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  1. When Did Svatantra Inference Gain Its Autonomy? Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla as Sources for a Tibetan Distinction.Kevin Vose - 2020 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 48 (4):703-750.
    This article examines Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s understandings of svatantra and prasaṅga proofs in the attempt to clarify how and why Tibetan Prāsaṅgikas came to portray svatantra inference as an instance of the very thing Madhyamaka rejects. The article proceeds in four parts. A brief comparison of Patsap Nyimadrak’s portrayal of svatantra inference with Bhāviveka’s and Candrakīrti’s employment of this expression shows that Patsap expanded the meaning of it, charging its users with embracing a realism at odds with Madhyamaka emptiness. Patsap’s (...)
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  • Authority in Early Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka.Kevin Vose - 2010 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (6):553-582.
    This paper examines the role of pramāṇa in Jayānanda’s commentary to Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra. As the only extant Indian commentary on any of Candrakīrti’s works (available only in Tibetan translation), written in the twelfth century when Candrakīrti’s interpretation of Madhyamaka first became widely valued, Jayānanda’s Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā is crucial to our understanding of early Prāsaṅgika thought. In the portions of his text examined here, Jayānanda offers a pointed critique of both svatantra inferences and the broader Buddhist epistemological movement. In developing this critique, (...)
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  • Is Dharmakīrti Grabbing the Rabbit by the Horns? A Reassessment of the Scope of Prameya in Dharmakīrtian Epistemology.Pascale Hugon - 2011 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 39 (4-5):367-389.
    This paper attempts to make sense of Dharmakīrti’s conflicting statements regarding the object of valid cognition ( prameya ) in various parts of his works, considering in particular the claims that (i) there are two kinds of prameyas (particulars and universals), (ii) the particular alone is prameya , and (iii) what is non-existent also qualifies as prameya . It inquires into the relationship between validity ( prāmāṇya ), reliability ( avisaṃvāda ) and causal efficacy ( arthakriyā ) and suggests that (...)
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  • Dharmakīrti and His Commentators on the Process of Perceptual Activities.Jeson Woo - 2019 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 47 (1):31-48.
    In the tradition of Dharmakīrti, perception is, by definition, free from conceptual construction. Insofar as perception is thus, it lacks the nature of determining its object. Without identifying its object, how does perception lead one to a successful action? Perception in isolation would not be pramāṇa unless it is supplemented by perceptual judgement. This paper looks at how Dharamkīrti and his commentators offer solutions to the contradiction between perception’s foundational role and its seeming dependence on conceptual construction. The key point (...)
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  • Dharmakīrti.Tom Tillemans - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Mind in Indian Buddhist Philosophy.Christian Coseru - 2009 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Perhaps no other classical philosophical tradition, East or West, offers a more complex and counter-intuitive account of mind and mental phenomena than Buddhism. While Buddhists share with other Indian philosophers the view that the domain of the mental encompasses a set of interrelated faculties and processes, they do not associate mental phenomena with the activity of a substantial, independent, and enduring self or agent. Rather, Buddhist theories of mind center on the doctrine of no-self (Pāli anatta, Skt.[1] anātma), which postulates (...)
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