This open access book is a superb collection of some fifteen chapters inspired by Schroeder-Heister's groundbreaking work, written by leading experts in the field, plus an extensive autobiography and comments on the various contributions by Schroeder-Heister himself. For several decades, Peter Schroeder-Heister has been a central figure in proof-theoretic semantics, a field of study situated at the interface of logic, theoretical computer science, natural-language semantics, and the philosophy of language. -/- The chapters of which this book is composed discuss the (...) subject from a rich variety of angles, including the history of logic, the proper interpretation of logical validity, natural deduction rules, the notions of harmony and of synonymy, the structure of proofs, the logical status of equality, intentional phenomena, and the proof theory of second-order arithmetic. All chapters relate directly to questions that have driven Schroeder-Heister's own research agenda and to which he has made seminal contributions. The extensive autobiographical chapter not only provides a fascinating overview of Schroeder-Heister's career and the evolution of his academic interests but also constitutes a contribution to the recent history of logic in its own right, painting an intriguing picture of the philosophical, logical, and mathematical institutional landscape in Germany and elsewhere since the early 1970s. The papers collected in this book are illuminatingly put into a unified perspective by Schroeder-Heister's comments at the end of the book. Both graduate students and established researchers in the field will find this book an excellent resource for future work in proof-theoretic semantics and related areas. (shrink)

Cantor proved that no set has a bijection between itself and its power set. This is widely taken to have shown that there infinitely many sizes of infinite sets. The argument depends on the princip...

In this paper, I consider an argument for the claim that any satisfactory epistemology of mathematics will violate core tenets of naturalism, i.e. that mathematics cannot be naturalized. I find little reason for optimism that the argument can be effectively answered.

What is the source of logical and mathematical truth? This book revitalizes conventionalism as an answer to this question. Conventionalism takes logical and mathematical truth to have their source in linguistic conventions. This was an extremely popular view in the early 20th century, but it was never worked out in detail and is now almost universally rejected in mainstream philosophical circles. Shadows of Syntax is the first book-length treatment and defense of a combined conventionalist theory of logic and mathematics. It (...) argues that our conventions, in the form of syntactic rules of language use, are perfectly suited to explain the truth, necessity, and a priority of logical and mathematical claims, as well as our logical and mathematical knowledge. (shrink)

The volume includes twenty-five research papers presented as gifts to John L. Bell to celebrate his 60th birthday by colleagues, former students, friends and admirers. Like Bell’s own work, the contributions cross boundaries into several inter-related fields. The contributions are new work by highly respected figures, several of whom are among the key figures in their fields. Some examples: in foundations of maths and logic ; analytical philosophy, philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics and decision theory and foundations of economics. (...) Most articles are contributions to current philosophical debates, but contributions also include some new mathematical results, important historical surveys, and a translation by Wilfrid Hodges of a key work of arabic logic. (shrink)

Esta enciclopédia abrange, de uma forma introdutória mas desejavelmente rigorosa, uma diversidade de conceitos, temas, problemas, argumentos e teorias localizados numa área relativamente recente de estudos, os quais tem sido habitual qualificar como «estudos lógico-filosóficos». De uma forma apropriadamente genérica, e apesar de o território teórico abrangido ser extenso e de contornos por vezes difusos, podemos dizer que na área se investiga um conjunto de questões fundamentais acerca da natureza da linguagem, da mente, da cognição e do raciocínio humanos, bem (...) como questões acerca das conexões destes com a realidade não mental e extralinguística. A razão daquela qualificação é a seguinte: por um lado, a investigação em questão é qualificada como filosófica em virtude do elevado grau de generalidade e abstracção das questões examinadas (entre outras coisas); por outro, a investigação é qualificada como lógica em virtude de ser uma investigação logicamente disciplinada, no sentido de nela se fazer um uso intenso de conceitos, técnicas e métodos provenientes da disciplina de lógica. O agregado de tópicos que constitui a área de estudos lógico-filosóficos é já visível, pelo menos em parte, no Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus de Ludwig Wittgenstein, uma obra publicada em 1921. E uma boa maneira de ter uma ideia sinóptica do território disciplinar abrangido por esta enciclopédia, ou pelo menos de uma porção substancial dele, é extrair do Tractatus uma lista dos tópicos mais salientes aí discutidos; a lista incluirá certamente tópicos do seguinte género, muitos dos quais se podem encontrar ao longo desta enciclopédia: factos e estados de coisas; objectos; representação; crenças e estados mentais; pensamentos; a proposição; nomes próprios; valores de verdade e bivalência; quantificação; funções de verdade; verdade lógica; identidade; tautologia; o raciocínio matemático; a natureza da inferência; o cepticismo e o solipsismo; a indução; as constantes lógicas; a negação; a forma lógica; as leis da ciência; o número. (shrink)

Approaching Infinity addresses seventeen paradoxes of the infinite, most of which have no generally accepted solutions. The book addresses these paradoxes using a new theory of infinity, which entails that an infinite series is uncompletable when it requires something to possess an infinite intensive magnitude. Along the way, the author addresses the nature of numbers, sets, geometric points, and related matters. The book addresses the need for a theory of infinity, and reviews both old and new theories of infinity. It (...) discussing the purposes of studying infinity and the troubles with traditional approaches to the problem, and concludes by offering a solution to some existing paradoxes. (shrink)

In this article we study several reduction principles in the context of Simpson’s set theory ATR0S\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$ATR_{0}^{S}$$\end{document} and Kripke-Platek set theory KP (with infinity). Since ATR0S\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$ATR_{0}^{S}$$\end{document} is the set-theoretic version of ATR0 there is a direct link to second order arithmetic and the results for reductions over ATR0S\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$ATR_{0}^{S}$$\end{document} are as expected and more or less (...) straightforward. However, over KP we obtain several interesting new results and are lead to some open questions. (shrink)

We discuss a problem asked by E. van Douwen and A. Miller [5] in various forcing models.

The notion of an entangled linear order gives a useful method to construct counter examples for such problems as the productivity of chain conditions, the square bracket partition relation and the existence of a large size monotonic subfunction. In particular, if there exists and ℵ1-entangled linear order then some consequences ofMA ℵ 1 or of wOCA fail. So, in which model ofZFC does an ℵ1-entangled linear order exist? Todorcevic [6] has shown if cf2ℵ 0=ω1 then there is an ℵ1-entangled linear (...) order of size ℵ1. And it is widely known that adding κ many Cohen reals adds such a linear order of size κ. In this note it is shown that adding asingle Cohen real is sufficient to get a maximal size ℵ1-entangled linear order. (shrink)

We introduce a property of forcing notions, called the anti-, which comes from Aronszajn trees. This property canonically defines a new chain condition stronger than the countable chain condition, which is called the property . In this paper, we investigate the property . For example, we show that a forcing notion with the property does not add random reals. We prove that it is consistent that every forcing notion with the property has precaliber 1 and for forcing notions with the (...) property fails. This negatively answers a part of one of the classical problems about implications between fragments of. (shrink)

In this article the problem of unification of mathematical theories is discussed. We argue, that specific problems arise here, which are quite different than the problems in the case of empirical sciences. In particular, the notion of unification depends on the philosophical standpoint. We give an analysis of the notion of unification from the point of view of formalism, Gödel's platonism and Quine's realism. In particular we show, that the concept of “having the same object of study” should be made (...) precise in the case of mathematical theories. In the appendix we give a working proposal of a certain understanding of this notion. (shrink)

In this article I discuss the 'procedural postulationist' view of mathematics advanced by Kit Fine in a recent paper. I argue that he has not shown that this view provides an avenue to knowledge of mathematical truths, at least if such truths are objective truths. In particular, more needs to be said about the criteria which constrain which types of entities can be postulated. I also argue that his reliance on second-order quantification means that his background logic is not free (...) of ontological commitment and that his doctrine of 'creative expansion' only makes sense from a radically anti-realist perspective. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore the role of syntactic representations in set theory. We highlight a common inferential scheme in set theory, which we call the Syntactic Representation Inferential Scheme, in which the set theorist infers information about a concept based on the way that concept can be represented syntactically. However, the actual syntactic representation is only indicated, not explicitly provided. We consider this phenomenon in relation to the derivation indicator position that asserts that the ordinary proofs given in mathematical (...) discourse indicate syntactic derivations in a formal logical system. In particular, we note that several of the arguments against the derivation indicator position would seem to imply that set theorists could gain no benefits from the syntactic representations of concepts indicated by their definitions, yet set theorists clearly do. (shrink)

This paper begins an axiomatic development of naive set theoryin a paraconsistent logic. Results divide into two sorts. There is classical recapture, where the main theorems of ordinal and Peano arithmetic are proved, showing that naive set theory can provide a foundation for standard mathematics. Then there are major extensions, including proofs of the famous paradoxes and the axiom of choice (in the form of the well-ordering principle). At the end I indicate how later developments of cardinal numbers will lead (...) to Cantor’s theorem, the existence of large cardinals, and a counterexample to the continuum hypothesis. (shrink)

Traditional models of mathematical proof describe proofs as sequences of assertion where each assertion is a claim about mathematical objects. However, Tanswell observed that in practice, many proofs do not follow these models. Proofs often contain imperatives, and other instructions for the reader to perform mathematical actions. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of instructions in proofs by systematically analyzing how instructions are used in Kunen’s Set theory: An introduction to independence proofs, a widely used graduate (...) text in set theory. I use Kunen’s text to describe how instructions and constructions in proof work in mathematical practice and explore epistemic consequences of how proofs are read and understood. (shrink)

This essay clarifies quantifier variance and uses it to provide a theory of indefinite extensibility that I call the variance theory of indefinite extensibility. The indefinite extensibility response to the set-theoretic paradoxes sees each argument for paradox as a demonstration that we have come to a different and more expansive understanding of ‘all sets’. But indefinite extensibility is philosophically puzzling: extant accounts are either metasemantically suspect in requiring mysterious mechanisms of domain expansion, or metaphysically suspect in requiring nonstandard assumptions about (...) mathematical objects. Happily, the view of quantifier meanings that underwrites quantifier variance can be used to provide an account of indefinite extensibility that is both metasemantically and metaphysically satisfying. Section 1 introduces the puzzle of indefinite extensibility; section 2 develops and clarifies the metasemantics of quantifier variance; section 3 solves section 1's puzzle of indefinite extensibility by applying section 2's account of quantifier meanings; and section 4 compares the theory developed in section 3 to several other theories in the literature. (shrink)

In many ontological debates there is a familiar challenge. Consider a debate over X s. The “small” or anti-X side tries to show that they can paraphrase the pro-X or “big” side’s claims without any loss of expressive power. Typically though, when the big side adds whatever resources the small side used in their paraphrase, the symmetry breaks down. The big side plus small’s resources is a more expressively powerful and thus more theoretically fruitful theory. In this paper, I show (...) that there is a very general solution to this problem, for the small side. Assuming the resources of set theory, small can successfully paraphrase big. This result depends on a theorem about models of set theory with urelements. After proving this theorem, I discuss some of its philosophical ramifications. (shrink)

Conventionalism about mathematics claims that mathematical truths are true by linguistic convention. This is often spelled out by appealing to facts concerning rules of inference and formal systems, but this leads to a problem: since the incompleteness theorems we’ve known that syntactic notions can be expressed using arithmetical sentences. There is serious prima facie tension here: how can mathematics be a matter of convention and syntax a matter of fact given the arithmetization of syntax? This challenge has been pressed in (...) the literature by Hilary Putnam and Peter Koellner. In this paper I sketch a conventionalist theory of mathematics, show that this conventionalist theory can meet the challenge just raised , and clarify the type of mathematical pluralism endorsed by the conventionalist by introducing the notion of a semantic counterpart. The paper’s aim is an improved understanding of conventionalism, pluralism, and the relationship between them. (shrink)

Starting with a λ-supercompact cardinal κ, where λ is a regular cardinal greater than or equal to κ, we produce a model with a stationary subset S of such that , the ideal generated by the non-stationary ideal over together with , is λ+-saturated. Using this model we prove the consistency of the existence of such a stationary set together with the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis . We also show that in our model we can make -saturated, where S is the (...) set of all such that , the order type of x, is a regular cardinal and x is stationary in sup. Furthermore we construct a model where is κ+-saturated but GCH fails. We show that if SS is stationary in , then S can be split into λ many disjoint stationary subsets. (shrink)

We show that the notion of cardinality of a set is independent from that of wellordering, and that reasonable total notions of cardinality exist in every model of ZF where the axiom of choice fails. Such notions are either definable in a simple and natural way, or non-definable, produced by forcing. Analogous cardinality notions exist in nonstandard models of arithmetic admitting nontrivial automorphisms. Certain motivating phenomena from quantum mechanics are also discussed in the Appendix.

We give a characterization of extendibility in terms of embeddings between the structures H λ . By that means, we show that the GCH can be forced (by a class forcing) while preserving extendible cardinals. As a corollary, we argue that such cardinals cannot in general be made indestructible by (set) forcing, under a wide variety of forcing notions.

We give an overview of a research line concentrated on finding to which extent compactness fails at the level of first uncountable cardinal and to which extent it could be recovered on some other perhaps not so large cardinal. While this is of great interest to set theorists, one of the main motivations behind this line of research is in its applicability to other areas of mathematics. We give some details about this and we expose some possible directions for further (...) research. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper I investigate how conceptual engineering applies to mathematical concepts in particular. I begin with a discussion of Waismann’s notion of open texture, and compare it to Shapiro’s modern usage of the term. Next I set out the position taken by Lakatos which sees mathematical concepts as dynamic and open to improvement and development, arguing that Waismann’s open texture applies to mathematical concepts too. With the perspective of mathematics as open-textured, I make the case that this allows us (...) to deploy the tools of conceptual engineering in mathematics. I will examine Cappelen’s recent argument that there are no conceptual safe spaces and consider whether mathematics constitutes a counterexample. I argue that it does not, drawing on Haslanger’s distinction between manifest and operative concepts, and applying this in a novel way to set-theoretic foundations. I then set out some of the questions that need to be engaged with to establish mathematics as involving a kind of conceptual engineering. I finish with a case study of how the tools of conceptual engineering will give us a way to progress in the debate between advocates of the Universe view and the Multiverse view in set theory. (shrink)

Sureson, C., Symmetric submodels of a Cohen generic extension, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 58 247–261. We study some symmetric submodels of a Cohen generic extension and the satisfaction of several properties ) which strongly violate the axiom of choice.

Let ${{\mathcal J}\,(\mathbb M^2)}$ denote the σ-ideal associated with two-dimensional Miller forcing. We show that it is relatively consistent with ZFC that the additivity of ${{\mathcal J}\,(\mathbb M^2)}$ is bigger than the covering number of the ideal of the meager subsets of ω ω. We also show that Martin’s Axiom implies that the additivity of ${{\mathcal J}\,(\mathbb M^2)}$ is 2 ω .Finally we prove that there are no analytic infinite maximal antichains in any finite product of ${\mathfrak{P}{(\omega)}/{\rm fin}}$.

In this paper, we study the relationship between the cofinalityc(Sym(ω)) of the infinite symmetric group and the minimal cardinality $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\thicksim}$}}{b} $$ of an unbounded familyF of ω ω.

We investigate the structure of the Medvedev lattice as a partial order. We prove that every interval in the lattice is either finite, in which case it is isomorphic to a finite Boolean algebra, or contains an antichain of size $2^{2^{\aleph }0}$ , the size of the lattice itself. We also prove that it is consistent with ZFC that the lattice has chains of size $2^{2^{\aleph }0}$ , and in fact these big chains occur in every infinite interval. We also (...) study embeddings of lattices and algebras. We show that large Boolean algebras can be embedded into the Medvedev lattice as upper semilattices, but that a Boolean algebra can be embedded as a lattice only if it is countable. Finally we discuss which of these results hold for the closely related Muchnik lattice. (shrink)

We show that weakly compact cardinals are the smallest large cardinals k where k+ < k+ is impossible provided 0# does not exist. We also show that if k+Kc < k+ for some k being weakly compact , then there is a transitive set M with M ⊨ ZFC + “there is a strong cardinal”.

We show that weakly compact cardinals are the smallest large cardinals k where k+ < k+ is impossible provided 0# does not exist. We also show that if k+Kc < k+ for some k being weakly compact , then there is a transitive set M with M ⊨ ZFC + “there is a strong cardinal”.

We give a simplified treatment of revised countable support (RCS) forcing iterations, previously considered by Shelah (see [Sh, Chap. X]). In particular we prove the fundamental theorem of semi-proper forcing, which is due to Shelah: any RCS iteration of semi-proper posets is semi-proper.

We introduce an extension of the propositional calculus to include abstracts of predicates and quantifiers, employing a single rule along with a novel comprehension schema and a principle of extensionality, which are substituted for the Bernays postulates for quantifiers and the comprehension schemata of ZF and other set theories. We prove that it is consistent in any finite Boolean subset lattice. We investigate the antinomies of Russell, Cantor, Burali-Forti, and others, and discuss the relationship of the system to other set-theoretic (...) systems ZF, NBG, and NF. We discuss two methods of axiomatizing higher order quantification and abstraction, and then very briefly discuss the application of one of these methods to areas of mathematics outside of logic. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a view on set-theoretic ontology I call Universe-Indeterminism, according to which there is a unique but indeterminate universe of sets. I argue that Solomon Feferman’s work on semi-constructive set theories can be adapted to this project, and develop a philosophical motivation for a semi-constructive set theory closely based on Feferman’s but tailored to the Universe-Indeterminist’s viewpoint. I also compare the emergent Universe-Indeterminist view to some more familiar views on set-theoretic ontology.

A new research project has, quite recently, been launched to clarify how different, from systems in second order number theory extending ACA0, those in second order set theory extending NBG are. In this article, we establish the equivalence between Δ01-LFP\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Delta^1_0\mbox{\bf-LFP}}$$\end{document} and Δ01-FP\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Delta^1_0\mbox{\bf-FP}}$$\end{document}, which assert the existence of a least and of a fixed point, respectively, for positive elementary operators. Our proof also shows (...) the equivalence between ID1 and ID^1\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\widehat{\it ID}_1}$$\end{document}, both of which are defined in the standard way but with the starting theory PA replaced by ZFC. (shrink)

We prove that the Sacks forcing collapses the continuum onto ${\frak d}$ , answering the question of Carlson and Laver. Next we prove that if a proper forcing of the size at most continuum collapses $\omega_2$ then it forces $\diamondsuit_{\omega_{1}}$.

In this chapter, I consider some problems with naturalizing mathematics. More specifically, I consider how the two leading kinds of approach to naturalizing mathematics, to wit, Quinean indispensability‐based approaches and Maddy's Second Philosophical approach, seem to run afoul of constraints that any satisfactory naturalistic mathematics must meet. I then suggest that the failure of these kinds of approach to meet the relevant constraints indicates a general problem with naturalistic mathematics meeting these constraints, and thus with the project of naturalizing mathematics (...) itself. (shrink)

Penelope Maddy advances a purportedly naturalistic account of mathematical methodology which might be taken to answer the question 'What justifies axioms of set theory?' I argue that her account fails both to adequately answer this question and to be naturalistic. Further, the way in which it fails to answer the question deprives it of an analog to one of the chief attractions of naturalism. Naturalism is attractive to naturalists and nonnaturalists alike because it explains the reliability of scientific practice. Maddy's (...) account, on the other hand, appears to be unable to similarly explain the reliability of mathematical practice without violating one of its central tenets. (shrink)

König, Larson and Yoshinobu initiated the study of principles for guessing generalized clubs, and introduced a construction of a higher Souslin tree from the strong guessing principle.Complementary to the author’s work on the validity of diamond and non-saturation at the successor of singulars, we deal here with a successor of regulars. It is established that even the non-strong guessing principle entails non-saturation, and that, assuming the necessary cardinal arithmetic configuration, entails a diamond-type principle which suffices for the construction of a (...) higher Souslin tree.We also establish the consistency of GCH with the failure of the weakest form of generalized club guessing. This, in particular, settles a question from the original paper. (shrink)

In this note we consider subfamilies of the ideal s0 introduced by Marczewski-Szpilrajn and ideals sp0, l0 analogously defined using complete Laver trees and Laver trees respectively. We show that under some set-theoretical assumptions =c\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${cov=\mathfrak{c}}$$\end{document} for example) in every uncountable Polish space X every family A⊆s0\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal{A}\subseteq s_0}$$\end{document} covering X has a subfamily with s-nonmeasurable union. We show the consistency of cov=ω1 (...) \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${cov=\omega_1 < \mathfrak{c}}$$\end{document} with the existence of a partition A∈[s0]ω1\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal{A}\in[s_0]^{\omega_1}}$$\end{document} of the real line with a subfamily A′⊆A\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal{A}'\subseteq\mathcal{A}}$$\end{document} for which ⋃A′\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\bigcup\mathcal{A}'}$$\end{document} is s-nonmeasurable. We also show that it is relatively consistent with ZFC that ω1shrink)

In this paper, we endeavour to give a historically accurate presentation of how Leibniz understood his infinitesimals, and how he justified their use. Some authors claim that when Leibniz called them “fictions” in response to the criticisms of the calculus by Rolle and others at the turn of the century, he had in mind a different meaning of “fiction” than in his earlier work, involving a commitment to their existence as non-Archimedean elements of the continuum. Against this, we show that (...) by 1676 Leibniz had already developed an interpretation from which he never wavered, according to which infinitesimals, like infinite wholes, cannot be regarded as existing because their concepts entail contradictions, even though they may be used as if they exist under certain specified conditions—a conception he later characterized as “syncategorematic”. Thus, one cannot infer the existence of infinitesimals from their successful use. By a detailed analysis of Leibniz’s arguments in his De quadratura of 1675–1676, we show that Leibniz had already presented there two strategies for presenting infinitesimalist methods, one in which one uses finite quantities that can be made as small as necessary in order for the error to be smaller than can be assigned, and thus zero; and another “direct” method in which the infinite and infinitely small are introduced by a fiction analogous to imaginary roots in algebra, and to points at infinity in projective geometry. We then show how in his mature papers the latter strategy, now articulated as based on the Law of Continuity, is presented to critics of the calculus as being equally constitutive for the foundations of algebra and geometry and also as being provably rigorous according to the accepted standards in keeping with the Archimedean axiom. (shrink)

En este artículo se examinan algunas implicaciones del naturalismo matemático de P. Maddy como una concepción filosófica que permite superar las dificultades del ficcionalismo y el realismo fisicalista en matemáticas. Aparte de esto, la mayor virtud de tal concepción parece ser que resuelve el problema que plantea para la aplicabilidad de la matemática el no asumir la tesis de indispensabilidad de Quine sin comprometerse con su holismo confirmacional. A continuación, sobre la base de dificultades intrínsecas al programa de Maddy, exploramos (...) un camino naturalista mejor motivado, el enfoque cognitivista corporeizado, y sugerimos que él permite explicar de manera adecuada la postulación de ciertos cardinales grandes, en particular, la aceptación de conjuntos no-construibles. (shrink)

This essay defends the following two claims: (1) liraitation-of-size reasoning yields enough sets to meet the needs of most mathematicians; (2) set formation and mereological fusion share enough logical features to justify placing both in the genus composition (even when the components of a set are taken to be its members rather than its subsets).

We define , a square principle in the context of , and prove its consistency relative to ZFC by a directed-closed forcing and hence that it is consistent to have hold when κ is supercompact, whereas □κ is known to fail under this condition. The new principle is then extended to produce a principle with a non-reflection property. Another variation on is also considered, this one based on a family of club subsets of . Finally, a new square principle for (...) cardinals, denoted , is introduced. This principle is proved consistent with κ being supercompact. It is shown to yield a non-reflection result similar to that given by □κ. (shrink)

The interplay between ultrafilters and unbounded subsets of \ with the order \ of strict eventual domination is studied. Among the tools are special kinds of non-principal ultrafilters on \. These include simple P-points; that is, ultrafilters with a base that is well-ordered with respect to the reverse of the order \ of almost inclusion. It is shown that the cofinality of such a base must be either \, the least cardinality of \-unbounded set, or \, the least cardinality of (...) a \-cofinal set. The small uncountable cardinal \ is introduced. Consequences of \ and of \ are explored; in particular, both imply \. Here \ is the reaping number, and is also the least cardinality of a \-base for a free ultrafilter. Both of these inequalities are shown to occur if there exist simple P-points of different cofinalities and there exist simple \-points and \-points), but this is a long-standing open problem. Six axioms on nonprincipal ultrafilters on \ and the relationships between them are discussed along with various models of set theory in which one or more are known to hold. The strongest of these, Axiom 1, is that for every free ultrafilter \ and for every \-unbounded \-chain C of increasing functions in \, C is also unbounded in the ultraproduct \. The other axioms replace one or both quantifiers with “there exists.” The negation of Axiom 3 in a model provides a family of normal sequentially compact spaces whose product is not countably compact. The question of whether such a family exists in ZFC, even with “normal” weakened to “regular”, is a famous unsolved problem of set-theoretic topology, known as the Scarborough–Stone problem. (shrink)