The analyses of the mind–world relation offered by transcendental idealists such as Husserl have often been dismissed with the argument that they remain committed to an outdated form of internalism. The first move in this paper will be to argue that there is a tight link between Husserl’s transcendental idealism and what has been called phenomenological externalism, and that Husserl’s endorsement of the former commits him to a version of the latter. Secondly, it will be shown that key elements in (...) Husserl’s transcendental idealism, including his rejection of representationalism and metaphysical realism, is shared with a number of prominent contemporary defenders of an externalist view on the mind. Ultimately, however, it will be suggested that the very alternative between internalism and externalism—an alternative based on the division between inner and outer—might be inapplicable when it comes to phenomenological conceptions of the mind–world relation. (shrink)

Cristina Lafont's recent reading of Heidegger offers a powerful formulation of the widespread view that once one recognizes our `facticity' and the role of language in shaping it, there is no room left to talk about transcendental structures of meaning or experience. In this article I challenge this view. I argue that Lafont inaccurately conflates what Heidegger calls our `understanding of being' with that which language discloses. In order to show that the philosophical motivation for this conflation is unsound, I (...) also argue that Lafont's own positive theory of meaning itself tacitly assumes a distinction between factical and transcendental, and so rests on exactly what she finds problematic in Heidegger. This still leaves a puzzle as to how factical individuals are actually able to grasp anything transcendental, so I conclude by sketching Heidegger's method of `formal indication', which is meant to show precisely how this can be done. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Husserl—Heidegger relationship is systematically misunderstood when framed in terms of a distinction between internalism and externalism. Both philosophers, it is argued, employ the phenomenological reduction to immanence as a fundamental methodological instrument. After first outlining the assumptions regarding inner and outer and the individual and the social from which recent epistemological interpretations of phenomenology begin, I turn to the question of Husserl's internalism. I argue that Husserl can only be understood as an internalist on the (...) assumption that immanence equates with internal. This, however, is not the case as can be seen once the reduction is understood not as setting aside the existence of the world, but rather a reflection on its meaning. Turning to Heidegger, I argue that his commitment to a form of the phenomenological reduction precludes him from being either a semantic or a social externalist. The place of authenticity and the first person perspective in his work derive from his phenomenological commitments, which can be seen in his accounts of discourse and language and of falling (Verfallen). I then go on to briefly outline a more plausible basis for understanding the difference between Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenologies in terms of their respective emphases on logic and on poetics. (shrink)

Christina Lafont has argued that the early Heidegger's reflections on truth and understanding are incompatible with ‘the supposition of a single objective world’. This paper presents her argument, reviews some responses that the existing Heidegger literature suggests, and offers what I argue is a superior response. Building on a deeper exploration of just what the above ‘supposition’ demands, I argue that a crucial assumption that Lafont and Haugeland both accept must be rejected, namely, that different ‘understandings of Being’ can be (...) viewed as offering ‘rival perspectives’ on a common subject-matter. I develop this case by drawing on an alternative account of what a Heideggerian ‘understanding of Being’ might be like. (shrink)

O presente trabalho analisa a assimilação produtiva heideggeriana da retórica aristotélica que encontramos em suas lições de 1924, Conceitos fundamentais da filosofia aristotélica, e sua posterior repercussão nas análises do impessoal cotidiano e do falatório em Ser e tempo. Primeiro se apresentam as linhas básicas da interpretação do jovem Heidegger dos escritos práticos e políticos de Aristóteles. Em seguida se perfila com mais detalhe sua releitura com explicação ontológica da Retórica de Aristóteles, com especial atenção para o plano da comunicabilidade (...) das opiniões. E, finalmente, se mostram os aspectos positivos e negativos contidos no fenômeno do falatório analisado em Ser e tempo, um fenômeno que condensa boa parte das interpretações da retórica aristotélica. (shrink)

This paper argues that transcendental phenomenology (here represented by Edmund Husserl) can accommodate the main thesis of semantic externalism, namely, that intentional content is not simply a matter of what is ‘in the head,’ but depends on how the world is. I first introduce the semantic problem as an issue of how linguistic tokens or mental states can have ‘content’—that is, how they can set up conditions of satisfaction or be responsive to norms such that they can succeed or fail (...) at referring. The standard representationalist view—which thinks of the problem in first-person terms—is contrasted with Brandom’s pragmatic inferentialist approach, which adopts a third-person stance. The rest of the paper defends a phenomenological version of the representationalist position (seeking to preserve its first-person stance) but offers a conception of representation that does not identify it with an entity ‘in the head.’ The standard view of Husserl as a Cartesian internalist is undermined by rejecting its fundamental assumption—that Husserl’s concept of the ‘noema’ is a mental entity—and by defending a concept of ‘phenomenological immanence’ that has a normative, rather than a psychological, structure. Finally, it is argued that phenomenological immanence cannot be identified with ‘consciousness’ in Husserl’s sense, though consciousness is a necessary condition for it. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 48, Issue 2, pp 175 - 196 This article provides an analysis of the development of the notions of “self” and “nature” through three stages of Heidegger’s thought. The main contention is that Heidegger’s conceptions of the self and nature are indissolubly connected to each other, and that such connection appears through three concerns that represent important elements of continuity: 1) the “irreducibility of the self,” conceived in a non-subjectivist way; 2) the recovery of a non-objectivist “originary” (...) account of nature; 3) the overall commitment to the overcoming of the polarization between subject and object. I argue that there is a parallelism in the way self and nature are addressed in each of the three phases; and that the transformations of the notions are functional to the project of addressing the concerns mentioned earlier. I conclude by addressing the “violence of nature,” which remains a “blind spot” in the philosophy of the later Heidegger. (shrink)

Levinas is usually discussed as a philosopher wrestling with the nature of our experience of others, ethical obligation, and the divine. Unlike other phenomenologists, such as Husserl and Heidegger, he is not often mentioned in discussions about issues in philosophy of mind. His work in that area, especially on perception, is underappreciated. He gives an account of the nature of perceptual experience that is remarkable both in how it departs from that of others in the phenomenological tradition and for how (...) it fits in among presently available views about the nature of perceptual experience, namely, as a form of naïve realism. (shrink)

El presente trabajo analiza la productiva asimilación heideggeriana de la retórica aristotélica que encontramos en sus lecciones de 1924, Conceptos fundamentales de la filosofía aristotélica, y su posterior repercusión en los análisis del uno cotidiano y de la habladuría en Ser y tiempo. Primero se presentan las líneas básicas de la interpretación heideggeriana temprana de los escritos prácticos y políticos de Aristóteles (1). Luego se perfila con más detalle su relectura en clave ontológica de la Retórica de Aristóteles, prestando una (...) especial atención al plano de la comunicabilidad de las opiniones (2). Y, finalmente, se muestran los aspectos positivos y negativos contenidos en el fenómeno de la habladuría analizado en Ser y tiempo, un fenómeno que condensa buena parte de las interpretaciones de la retórica aristotélica (3). The present article analyses Heidegger's productive assimilation of the Aristotelian rhetoric, paying special attention to his lectures of 1924, Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy, and its later influence on the phenomenon of everydayness and the idle talk exposed in Being and Time. First, I outline Heidegger's early interpretation of Aristotle's politic and practical writings (1). Second, I show in more detail his ontological reading of Aristotle's Rhetoric, focusing on the sphere of communicability of opinions (2). And third, I describe the positive and negative aspects related to the phenomenon of idle talk sketched out in Being and Time, a phenomenon which condensates a good portion of his interpretations of Aristotelian rhetoric. (shrink)