Switch to: References

Citations of:

Naming and Necessity

Critica 17 (49):69-71 (1985)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Binding Bound Variables in Epistemic Contexts.Brian Rabern - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-31.
    Quine insisted that the satisfaction of an open modalised formula by an object depends on how that object is described. Kripke’s "objectual" interpretation of quantified modal logic, whereby variables are rigid, is commonly thought to avoid these Quinean worries. Yet there remain residual Quinean worries in the epistemic case. Theorists have recently been toying with assignment-shifting treatments of epistemic contexts. On such views an epistemic operator ends up binding all the variables in its scope. One might worry that this yields (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Austerity Framework and Semantic Normativity.Mark Pinder - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-19.
    According to Herman Cappelen’s Austerity Framework, conceptual engineering doesn’t involve concepts, and barely involves engineering. I begin by raising two objections to the Austerity Framework as it stands: the framework cannot account for important normative aspects of conceptual engineering; and it doesn’t give us an adequate response to Strawson-style objections that conceptual engineering serves only to change the subject. I then supplement the Austerity Framework with an account of semantic normativity, which builds on the speaker/semantic meaning distinction, and show that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Ontology of Words: A Structural Approach.Ryan M. Nefdt - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-35.
    ABSTRACTWords form a fundamental basis for our understanding of linguistic practice. However, the precise ontology of words has eluded many philosophers and linguists. A persistent difficulty for most accounts of words is the type-token distinction [Bromberger, S. 1989. “Types and Tokens in Linguistics.” In Reflections on Chomsky, edited by A. George, 58–90. Basil Blackwell; Kaplan, D. 1990. “Words.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume LXIV: 93–119]. In this paper, I present a novel account of words which differs from the atomistic and platonistic (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the Individuation of Words.James Miller - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-10.
    The idea that two words can be instances of the same word is a central intuition in our conception of language. This fact underlies many of the claims that we make about how we communicate, and how we understand each other. Given this, irrespective of what we think words are, it is common to think that any putative ontology of words, must be able to explain this feature of language. That is, we need to provide criteria of identity for word-types (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On Pictorially Mediated Mind-Object Relations.Jessica Pepp - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-29.
    ABSTRACTWhen I see a tree through my window, that particular worldly tree is said to be ‘in’, ‘on’, or ‘before’ my mind. My ordinary visual link to it is ‘intentional’. How similar to this link are the links between me and particular worldly trees when I see them in photographs, or in paintings? Are they, in some important sense, links of the same kind? Or are they links of importantly different kinds? Or, as a third possibility, are they at once (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • How to Infer What Persistent Things Are Up to – a Fregean Puzzle for Traditional Fregeans.Johan Gersel - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-30.
    ABSTRACTHow do we inferentially unify separately acquired empirical information into a single comprehensive picture of the lives of persistent particulars? This paper argues that hidden in such inferences is a Fregean puzzle that can only be solved by individuating our demonstratives thoughts in terms of object-dependent Fregean Senses. I begin by characterizing some constraints on a non-skeptical account of our inferential unification of empirical information. I then go on to show that traditional Fregean views of Sense cannot explain the rationality (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Every Performance Is a Stage: Musical Stage Theory as a Novel Account for the Ontology of Musical Works.Caterina Moruzzi - 2018 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 76 (3):341-351.
    This paper defends Musical Stage Theory as a novel account of the ontology of musical works. Its main claim is that a musical work is a performance. The significance of this argument is twofold. First, it demonstrates the availability of an alternative, and ontologically tenable, view to well-established positions in the current debate on musical metaphysics. Second, it shows how the revisionary approach of Musical Stage Theory actually provides a better account of the ontological status of musical works.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Non-Epicurean Desires.Fabien Schang - 2016 - Filosofia Unisinos 17 (1):63-68.
    In this paper, it is argued that there can be necessary and non-natural desires. After a discussion about what seems wrong with such desires, Epicurus’ classification of desires is treated similarly to Kripke’s treatment of the Kantian table of judgments. A sample of three cases is suggested to make this point.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Compositionality and the Prospect of a Pluralistic Semantic Theory.Adam C. Podlaskowski - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):325-339.
    A semantic theory is committed to semantic monism just in case every particular semantic property posited by the theory is a member of the same kind. The commitment to semantic monism appears to draw some support from the need to provide a compositional semantics, since taking a single kind of semantic property as key to a semantic theory affords a uniform pattern on the basis of which the meaning of any given sentence can be compositionally determined. This line of support (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Mental Files, Concepts, and Bodies of Information.Poong Lee - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3499-3518.
    In this paper, I argue that mental files are both concepts and bodies of information, against the existing views proposed by Fodor and Recanati. Fodor argues that mental files are not concepts but memories of information because concepts are mental symbols. However, Fodor’s argument against the identification of mental files with concepts fails. Recanati disagrees with Fodor and argues that mental files are concepts. But Recanati’s view does not differ essentially from Fodor’s because Recanati holds that mental files are simple (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Mental Files and Naïve Semantic Accounts of Substitution Failure.Mayank Bora - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-25.
    Ever since Kripke’s influential arguments against descriptivism philosophers have attempted to provide solutions to Frege’s puzzle of substitution failure that adhere to Naïve Semantics—the view that names contribute their referents and referents alone to propositions expressed by sentences containing them. Recently, philosophers have also appealed to psychological objects called mental files, which are used to represent and store information on individuals, in solving the puzzle. Combining the two promises to revive a simple commonsensical theory while, at least prima facie, doing (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • How to Pick Out a Dragon: Fiction and the Selection Problem.Fredrik Haraldsen - forthcoming - Topoi:1-12.
    Non-actualist theories promise straightforward accounts of meaning, truth and reference of fictional discourse but are ostensibly saddled with a Selection Problem, that multiple possible candidates satisfy the role-descriptions associated with names used in fictions and no principled way to distinguish between them; yet if names are referential, there can only be one referent. The problem is often taken to be a serious—even decisive—obstacle for non-actualism, and the aim of this article is to show that the challenge can be met. I (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Towards a Pluralist Theory of Singular Thought.Michele Palmira - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3947-3974.
    This paper investigates the question of how to correctly capture the scope of singular thinking. The first part of the paper identifies a scope problem for the dominant view of singular thought maintaining that, in order for a thinker to have a singular thought about an object o, the thinker has to bear a special epistemic relation to o. The scope problem has it is that this view cannot make sense of the singularity of our thoughts about objects to which (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The No Reason Thesis.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1989 - Social Philosophy and Policy 7 (1):1.
    Moral theorists often say such things as “But surely A ought to do such and such,” or “Plainly it is morally permissible for B to do so and so,” and do not even try to prove that those judgments are true. Moreover, they often rest weight on the supposition that those judgments are true. In particular, they often rest theories on them: they take them as data. Others object. They say that nobody is entitled to rest any weight at all (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • In Defence of Narrow Content.Anandi Hattiangadi - forthcoming - Analysis:anz029.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Causal Metaphor Account of Metaphysical Explanation.Jonathan Shaheen - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):553-578.
    This paper argues that the semantic facts about ‘because’ are best explained via a metaphorical treatment of metaphysical explanation that treats causal explanation as explanation par excellence. Along the way, it defends a commitment to a unified causal sense of ‘because’ and offers a proprietary explanation of grounding skepticism. With the causal metaphor account of metaphysical explanation on the table, an extended discussion of the relationship between conceptual structure and metaphysics ends with a suggestion that the semantic facts about ‘because’ (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Formed Matter Without Objects: A Reply to Denkel.Alan Sidelle - 1991 - Dialogue 30 (1-2):163-.
    A reply to Arda Denkel's argument that it is not possible to have matter without objects. I argue that the argument assumes that having a 'form' is being sufficient for the existence of an object, which the opponent should not be thought to grant.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Consciousness From a First-Person Perspective.Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):702-726.
    This paper replies to the first 36 commentaries on my target article on “Is human information processing conscious?” (Behavioral and Brain Sciences,1991, pp.651-669). The target article focused largely on experimental studies of how consciousness relates to human information processing, tracing their relation from input through to output, while discussion of the implications of the findings both for cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind was relatively brief. The commentaries reversed this emphasis, and so, correspondingly, did the reply. The sequence of topics (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   119 citations  
  • Consciousness: Limited but Consequential.Timothy D. Wilson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):701-701.
  • No Conscious or Co-Conscious?Graham F. Wagstaff - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):700-700.
  • Consciousness May Still Have a Processing Role to Play.Robert Van Gulick - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):699-700.
  • Attention is Necessary for Word Integration.Geoffrey Underwood - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):698-698.
  • Damn! There Goes That Ghost Again!Keith E. Stanovich - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):696-698.
  • Dissociating Consciousness From Cognition.David Spiegel - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):695-696.
  • Developing Concepts of Consciousness.Aaron Sloman - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):694-695.
  • A Lawful First-Person Psychology Involving a Causal Consciousness: A Psychoanalytic Solution.Howard Shevrin - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):693-694.
  • Isn't the First-Person Perspective a Bad Third-Person Perspective?W. Schaeken & G. D'Ydewalle - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):692-693.
  • A Limitation of the Reflex-Arc Approach to Consciousness.J. Steven Reznick & Philip David Zelazo - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):692-692.
  • Reasons for Doubting the Existence of Even Epiphenomenal Consciousness.Georges Rey - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):691-692.
  • Epi-Arguments for Epiphenomenalism.Bruce Mangan - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):689-690.
  • The Processing of Information is Not Conscious, but its Products Often Are.George Mandler - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):688-689.
  • Consciousness is King of the Neuronal Processors.William A. MacKay - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):687-688.
  • Consciousness: Only Introspective Hindsight?Dan Lloyd - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):686-687.
  • Conscious Functions and Brain Processes.Benjamin Libet - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):685-686.
  • Understanding Awareness at the Neuronal Level.Christof Koch & Francis Crick - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):683-685.
  • Is Consciousness Information Processing?Raymond Klein - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):683-683.
  • Velmans's Overfocused Perspective on Consciousness.Marcel Kinsbourne - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):682-683.
  • Consciousness, Analogy and Creativity.Mark T. Keane - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):682-682.
  • Limits of Preconscious Processing.Albrecht Werner Inhoff - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):680-681.
  • Epiphenomenalism and the Reduction of Experience.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):680-680.
  • Has Consciousness a Sharp Edge?Robert A. M. Gregson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):679-680.
  • What is the Relation Between Language and Consciousness?Jeffrey A. Gray - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):679-679.
  • Memory with and Without Recollective Experience.John M. Gardiner - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):678-679.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Dream Processing.David Foulkes - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):678-678.
  • Observing Protocol.Judith Economos - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):677-677.
  • Conscious Acts and Their Objects.Fred Dretske - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):676-677.
  • Hydrocephalus and “Misapplied Competence”: Awkward Evidence for or Against?N. F. Dixon - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):675-676.
  • On the Premature Demise of Causal Functions for Consciousness in Human Information Processing.Dale Dagenbach - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):675-675.
  • Consciousness and Making Choices.Raymond S. Corteen - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):674-674.