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  1. Reprint Of: A More General General Proof Theory.Heinrich Wansing - 2017 - Journal of Applied Logic 25:23-46.
    In this paper it is suggested to generalize our understanding of general (structural) proof theory and to consider it as a general theory of two kinds of derivations, namely proofs and dual proofs. The proposal is substantiated by (i) considerations on assertion, denial, and bi-lateralism, (ii) remarks on compositionality in proof-theoretic semantics, and (iii) comments on falsification and co-implication. The main formal result of the paper is a normal form theorem for the natural deduction proof system N2Int of the bi-intuitionistic (...)
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  • Bilateralist Detours: From Intuitionist to Classical Logic and Back.Nils Kürbis - 2017 - Logique Et Analyse 60 (239):301-316.
    There is widespread agreement that while on a Dummettian theory of meaning the justified logic is intuitionist, as its constants are governed by harmonious rules of inference, the situation is reversed on Huw Price's bilateralist account, where meanings are specified in terms of primitive speech acts assertion and denial. In bilateral logics, the rules for classical negation are in harmony. However, as it is possible to construct an intuitionist bilateral logic with harmonious rules, there is no formal argument against intuitionism (...)
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  • Bilateralism Does Not Provide a Proof Theoretic Treatment of Classical Logic.Michael Gabbay - 2017 - Journal of Applied Logic 25:S108-S122.
    In this short paper I note that a key metatheorem does not hold for the bilateralist inferential framework: harmony does not entail consistency. I conclude that the requirement of harmony will not suffice for a bilateralist to maintain a proof theoretic account of classical logic. I conclude that a proof theoretic account of meaning based on the bilateralist framework has no natural way of distinguishing legitimate definitional inference rules from illegitimate ones (such as those for tonk). Finally, as an appendix (...)
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