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  1. On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on (...)
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  • Overworking the Hippocampus.Daniel C. Dennett - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):677-678.
    Gray mistakenly thinks I have rejected the sort of theoretical enterprise he is undertaking, because, according to him, I think that "more data" is all that is needed to resolve all the issues. Not at all. My stalking horse was the bizarre (often pathetic) claim that no amount of empirical, "third-person point-of-view" science (data plus theory) could ever reduce the residue of mystery about consciousness to zero. This "New Mysterianism" (Flanagan, 1991) is one that he should want to combat as (...)
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  • The Path Not Taken.Daniel Dennett - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):252-253.
    The differences Block attempts to capture with his putative distinction between P-consciousness and A-consciousness are more directly and perspicuously handled in terms of differences in richness of content and degree of influence. Block's critiques, based on his misbegotten distinction, evaporate on closer inspection.
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  • Consciousness Without Conflation.Anthony P. Atkinson & Martin Davies - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):248-249.
    Although information-processing theories cannot provide a full explanatory account of P-consciousness, there is less conflation and confusion in cognitive psychology than Block suspects. Some of the reasoning that Block criticises can be interpreted plausibly in the light of a folk psychological view of the relation between P-consciousness and A-consciousness.
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  • Is 'Mind' a Scientific Kind?Andy Clark - 1995 - In Philosophica. Taipei: Inst Euro-Amer Stud.
  • How Many Concepts of Consciousness?Ned Block - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):272-287.
  • Feeling of Knowing and Phenomenal Consciousness.Tiziana Zalla & Adriano P. Palma - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271-272.
  • More on Prosopagnosia.Andrew W. Young - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271-271.
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  • Should We Continue to Study Consciousness?Richard M. Warren - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):270-271.
  • Consciousness is Not a Natural Kind.J. van Brakel - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):269-270.
  • Blindsight, Orgasm, and Representational Overlap.Michael Tye - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):268-269.
  • What is an Agent That It Experiences P-Consciousness? And What is P-Consciousness That It Moves an Agent?Roger N. Shepard - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):267-268.
  • Block's Philosophical Anosognosia.G. Rey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):266-267.
  • Conscious and Nonconscious Control of Action.Antti Revonsuo - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):265-266.
  • How Access-Consciousness Might Be a Kind of Consiousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):264-265.
  • Phenomenal and Attentional Consciousness May Be Inextricable.Adam Morton - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):263-264.
  • We've Only Just Begun.William G. Lycan - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):262-263.
  • Phenomenal Access: A Moving Target.Joseph Levine - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):261-261.
  • Access Denied.Dan Lloyd - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):261-262.
  • Access and What It is Like.Bernard W. Kobes - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):260-260.
  • Triangulating Phenomenal Consciousness.Patricia Kitcher - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):259-260.
  • On Distinguishing Phenomenal Consciousness From the Representational Functions of Mind.Leonard D. Katz - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):258-259.
  • Blocking Out the Distinction Between Sensation and Perception: Superblindsight and the Case of Helen.Nicholas Humphrey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):257-258.
  • Phenomenal Fallacies and Conflations.Gilbert Harman - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):256-257.
  • Guilty Consciousness.George Graham - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):255-256.
  • Is Consciousness of Perception Really Separable From Perception?Martha J. Farah - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):254-255.
  • Breakthrough on the Consciousness Front or Much Ado About Nothing?N. F. Dixon - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):253-254.
  • Fallacies or Analyses?Jennifer Church - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):251--2.
    To demonstrate that a fallacy is committed, Block needs to convince us of two things: first, that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is distinct from that of access consciousness, and second, that it picks out a different property from that of access consciousness. I raise doubt about both of these claims, suggesting that the concept of a phenomenal property is the concept of a property to which we have a special sort of access.
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  • More Empirical Cases to Break the Accord of Phenomenal and Access-Consciousness.Talis Bachmann - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):249-251.
  • Evidence That Phenomenal Consciousness is the Same as Access Consciousness.Bernard J. Baars - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):249-249.
  • Perception-Consciousness and Action-Consciousness?D. M. Armstrong - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):247-248.
  • Consciousness and its (Dis)Contents.Jeffrey A. Gray - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):703-722.
    The first claim in the target article was that there is as yet no transparent, causal account of the relations between consciousness and brain-and-behaviour. That claim remains firm. The second claim was that the contents of consciousness consist, psychologically, of the outputs of a comparator system; the third consisted of a description of the brain mechanisms proposed to instantiate the comparator. In order to defend these claims against criticism, it has been necessary to clarify the distinction between consciousness-as-such and the (...)
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  • The Limits of Neuropsychological Models of Consciousness.Max Velmans - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):702-703.
    This commentary elaborates on Gray's conclusion that his neurophysiological model of consciousness might explain how consciousness arises from the brain, but does not address how consciousness evolved, affects behaviour or confers survival value. The commentary argues that such limitations apply to all neurophysiological or other third-person perspective models. To approach such questions the first-person nature of consciousness needs to be taken seriously in combination with third-person models of the brain.
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  • Consciousness Does Not Seem to Be Linked to a Single Neural Mechanism.Carlo Umiltà & Marco Zorzi - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):701-702.
  • On Giving a More Active and Selective Role to Consciousness.Frederick Toates - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):700-701.
  • Don't Leave the “Un” Off “Consciousness”.Neal R. Swerdlow - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):699-700.
  • Ultimate Differences.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):698-699.
  • The Homunculus at Home.J. David Smith - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):697-698.
  • Consciousness Beyond the Comparator.Victor A. Shames & Timothy L. Hubbard - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):697-697.
  • Communication and Consciousness: A Neural Network Conjecture.N. A. Schmajuk & E. Axelrad - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):695-696.
  • Prospects for a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness.Antti Revonsuo - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):694-695.
  • Unitary Consciousness Requires Distributed Comparators and Global Mappings.George N. Reeke - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):693-694.
  • The Elusive Quale.Howard Rachlin - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):692-693.
  • Reticular-Thalamic Activation of the Cortex Generates Conscious Contents.James Newman - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):691-692.
    Gray hypothesizes that the contents of consciousness correspond to the outputs of a subicular (hippocampal/temporal lobe) comparator that compares the current state of the organism's perceptual world with a predicted state. I argue that Gray has identified a key contributing system to conscious awareness, but that his model is inadequate for explaining how conscious contents are generated in the brain. An alternative model is offered.
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  • The Control of Consciousness Via a Neuropsychological Feedback Loop.Todd D. Nelson - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):690-691.
  • Comparators, Functions, and Experiences.Harold Merskey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):689-690.
  • Human Consciousness: One of a Kind.R. E. Lubow - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):689-689.
  • Correlating Mind and Body.T. J. Lioyd-Jones, N. Donnelly & B. Weekes - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):688-688.
  • Septohippocampal Comparator: Consciousness Generator or Attention Feedback Loop?Marcel Kinsbourne - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):687-688.