Switch to: References

Citations of:

What luck is not

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):255 – 267 (2008)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Anti-Luck Epistemology and Pragmatic Encroachment.Duncan Pritchard - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):715-729.
    A distinctive approach to the theory of knowledge is described, known as anti-luck epistemology. The goal of the paper is to consider whether there are specific features of this proposal that entails that it is committed to pragmatic encroachment, such that whether one counts as having knowledge significantly depends on non-epistemic factors. In particular, the plausibility of the following idea is explored: that since pragmatic factors play an essential role when it comes to the notion of luck, then according to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Safety and Necessity.Niall J. Paterson - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-17.
    Can epistemic luck be captured by modal conditions such as safety from error? This paper answers ‘no’. First, an old problem is cast in a new light: it is argued that the trivial satisfaction associated with necessary truths and accidentally robust propositions is a symptom of a more general disease. Namely, epistemic luck but not safety from error is hyperintensional. Second, it is argued that as a consequence the standard solution to deal with this worry, namely the invocation of content (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • An Evolutionary Sceptical Challenge to Scientific Realism.Christophe de Ray - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    Evolutionary scepticism holds that the evolutionary account of the origins of the human cognitive apparatus has sceptical implications for at least some of our beliefs. A common target of evolutionary scepticism is moral realism. Scientific realism, on the other hand, is much less frequently targeted, though the idea that evolutionary theory should make us distrustful of science is by no means absent from the literature. This line of thought has received unduly little attention. I propose to remedy this by advancing (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Knowledge-Yielding Communication.Andrew Peet - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3303-3327.
    A satisfactory theory of linguistic communication must explain how it is that, through the interpersonal exchange of auditory, visual, and tactile stimuli, the communicative preconditions for the acquisition of testimonial knowledge regularly come to be satisfied. Without an account of knowledge-yielding communication this success condition for linguistic theorizing is left opaque, and we are left with an incomplete understanding of testimony, and communication more generally, as a source of knowledge. This paper argues that knowledge-yielding communication should be modelled on knowledge (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A Statistical Analysis of Luck.Isaac Wilhelm - 2018 - Synthese (2):1-19.
    A modal analysis of luck, due to Duncan Pritchard, has become quite popular in recent years. There are many reasons to like Pritchard’s analysis, but at least two compelling problems have been identified. So I propose an alternative analysis of luck based on the laws of statistical mechanics. The statistical analysis avoids the two problems facing Pritchard’s analysis, and it has many other attractive features.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Anti-Luck Epistemology, Pragmatic Encroachment, and True Belief.Nathan Ballantyne - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):485-503.
    Two common theses in contemporary epistemology are that ‘knowledge excludes luck’ and that knowledge depends on ‘purely epistemic’ factors. In this essay, I shall argue as follows: given some plausible assumptions, ‘anti-luck epistemology,’ which is committed to the fi rst thesis, implies the falsity of the second thesis. That is, I will argue that anti-luck epistemology leads to what has been called ‘pragmatic encroachment’ on knowledge. Anti-luck epistemologists hoping to resist encroachment must accept a controversial thesis about true belief or (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Epistemic Justification and Epistemic Luck.Job de Grefte - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3821-3836.
    Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists. But there are many internalism/externalism debates in epistemology, and it is not always clear how these debates relate to each other. In the present paper I investigate the relation between epistemic luck and prominent internalist and externalist accounts of epistemic justification. I argue that the dichotomy between internalist and externalist concepts of justification can be characterized in terms of epistemic (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • No Excuses: Performance Mistakes in Morality.Santiago Amaya & John M. Doris - 2015 - In Jens Clausen & Neil Levy (eds.), Handbook of Neuroethics. Springer. pp. 253-272.
    Philosophical accounts of moral responsibility are standardly framed by two platitudes. According to them, blame requires the presence of a moral defect in the agent and the absence of excuses. In this chapter, this kind of approach is challenged. It is argued that (a) people sometimes violate moral norms due to performance mistakes, (b) it often appears reasonable to hold them responsible for it, and (c) their mistakes cannot be traced to their moral qualities or to the presence of excuses. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • The Gettier-Illusion: Gettier-Partialism and Infallibilism.Stephen Hetherington - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):217-230.
    Could the standard interpretation of Gettier cases reflect a fundamental confusion? Indeed so. How well can epistemologists argue for the truth of that standard interpretation? Not so well. A methodological mistake is allowing them not to notice how they are simply (and inappropriately) being infallibilists when regarding Gettiered beliefs as failing to be knowledge. There is no Gettier problem that we have not merely created for ourselves by unwittingly being infallibilists about knowledge.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Luck and Interests.Nathan Ballantyne - 2012 - Synthese 185 (3):319-334.
    Recent work on the nature of luck widely endorses the thesis that an event is good or bad luck for an individual only if it is significant for that individual. In this paper, I explore this thesis, showing that it raises questions about interests, well-being, and the philosophical uses of luck. In Sect. 1, I examine several accounts of significance, due to Pritchard (2005), Coffman (2007), and Rescher (1995). Then in Sect. 2 I consider what some theorists want to ‘do’ (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Radical Epistemic Self-Sufficiency on Reed’s Long Road to Skepticism.Brian Ribeiro - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (4):789-793.
    Baron Reed has developed a new argument for skepticism: (1) contemporary epistemologists are all committed to two theses, fallibilism and attributabilism; unfortunately, (2) these two theses about knowledge are incompatible; therefore, (3) knowledge as conceived by contemporary epistemologists is impossible. In this brief paper I suggest that Reed's argument appears to rest on an understanding of attributabilism that is so strong (call it maximal attributabilism) that it's doubtful that many contemporary epistemologists actually embrace it. Nor does Reed offer any direct (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Anti-Luck Epistemology and Safety’s Discontents.Joseph Adam Carter - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (3):517-532.
    Anti-luck epistemology is an approach to analyzing knowledge that takes as a starting point the widely-held assumption that knowledge must exclude luck. Call this the anti-luck platitude. As Duncan Pritchard (2005) has suggested, there are three stages constituent of anti-luck epistemology, each which specifies a different philosophical requirement: these stages call for us to first give an account of luck; second, specify the sense in which knowledge is incompatible with luck; and finally, show what conditions must be satisfied in order (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Luck as an Epistemic Notion.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2010 - Synthese 176 (3):361-377.
    Many philosophers have argued that an event is lucky for an agent only if it was suitably improbable, but there is considerable disagreement about how to understand this improbability condition. This paper argues for a hitherto overlooked construal of the improbability condition in terms of the lucky agent’s epistemic situation. According to the proposed account, an event is lucky for an agent only if the agent was not in a position to know that the event would occur. It is also (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Anti-Luck Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.
    In this paper, I do three things. First, I offer an overview of an anti- luck epistemology, as set out in my book, Epistemic Luck. Second, I attempt to meet some of the main criticisms that one might level against the key theses that I propose in this work. And finally, third, I sketch some of the ways in which the strategy of anti- luck epistemology can be developed in new directions.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   158 citations  
  • A New Argument for Skepticism.Baron Reed - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):91 - 104.
    The traditional argument for skepticism relies on a comparison between a normal subject and a subject in a skeptical scenario: because there is no relevant difference between them, neither has knowledge. Externalists respond by arguing that there is in fact a relevant difference—the normal subject is properly situated in her environment. I argue, however, that there is another sort of comparison available—one between a normal subject and a subject with a belief that is accidentally true—that makes possible a new argument (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Neural phase: a new problem for the modal account of epistemic luck.Adam Michael Bricker - 2019 - Synthese (8):1-18.
    One of the most widely recognised intuitions about knowledge is that knowing precludes believing truly as a matter of luck. On Pritchard’s highly influential modal account of epistemic luck, luckily true beliefs are, roughly, those for which there are many close possible worlds in which the same belief formed in the same way is false. My aim is to introduce a new challenge to this account. Starting from the observation—as documented by a number of recent EEG studies—that our capacity to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Conclusive Reasons and Epistemic Luck.Tamar Lando - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):378-395.
    What is it to have conclusive reasons to believe a proposition P? According to a view famously defended by Dretske, a reason R is conclusive for P just in case [R would not be the case unless P were the case]. I argue that, while knowing that P is plausibly related to having conclusive reasons to believe that P, having such reasons cannot be understood in terms of the truth of this counterfactual condition. Simple examples show that it is possible (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Review of The Social Psychology of Morality. [REVIEW]Michael Klenk - 2016 - Metapsychology Online 20 (48):1-8.
    If you put chimpanzees from different communities together you can expect mayhem - they are not keen on treating each other nicely. There is closely related species of apes, however, whose members have countless encounters with unrelated specimen on a daily basis and yet almost all get through the day in one piece - that species is us, homo sapiens. But what makes us get along, most of the time? Morality as such is, perhaps surprisingly, not a mainstream research topic (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Does Folk Disagreement About Ambiguous Lucky Cases Warrant an Error Theory? A Response to Hales and Johnson.Jesse Hill - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (6):876-891.
    Steven Hales and Jennifer Johnson—building off their (2014) work as well as Hales (2015, 2016)—have recently conducted two studies in Philosophical Psychology (2018) that show that there is a relationship between optimism and folk assessments of luck. Hales and Johnson use these results to argue that there is no such thing as luck. Instead, they claim that the concept is highly subjective and a cognitive illusion and that what we are in need of is an error theory. After reviewing Hales (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Wittgenstein’s Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Sense Reconsidered.Cato Wittusen - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:259-274.
    This essay discusses Wittgenstein’s suggestion that we may speak of a distinction between a word’s primary and secondary senses. Instead of seeing the distinction merely as an example of a puzzling language use, many commentators have attempted to work out the distinction in terms of a supplement to a general theory of sense that they presume Wittgenstein developed in his later writings. I don’t think it is fair to ascribe such systematic aspirations to Wittgenstein.Indeed, Wittgenstein speaks explicitly of the distinction (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Misleading Dispositions and the Value of Knowledge.E. J. Coffman - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:241-258.
    Gettiered beliefs are those whose agents are subject to the kind of epistemologically significant luck illustrated by Gettier Cases. Provided that knowledge requires ungettiered belief, we can learn something about knowledge by figuring out how luck blocks it in Gettier Cases. After criticizing the most promising of the going approaches to gettiered belief—the Risk of False Belief Approach—, I explain and defend a new approach: the Risk of Misleading Dispositions Approach.Roughly, this view says that a belief is gettiered just in (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Kant’s Philosophy of Moral Luck.Samuel Kahn - 2021 - Sophia 60 (2):365-387.
    In the modern moral luck debate, Kant is standardly taken to be the enemy of moral luck. My goal in this paper is to show that this is mistaken. The paper is divided into six sections. In the first, I show that participants in the moral luck literature take moral luck to be anathema to Kantian ethics. In the second, I explain the kind of luck I am going to focus on here: consequence luck, a species of resultant luck. In (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On Luck and Modality.Jesse Hill - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-15.
    The modal account of luck is the predominant account of luck in epistemology and ethics. In the first half of this paper, I discuss three possible interpretations of the modal account and raise objections to each. I then raise an objection to all plausible versions of the modal account, that is, that whether an event is lucky or the extent to which it is a matter of luck will depend on what initial conditions or features of the event one holds (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • No Luck With Knowledge? On a Dogma of Epistemology.Peter Baumann - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):523-551.
    Current epistemological orthodoxy has it that knowledge is incompatible with luck. More precisely: Knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck . This is often treated as a truism which is not even in need of argumentative support. In this paper, I argue that there is lucky knowledge. In the first part, I use an intuitive and not very developed notion of luck to show that there are cases of knowledge which are “lucky” in that sense. In the second part, I look (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • Why Every Theory of Luck is Wrong.Steven D. Hales - 2016 - Noûs 50 (3):490-508.
    There are three theories of luck in the literature, each of which tends to appeal to philosophers pursuing different concerns. These are the probability, modal, and control views. I will argue that all three theories are irreparably defective; not only are there counterexamples to each of the three theories of luck, but there are three previously undiscussed classes of counterexamples against them. These are the problems of lucky necessities, skillful luck, and diachronic luck. I conclude that a serious reevaluation of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Pritchard Versus Pritchard on Luck.Job De Grefte - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (1-2):3-15.
    This paper argues for a particular account of luck by comparing two distinct versions of the modal account of luck that have been provided by Duncan Pritchard (2005, 2014). More specifically, it argues that there are three respects in which Pritchard’s earlier modal account of luck is preferable to his later account: it accounts better for the fact that luck comes in degrees, it includes a significance condition, and it better acknowledges the subjective nature of luck. The paper then discusses (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (3):436-461.
    In this article it is argued that the standard theoretical account of risk in the contemporary literature, which is cast along probabilistic lines, is flawed, in that it is unable to account for a particular kind of risk. In its place a modal account of risk is offered. Two applications of the modal account of risk are then explored. First, to epistemology, via the defence of an anti-risk condition on knowledge in place of the normal anti-luck condition. Second, to legal (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  • Luck as Risk and the Lack of Control Account of Luck.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (1):1-25.
    This essay explains the notion of luck in terms of risk. It starts by distinguishing two senses of risk, the risk that an event has of occurring and the risk at which an agent is with respect to an event. It cashes out the former in modal terms and the latter in terms of lack of control. It then argues that the presence or absence of event-relative risk marks a distinction between two types of luck or fortune commonly overlooked in (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • You Make Your Own Luck.Rachel McKinnon - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):558-577.
    This essay takes up two questions. First, what does it mean to say that someone creates her own luck? At least colloquially speaking, luck is conceived as something out of an agent's control. So how could an agent increase or decrease the likelihood that she'll be lucky? Building on some recent work on the metaphysics of luck, the essay argues that there is a sense in which agents can create their own luck because people with more skill tend to have (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • The Modal Account of Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):594-619.
    This essay offers a rearticulation and defence of the modal account of luck that the author developed in earlier work . In particular, the proposal is situated within a certain methodology, a component of which is paying due attention to the cognitive science literature on luck ascriptions. It is shown that with the modal account of luck properly articulated it can adequately deal with some of the problems that have recently been offered against it, and that the view has a (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   55 citations  
  • Subject‐Involving Luck.Joe Milburn - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):578-593.
    In recent years, philosophers have tended to think of luck as being a relation between an event and a subject; to give an account of luck is to fill in the right-hand side of the following biconditional: an event e is lucky for a subject S if and only if ____. We can call such accounts of luck subject-relative accounts of luck, since they attempt to spell out what it is for an event to be lucky relative to a subject. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Strokes of Luck.E. J. Coffman - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):477-508.
    This essay aims to reorient current theorizing about luck as an aid to our discerning this concept's true philosophical significance. After introducing the literature's leading theories of luck, it presents and defends counterexamples to each of them. It then argues that recent luck theorists’ main target of analysis—the concept of an event's being lucky for a subject—is parasitic on the more fundamental notion of an event's being a stroke of luck for a subject, which thesis serves as at least a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Luck, Knowledge, and “Mere” Coincidence.Wayne D. Riggs - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):627-639.
    There are good reasons for pursuing a theory of knowledge by way of understanding the connection between knowledge and luck. Not surprisingly, then, there has been a burgeoning of interest in “luck theories” of knowledge as well as in theories of luck in general. Unfortunately, “luck” proves to be as recalcitrant an analysandum as “knows.” While it is well worth pursuing a general theory of luck despite these difficulties, our theory of knowledge might be made more manageable if we could (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Getting Moral Luck Right.Lee John Whittington - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):654-667.
    Moral luck, until recently, has been understood either explicitly or implicitly through using a lack of control account of luck. For example, a case of resultant moral luck is a case where an agent is morally blameworthy or more morally blameworthy or praiseworthy for an outcome despite that outcome being significantly beyond that agent's control . Due to a shift in understanding the concept of luck itself in terms of modal robustness, however, other accounts of moral luck have surfaced. Both (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Getting Luck Properly Under Control.Rachel McKinnon - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (4):496-511.
    This article proposes a new account of luck and how luck impacts attributions of credit for agents' actions. It proposes an analogy with the expected value of a series of wagers and argues that luck is the difference between actual outcomes and expected value. The upshot of the argument is that when considering the interplay of intention, chance, outcomes, skill, and actions, we ought to be more parsimonious in our attributions of credit when exercising a skill and obtaining successful outcomes, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Medical Good Luck and Medical Bad Luck.G. V. Ramesh Prasad - 2020 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 26 (2):465-470.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Towards a Hybrid Account of Luck.Job Grefte - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):240-255.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Robust Virtue Epistemology As Anti‐Luck Epistemology: A New Solution.J. Adam Carter - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):140-155.
    Robust Virtue Epistemology maintains that knowledge is achieved just when an agent gets to the truth through, or because of, the manifestation of intellectual virtue or ability. A notorious objection to the view is that the satisfaction of the virtue condition will be insufficient to ensure the safety of the target belief; that is, RVE is no anti-luck epistemology. Some of the most promising recent attempts to get around this problem are considered and shown to ultimately fail. Finally, a new (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Does Luck Have a Place in Epistemology?Nathan Ballantyne - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1391-1407.
    Some epistemologists hold that exploration and elaboration of the nature of luck will allow us to better understand knowledge. I argue this is a mistake.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Luck, Propositional Perception, and the Entailment Thesis.Chris Ranalli - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1223-1247.
    Looking out the window, I see that it's raining outside. Do I know that it’s raining outside? According to proponents of the Entailment Thesis, I do. If I see that p, I know that p. In general, the Entailment Thesis is the thesis that if S perceives that p, S knows that p. But recently, some philosophers (McDowell 2002, Turri 2010, Pritchard 2011, 2012) have argued that the Entailment Thesis is false. On their view, we can see p and not (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • Extended Cognition and Epistemic Luck.J. Adam Carter - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4201-4214.
    When extended cognition is extended into mainstream epistemology, an awkward tension arises when considering cases of environmental epistemic luck. Surprisingly, it is not at all clear how the mainstream verdict that agents lack knowledge in cases of environmental luck can be reconciled with principles central to extended cognition.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Towards an Account of Epistemic Luck for Necessary Truths.James Collin - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (4):483-504.
    Modal epistemologists parse modal conditions on knowledge in terms of metaphysical possibilities or ways the world might have been. This is problematic. Understanding modal conditions on knowledge this way has made modal epistemology, as currently worked out, unable to account for epistemic luck in the case of necessary truths, and unable to characterise widely discussed issues such as the problem of religious diversity and the perceived epistemological problem with knowledge of abstract objects. Moreover, there is reason to think that this (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • A Problem for Pritchard’s Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.J. Adam Carter - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):253-275.
    Duncan Pritchard has, in the years following his (2005) defence of a safety-based account of knowledge in Epistemic Luck, abjured his (2005) view that knowledge can be analysed exclusively in terms of a modal safety condition. He has since (Pritchard in Synthese 158:277–297, 2007; J Philosophic Res 34:33–45, 2009a, 2010) opted for an account according to which two distinct conditions function with equal importance and weight within an analysis of knowledge: an anti-luck condition (safety) and an ability condition-the latter being (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Accidentally Doing the Right Thing.Zoe Johnson King - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):186-206.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Is the Folk Concept of Luck Normative?Mario Attie-Picker - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-35.
    Contemporary accounts of luck, though differing in pretty much everything, all agree that the concept of luck is descriptive as opposed to normative. This widespread agreement forms part of the framework in which debates in ethics and epistemology, where the concept of luck plays a central role, are carried out. The hypothesis put forward in the present paper is that luck attributions are sensitive to normative considerations. I report five experiments suggesting that luck attributions are influenced by the normative features (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Relations of Mutual Recognition: Transforming the Political Aspect of Autonomy.María Pía Méndez Mateluna - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Glasgow
    Being autonomous depends on the kind of relations we enjoy in the different domains of our lives, but the impact of decision-making and the power exercise that takes place in the political sphere, makes political relations crucial to our development and enjoyment of autonomy. This dissertation develops a novel view of political participation by interrogating its connection to our personal autonomy. According to this view, our political relations are partially constitutive of our personal autonomy, which in other words means there (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):585-596.
    Although recent epistemology has been marked by several prominent disagreements – e.g., between foundationalists and coherentists, internalists and externalists – there has been widespread agreement that some form of fallibilism must be correct. According to a rough formulation of this view, it is possible for a subject to have knowledge even in cases where the justification or grounding for the knowledge is compatible with the subject’s being mistaken. In this paper, I examine the motivation for fallibilism before providing a fully (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Moral Luck as Moral Lack of Control.Mark B. Anderson - 2019 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):5-29.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • A Normative Account of Epistemic Luck.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):97-109.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark