ for the conclusion that phenomenal consciousness and access-consciousness are distinct. It shows that the data can be explained just as well in terms of a distinction between contents that are made globally accessible through bottom–up sensory stimulation and those that are sustained and made available in working memory through top-down attention.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Category-Selective Attention Modulates Unconscious Processes in the Middle Occipital Gyrus.Shen Tu, Jiang Qiu, Ulla Martens & Qinglin Zhang - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):479-485.
    Many studies have revealed the top-down modulation on unconscious processing. However, there is little research about how category-selective attention could modulate the unconscious processing. In the present study, using functional magnetic resonance imaging , the results showed that category-selective attention modulated unconscious face/tool processing in the middle occipital gyrus . Interestingly, MOG effects were of opposed direction for face and tool processes. During unconscious face processing, activation in MOG decreased under the face-selective attention compared with tool-selective attention. This result was (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Metacognitive Sensitivity of Subjective Reports of Decisional Confidence and Visual Experience.Manuel Rausch, Hermann J. Müller & Michael Zehetleitner - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 35:192-205.
  • Access, Phenomenology and Sorites.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2018 - Ratio 31 (3):285-293.
    The non-transitivity of the relation looks the same as has been used to argue that the relation has the same phenomenal character as is non-transitive—a result that jeopardizes certain theories of consciousness. In this paper, I argue against this conclusion while granting the premise by dissociating lookings and phenomenology; an idea that some might find counter-intuitive. However, such an intuition is left unsupported once phenomenology and cognitive access are distinguished from each other; a distinction that is conceptually and empirically grounded.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Multi‐Factor Account of Degrees of Awareness.Peter Fazekas & Morten Overgaard - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (6):1833-1859.
    In this paper we argue that awareness comes in degrees, and we propose a novel multi-factor account that spans both subjective experiences and perceptual representations. At the subjective level, we argue that conscious experiences can be degraded by being fragmented, less salient, too generic, or flash-like. At the representational level, we identify corresponding features of perceptual representations—their availability for working memory, intensity, precision, and stability—and argue that the mechanisms that affect these features are what ultimately modulate the degree of awareness. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Attentional Requirements of Consciousness.Michael A. Cohen, Patrick Cavanagh, Marvin M. Chun & Ken Nakayama - 2012 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (8):411-417.
  • Unconscious Vision and Executive Control: How Unconscious Processing and Conscious Action Control Interact.Ulrich Ansorge, Wilfried Kunde & Markus Kiefer - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 27:268-287.
  • Ensemble Representation and the Contents of Visual Experience.Tim Bayne & Tom McClelland - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):733-753.
    The on-going debate over the ‘admissible contents of perceptual experience’ concerns the range of properties that human beings are directly acquainted with in perceptual experience. Regarding vision, it is relatively uncontroversial that the following properties can figure in the contents of visual experience: colour, shape, illumination, spatial relations, motion, and texture. The controversy begins when we ask whether any properties besides these figure in visual experience. We argue that ‘ensemble properties’ should be added to the list of visually admissible properties. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Imagery and Overflow: We See More Than We Report.Nicholas D’Aloisio-Montilla - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (5):545-570.
    The question of whether our conscious experience is rich or sparse remains an enduring controversy in philosophy. The “overflow” account argues that perceptual consciousness is far richer than cognitive access: when perceiving a complex scene, subjects see more than they can report. This paper draws on aphantasia to propose a new argument in favor of overflow. First, it shows that opponents of overflow explain subjects’ performance in a change detection paradigm by appealing to a type of “internal imagery.” Second, it (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Subjective Measures of Consciousness in Artificial Grammar Learning Task.Michał Wierzchoń, Dariusz Asanowicz, Borysław Paulewicz & Axel Cleeremans - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (3):1141-1153.
    Consciousness can be measured in various ways, but different measures often yield different conclusions about the extent to which awareness relates to performance. Here, we compare five different subjective measures of awareness in the context of an artificial grammar learning task. Participants expressed their subjective awareness of rules using one of five different scales: confidence ratings , post-decision wagering , feeling of warmth , rule awareness , and continuous scale . All scales were equally sensitive to conscious knowledge. PDW, however, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • The Development of a Sense of Control Scale.Mia Y. Dong, Kristian Sandberg, Bo M. Bibby, Michael N. Pedersen & Morten Overgaard - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Elizabeth Irvine, Consciousness as a Scientific Concept: A Philosophy of Science Perspective. [REVIEW]Benjamin Kozuch - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3):651-655.
  • Multiple Factors and Multiple Mechanisms Determine the Quality of Conscious Experiences: A Reply to Anzulewicz and Wierzchoń.Peter Fazekas & Morten Overgaard - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (6):2101-2103.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Consciousness Operationalized, a Debate Realigned.Peter Carruthers & Bénédicte Veillet - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 55:79-90.
  • Target Meta-Awareness is a Necessary Condition for Physiological Responses to Masked Emotional Faces: Evidence From Combined Skin Conductance and Heart Rate Assessment.Myron Tsikandilakis, Peter Chapman & Jonathan Peirce - 2018 - Consciousness and Cognition 58:75-89.
  • Psychophysical “Blinding” Methods Reveal a Functional Hierarchy of Unconscious Visual Processing.Bruno G. Breitmeyer - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 35:234-250.
  • Consciousness as a Graded and an All-or-None Phenomenon: A Conceptual Analysis.Bert Windey & Axel Cleeremans - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 35:185-191.
  • A Brief Argument For Consciousness Without Access.Nicholas D'Aloisio‐Montilla - 2018 - Ratio 31 (2):119-136.
    This paper proposes a new argument in favour of the claim that phenomenal consciousness overflows – that is, has a far higher capacity than – cognitive access. It shows that opponents of overflow implicate a necessary role for visual imagery in the change detection paradigm. However, empirical evidence suggests that there is no correlation between visual imagery abilities and performance in this paradigm. Since the use of imagery is not implicated in the performance strategy of subjects, we find a new (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • No Iconic Memory Without Attention.Arien Mack, Muge Erol, Jason Clarke & John Bert - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 40:1-8.
  • Consciousness Isn’T All-or-None: Evidence for Partial Awareness During the Attentional Blink.James C. Elliott, Benjamin Baird & Barry Giesbrecht - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 40:79-85.
  • Empirical Support for Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Awareness.Hakwan Lau & David Rosenthal - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):365-373.
  • Consciousness Cannot Be Separated From Function.Michael A. Cohen & Daniel C. Dennett - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):358--364.
    Here, we argue that any neurobiological theory based on an experience/function division cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified and is thus outside the scope of science. A ‘perfect experiment’ illustrates this point, highlighting the unbreachable boundaries of the scientific study of consciousness. We describe a more nuanced notion of cognitive access that captures personal experience without positing the existence of inaccessible conscious states. Finally, we discuss the criteria necessary for forming and testing a falsifiable theory of consciousness.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   66 citations  
  • Perceptual Consciousness Overflows Cognitive Access.Ned Block - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.
    One of the most important issues concerning the foundations ofconscious perception centerson thequestion of whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse. The overflow argument uses a form of ‘iconic memory’ toarguethatperceptual consciousnessisricher (i.e.,has a higher capacity) than cognitive access: when observing a complex scene we are conscious of more than we can report or think about. Recently, the overflow argumenthas been challenged both empirically and conceptually. This paper reviews the controversy, arguing that proponents of sparse perception are committed to the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   64 citations  
  • Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Conceptions of Consciousness.Morten Overgaard & Thor Grünbaum - 2012 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (3):137.
  • Do We Still Need Phenomenal Consciousness? Comment on Block.Sid Kouider, Jérôme Sackur & Vincent de Gardelle - 2012 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (3):140-141.