Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Comparing More Revision and Fixed-Point Theories of Truth.Qiqing Lin & Hu Liu - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (4):615-671.
    Kremer presented three approaches of comparing fixed-point and revision theories of truth in Kremer, 363–403, 2009). Using these approaches, he established the relationships among ten fixed-point theories suggested by Kripke in, 690–716, 1975) and three revision theories presented by Gupta and Belnap in. This paper continues Kremer’s work. We add five other revision theories to the comparisons, including the theory proposed by Gupta in, 1–60, 1982), the theory proposed by Herzberger in, 61–102, 1982), the theory based on fully-varied revision sequences (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Revision Without Revision Sequences: Circular Definitions.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):57-85.
    The classical theory of definitions bans so-called circular definitions, namely, definitions of a unary predicate P, based on stipulations of the form $$Px =_{\mathsf {Df}} \phi,$$where ϕ is a formula of a fixed first-order language and the definiendumP occurs into the definiensϕ. In their seminal book The Revision Theory of Truth, Gupta and Belnap claim that “General theories of definitions are possible within which circular definitions [...] make logical and semantic sense” [p. IX]. In order to sustain their claim, they (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):1-9.
  • Revision Without Revision Sequences: Self-Referential Truth.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):523-551.
    The model of self-referential truth presented in this paper, named Revision-theoretic supervaluation, aims to incorporate the philosophical insights of Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth into the formal framework of Kripkean fixed-point semantics. In Kripke-style theories the final set of grounded true sentences can be reached from below along a strictly increasing sequence of sets of grounded true sentences: in this sense, each stage of the construction can be viewed as an improvement on the previous ones. I want to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Alternative Ways for Truth to Behave When There’s No Vicious Reference.Stefan Wintein - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):665-690.
    In a recent paper, Philip Kremer proposes a formal and theory-relative desideratum for theories of truth that is spelled out in terms of the notion of ‘no vicious reference’. Kremer’s Modified Gupta-Belnap Desideratum (MGBD) reads as follows: if theory of truth T dictates that there is no vicious reference in ground model M, then T should dictate that truth behaves like a classical concept in M. In this paper, we suggest an alternative desideratum (AD): if theory of truth T dictates (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • How Truth Behaves When There’s No Vicious Reference.Philip Kremer - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (4):345-367.
    In The Revision Theory of Truth (MIT Press), Gupta and Belnap (1993) claim as an advantage of their approach to truth "its consequence that truth behaves like an ordinary classical concept under certain conditions—conditions that can roughly be characterized as those in which there is no vicious reference in the language." To clarify this remark, they define Thomason models, nonpathological models in which truth behaves like a classical concept, and investigate conditions under which a model is Thomason: they argue that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • A Unified Theory of Truth and Paradox.Lorenzo Rossi - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (2):209-254.
    The sentences employed in semantic paradoxes display a wide range of semantic behaviours. However, the main theories of truth currently available either fail to provide a theory of paradox altogether, or can only account for some paradoxical phenomena by resorting to multiple interpretations of the language. In this paper, I explore the wide range of semantic behaviours displayed by paradoxical sentences, and I develop a unified theory of truth and paradox, that is a theory of truth that also provides a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Truth is Sometimes Simple.Philip Kremer - manuscript
    Philip Kremer, Department of Philosophy, McMaster University Note: The following version of this paper does not contain the proofs of the stated theorems. A longer version, complete with proofs, is forthcoming. §1. Introduction. In "The truth is never simple" and its addendum, Burgess conducts a breathtakingly comprehensive survey of the complexity of the set of truths which arise when you add a truth predicate to arithmetic, and interpret that predicate according to the fixed point semantics or the revision-theoretic semantics for (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Does Truth Behave Like a Classical Concept When There is No Vicious Reference?Philip Kremer - unknown
    §1. Introduction. When truth-theoretic paradoxes are generated, two factors seem to be at play: the behaviour that truth intuitively has; and the facts about which singular terms refer to which sentences, and so on. For example, paradoxicality might be partially attributed to the contingent fact that the singular term, "the italicized sentence on page one", refers to the sentence, The italicized sentence on page one is not true. Factors of this second kind might be represented by a ground model: an (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Formal Representations of Dependence and Groundedness.Edoardo Rivello - 2020 - Review of Symbolic Logic 13 (1):105-140.
    We study, in an abstract and general framework, formal representations of dependence and groundedness which occur in semantic theories of truth. Our goals are: (a) to relate the different ways in which groundedness is defined according to the way dependence is represented; and (b) to represent different notions of dependence as instances of a suitable generalisation of the mathematical notion of functional dependence.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Contraction and Revision.Shawn Standefer - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (3):58-77.
    An important question for proponents of non-contractive approaches to paradox is why contraction fails. Zardini offers an answer, namely that paradoxical sentences exhibit a kind of instability. I elaborate this idea using revision theory, and I argue that while instability does motivate failures of contraction, it equally motivates failure of many principles that non-contractive theorists want to maintain.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations