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Epistemology and artificial intelligence.Gregory R. Wheeler & Luís Moniz Pereira - 2004 - Journal of Applied Logic 2 (4):469-493.details
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Conditionals and consequences.Gregory Wheeler, Henry E. Kyburg & Choh Man Teng - 2007 - Journal of Applied Logic 5 (4):638-650.details
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When adjunction fails.Choh Man Teng - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):501-510.details
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Petitio Principii: A Bad Form of Reasoning.Daniele Sgaravatti - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):fzt086.details
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Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.details
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Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
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Full Belief and Loose Speech.Sarah Moss - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (3):255-291.details
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Logical questions behind the lottery and preface paradoxes: lossy rules for uncertain inference.David Makinson - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):511-529.details
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Deductive closure.Isaac Levi - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):493-499.details
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This paper surely contains some errors.Brian Kim - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1013-1029.details
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How to expect a surprising exam.Brian Kim & Anubav Vasudevan - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3101-3133.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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The preface paradox revisited.Igor Douven - 2003 - Erkenntnis 59 (3):389 - 420.details
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The evidential support theory of conditionals.Igor Douven - 2008 - Synthese 164 (1):19-44.details
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A new solution to the paradoxes of rational acceptability.Igor Douven - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):391-410.details
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Non-adjunctive inference and classical modalities.Horacio Arló Costa - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (5/6):581 - 605.details
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First order extensions of classical systems of modal logic; the role of the Barcan schemas.Horacio Arló Costa - 2002 - Studia Logica 71 (1):87-118.details
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Is Dialetheism an Idealism? The Russellian Fallacy and the Dialetheist’s Dilemma.Francesco Berto - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (2):235–263.details
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A New Puzzle about Believed Fallibility.Yitzhak Benbaji - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (4):679-696.details
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Inference to the Best Contradiction?Sam Baron - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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The logic of Simpson’s paradox.Prasanta S. Bandyoapdhyay, Davin Nelson, Mark Greenwood, Gordon Brittan & Jesse Berwald - 2011 - Synthese 181 (2):185 - 208.details
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A New Puzzle about Believed Fallibility.Yitzhak Benbaji - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (4):679-696.details
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Simpson's Paradox and Causality.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Mark Greenwood, Don Dcruz & Venkata Raghavan - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (1):13-25.details
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Epistemic Paradox and the Logic of Acceptance.Michael J. Shaffer - 2013 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 25:337-353.details
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Full & Partial Belief.Konstantin Genin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 437-498.details
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A Resource-bounded Default Logic.Gregory Wheeler - 2004 - In J. Delgrande & T. Schaub (eds.), Proceedings of NMR 2004. AAAI.details
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V čom sa nemôžete mýliť?Igor Sedlár - 2011 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (3):351-362.details
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