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  1. Types of Attention Matter for Awareness: A Study with Color Afterimages.Shruti Baijal & Narayanan Srinivasan - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (4):1039-1048.
    It has been argued that attention and awareness might oppose each other given that attending to an adapting stimulus weakens its afterimage. We argue instead that the type of attention guided by the spread of attention and the level of processing is critical and might result in differences in awareness using afterimages. Participants performed a central task with small, large, local or global letters and a blue square as an adapting stimulus in two experiments and indicated the onset and offset (...)
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  • A Mechanistic Theory of Consciousness.Michael S. A. Graziano & Taylor W. Webb - 2014 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 6 (2):163-176.
    Recently we proposed a theory of consciousness, the attention schema theory, based on findings in cognitive psychology and systems neuroscience. In that theory, consciousness is an internal model of attention or an "attention schema". Consciousness relates to attention in the same way that the internal model of the body, the "body schema", relates to the physical body. The body schema is used to model and help control the body. The attention schema is used to model and help regulate attention, a (...)
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  • ‘That’ Response Doesn't Work: Against a Demonstrative Defense of Conceptualism.Adina L. Roskies - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):112-134.
  • Perceiving the Present: Systematization of Illusions or Illusion of Systematization?Robert E. Briscoe - 2010 - Cognitive Science 34 (8):1530-1542.
    Mark Changizi et al. (2008) claim that it is possible systematically to organize more than 50 kinds of illusions in a 7 × 4 matrix of 28 classes. This systematization, they further maintain, can be explained by the operation of a single visual processing latency correction mechanism that they call “perceiving the present” (PTP). This brief report raises some concerns about the way a number of illusions are classified by the proposed systematization. It also poses two general problems—one empirical and (...)
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  • What You See is What You Set: Sustained Inattentional Blindness and the Capture of Awareness.Steve Most, Brian J. Scholl, E. Clifford & Daniel J. Simons - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (1):217-242.
  • Consciousness and Cognitive Access.Ned Block - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):289-317.
    This article concerns the interplay between two issues that involve both philosophy and neuroscience: whether the content of phenomenal consciousness is 'rich' or 'sparse', whether phenomenal consciousness goes beyond cognitive access, and how it would be possible for there to be evidence one way or the other.
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  • No Pause for a Brief Disruption: Failures of Visual Awareness During Ongoing Events.Daniel T. Levin & D. Alexander Varakin - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2):363-372.
    Past research has repeatedly documented the close relationship between visual attention and awareness. Most recently, research exploring change blindness, inattentional blindness, repetition blindness, and the attentional blink has converged on the conclusion that attention to one aspect of a scene or event may lead to a highly circumscribed awareness of only the specific information attended, while other information, even that which is spatially or temporally nearby can go completely unnoticed. In the present report, we extend these observations to the dynamic (...)
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  • Inaptitude of the Signal Detection Theory, Useful Vexation From the Microgenetic View, and Inevitability of Neurobiological Signatures in Understanding Perceptual (Un)Awareness.Talis Bachmann - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):101-106.
  • Subliminality, Consciousness, and Temporal Shifts in Awareness: Implications Within and Beyond the Laboratory.Robert F. Bornstein - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):613-18.
    In his analysis of subliminal perception research, Erdelyi documented two important phenomena: subchance perception and temporal variability in stimulus availability and accessibility. This Commentary addresses three issues raised by Erdelyi's review: the importance of distinguishing “micro” from “macro” temporal shifts; the need to analyze perception without awareness data at the level of the individual as well as the group; and parallels between the dissociations associated with neuroclinical phenomena and those observed in patients with certain forms of personality pathology. Continued integration (...)
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  • Glued to Which Face? Attentional Priority Effect of Female Babyface and Male Mature Face.Wenwen Zheng, Ting Luo, Chuan-Peng Hu & Kaiping Peng - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • Attention, Working Memory, and Phenomenal Experience of WM Content: Memory Levels Determined by Different Types of Top-Down Modulation.Jane Jacob, Christianne Jacobs & Juha Silvanto - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • Intracranial Spectral Amplitude Dynamics of Perceptual Suppression in Fronto-Insular, Occipito-Temporal, and Primary Visual Cortex.Juan R. Vidal, Marcela Perrone-Bertolotti, Philippe Kahane & Jean-Philippe Lachaux - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • Limits to the Usability of Iconic Memory.Ronald A. Rensink - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • Revisiting the Empirical Case Against Perceptual Modularity.Farid Masrour, Gregory Nirshberg, Michael Schon, Jason Leardi & Emily Barrett - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
    Some theorists hold that the human perceptual system has a component that receives input only from units lower in the perceptual hierarchy. This thesis, that we shall here refer to as the encapsulation thesis, has been at the center of a continuing debate for the past few decades. Those who deny the encapsulation thesis often rely on the large body of psychological findings that allegedly suggest that perception is influenced by factors such as the beliefs, desires, goals, and the expectations (...)
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  • Exploring the Visual Conscious.Bruno G. Breitmeyer, Markus Kiefer & Michael Niedeggen - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 35:178-184.
  • Temporal Structure Coding with and Without Awareness.N. Faivre & C. Koch - 2014 - Cognition 131 (3):404-414.
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  • Can Nonconceptual Content Be Stored in Visual Memory?Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):639-668.
    Dartnall claims that visual short-term memory stores nonconceptual content , in the form of compressed images. In this paper I argue against the claim that NCC can be stored in VSTM. I offer four reasons why NCC cannot be stored in visual memory and why only conceptual information can: NCC lasts for a very short time and does not reach either visual short-term memory or visual long-term memory; the content of visual states is stored in memory only if and when (...)
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  • Phenomenal Consciousness, Representational Content and Cognitive Access: A Missing Link Between Two Debates.Hilla Jacobson - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):1021-1035.
    Two debates loom large in current discussions on phenomenal consciousness. One debate concerns the relation between phenomenal character and representational content. Representationalism affirms, whereas “content separatism” denies, that phenomenal character is exhausted by representational content. Another debate concerns the relation between phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access. “Access separatism” affirms, whereas, e.g., the global workspace model denies, that there are phenomenally conscious states that are not cognitively accessed. I will argue that the two separatist views are related. Access separatism supports content (...)
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  • The Grain of Vision and the Grain of Attention.Ned Block - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):170-184.
    Often when there is no attention to an object, there is no conscious perception of it either, leading some to conclude that conscious perception is an attentional phenomenon. There is a well-known perceptual phenomenon—visuo-spatial crowding, in which objects are too closely packed for attention to single out one of them. This article argues that there is a variant of crowding—what I call ‘‘identity-crowding’’—in which one can consciously see a thing despite failure of attention to it. This conclusion, together with new (...)
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  • Identity-Crowding and Object-Seeing: A Reply to Block.Bradley Richards - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):9-19.
    Contrary to Block's assertion, “identity-crowding” does not provide an interesting instance of object-seeing without object-attention. The successful judgments and unusual phenomenology of identity-crowding are better explained by unconscious perception and non-perceptual phenomenology associated with cognitive states. In identity-crowding, as in other cases of crowding, subjects see jumbled textures and cannot individuate the items contributing to those textures in the absence of attention. Block presents an attenuated sense in which identity-crowded items are seen, but this is irrelevant to the debate about (...)
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  • No Difference Between Conscious and Nonconscious Visuomotor Control: Evidence From Perceptual Learning in the Masked Prime Task☆.Friederike Schlaghecken, Elisabeth Blagrove & Elizabeth A. Maylor - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):84-93.
    Negative compatibility effects in the masked-prime paradigm are usually obtained when primes are masked effectively. With ineffective masks—and primes above the perceptual threshold—positive compatibility effects occur. We investigated whether this pattern reflects a causal relationship between conscious awareness and low-level motor control, or whether it reflects the fact that both are affected in the same way by changes in physical stimulus attributes. In a 5-session perceptual learning task, participants learned to consciously identify masked primes. However, they showed unaltered NCEs that (...)
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  • The Electrophysiological Correlates of Stimulus Visibility and Metacontrast Masking.Henry Railo & Mika Koivisto - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):794-803.
    There are conflicting views concerning the electrophysiological correlates of visual consciousness. Whereas one view considers a relatively late positive deflection as a primary correlate of consciousness, another model links consciousness with earlier negativity . The present experiment utilized metacontrast masking in investigating the electrophysiological correlates of visual consciousness. The participants were presented with target-mask sequences in three stimulus onset asynchronies. The target stimuli were followed by either a metacontrast mask or a similar-looking, but ineffective pseudomask. The results showed that the (...)
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  • Perception of Ensemble Statistics Requires Attention.Molly Jackson-Nielsen, Michael A. Cohen & Michael A. Pitts - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 48:149-160.
  • Alerting and Orienting of Attention Without Visual Awareness.Shena Lu, Yongchun Cai, Mowei Shen, Ying Zhou & Shihui Han - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):928-938.
    Two types of the attentional network, alerting and orienting, help organisms respond to environmental events for survival in the temporal and spatial dimensions, respectively. Here, we applied chromatic flicker beyond the critical fusion frequency to address whether awareness was necessary for activation of the two attentional networks. We found that high-frequency chromatic flicker, despite its failure to reach awareness, produced the alerting and orienting effects, supporting the dissociation between attention and awareness. Furthermore, as the flicker frequency increased, the orienting effect (...)
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  • How Rich is Consciousness? The Partial Awareness Hypothesis.Sid Kouider, Vincent de Gardelle, Jérôme Sackur & Emmanuel Dupoux - 2010 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (7):301-307.
  • Preferential Awareness of Protofacial Stimuli in Autism.Hironori Akechi, Timo Stein, Yukiko Kikuchi, Yoshikuni Tojo, Hiroo Osanai & Toshikazu Hasegawa - 2015 - Cognition 143:129-134.
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  • A Dissociation Between Selective Attention and Conscious Awareness in the Representation of Temporal Order Information.Martin Eimer & Anna Grubert - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 35:274-281.
  • Access, Phenomenology and Sorites.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2018 - Ratio 31 (3):285-293.
    The non-transitivity of the relation looks the same as has been used to argue that the relation has the same phenomenal character as is non-transitive—a result that jeopardizes certain theories of consciousness. In this paper, I argue against this conclusion while granting the premise by dissociating lookings and phenomenology; an idea that some might find counter-intuitive. However, such an intuition is left unsupported once phenomenology and cognitive access are distinguished from each other; a distinction that is conceptually and empirically grounded.
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  • Phenomenal Consciousness, Access Consciousness and Self Across Waking and Dreaming: Bridging Phenomenology and Neuroscience.Martina Pantani, Angela Tagini & Antonino Raffone - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):175-197.
    The distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness is central to debates about consciousness and its neural correlates. However, this distinction has often been limited to the domain of perceptual experiences. On the basis of dream phenomenology and neuroscientific findings this paper suggests a theoretical framework which extends this distinction to dreaming, also in terms of plausible neural correlates. In this framework, phenomenal consciousness is involved in both waking perception and dreaming, whereas access consciousness is weakened, but not fully eliminated, during (...)
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  • Conscious, Preconscious, and Subliminal Processing: A Testable Taxonomy.Stanislas Dehaene, Jean-Pierre Changeux, Lionel Naccache, Jérôme Sackur & Claire Sergent - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (5):204-211.
    Amidst the many brain events evoked by a visual stimulus, which are specifically associated with conscious perception, and which merely reflect non-conscious processing? Several recent neuroimaging studies have contrasted conscious and non-conscious visual processing, but their results appear inconsistent. Some support a correlation of conscious perception with early occipital events, others with late parieto-frontal activity. Here we attempt to make sense of those dissenting results. On the basis of a minimal neuro-computational model, the global neuronal workspace hypothesis, we propose a (...)
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  • The Thalamic Dynamic Core Theory of Conscious Experience.Lawrence M. Ward - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):464-486.
    I propose that primary conscious awareness arises from synchronized activity in dendrites of neurons in dorsal thalamic nuclei, mediated particularly by inhibitory interactions with thalamic reticular neurons. In support, I offer four evidential pillars: consciousness is restricted to the results of cortical computations; thalamus is the common locus of action of brain injury in vegetative state and of general anesthetics; the anatomy and physiology of the thalamus imply a central role in consciousness; neural synchronization is a neural correlate of consciousness.
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  • When Endogenous Spatial Attention Improves Conscious Perception: Effects of Alerting and Bottom-Up Activation.Fabiano Botta, Juan Lupiáñez & Ana B. Chica - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 23:63-73.
  • The Philosophical Significance of Attention.Sebastian Watzl - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (10):722-733.
    What is the philosophical significance of attention? The present article provides an overview of recent debates surrounding the connections between attention and other topics of philosophical interest. In particular, it discusses the interplay between attention and consciousness, attention and agency, and attention and reference. The article outlines the questions and contemporary positions concerning how attention shapes the phenomenal character of experience, whether it is necessary or sufficient for consciousness, and whether it plays a special role in the best philosophical theories (...)
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  • Consciousness Wanted, Attention Found: Reasons for the Advantage of the Left Visual Field in Identifying T2 Among Rapidly Presented Series.Rolf Verleger & Kamila Śmigasiewicz - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 35:260-273.
  • Phenomenology Without Conscious Access is a Form of Consciousness Without Top-Down Attention.Christof Koch & Naotsugu Tsuchiya - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):509-510.
    We agree with Block's basic hypothesis postulating the existence of phenomenal consciousness without cognitive access. We explain such states in terms of consciousness without top-down, endogenous attention and speculate that their correlates may be a coalition of neurons that are consigned to the back of cortex, without access to working memory and planning in frontal cortex.
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  • Perceptual Systems and Realism.Athanasios Raftopoulos - 2008 - Synthese 164 (1):61 - 91.
    Constructivism undermines realism by arguing that experience is mediated by concepts, and that there is no direct way to examine those aspects of objects that belong to them independently of our conceptualizations; perception is theory-laden. To defend realism one has to show first that perception relates us directly with the world without any intermediary conceptual framework. The result of this direct link is the nonconceptual content of experience. Second, one has to show that part of the nonconceptual content extracted from (...)
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  • Selective Visual Attention and Perceptual Coherence.John T. Serences & Steven Yantis - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):38-45.
  • Attention Capture by Faces.Stephen R. H. Langton, Anna S. Law, A. Mike Burton & Stefan R. Schweinberger - 2008 - Cognition 107 (1):330-342.
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  • Identifying Neural Correlates of Consciousness: The State Space Approach.Juergen Fell - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (4):709-29.
    This article sketches an idealized strategy for the identification of neural correlates of consciousness. The proposed strategy is based on a state space approach originating from the analysis of dynamical systems. The article then focuses on one constituent of consciousness, phenomenal awareness. Several rudimentary requirements for the identification of neural correlates of phenomenal awareness are suggested. These requirements are related to empirical data on selective attention, on completely intrinsic selection and on globally unconscious states. As an example, neuroscientific findings on (...)
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  • The Attentional Requirements of Consciousness.Michael A. Cohen, Patrick Cavanagh, Marvin M. Chun & Ken Nakayama - 2012 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (8):411-417.
  • Unconscious Vision and Executive Control: How Unconscious Processing and Conscious Action Control Interact.Ulrich Ansorge, Wilfried Kunde & Markus Kiefer - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 27:268-287.
  • What Unilateral Visual Neglect Teaches Us About Perceptual Phenomenology.Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):339-358.
    Studies on the syndrome called ‘unilateral visual or spatial neglect’ have been used by philosophers in discussions concerning perceptual phenomenology. Nanay , based on spatial neglects studies, argued that the property of being suitable for action is part of the perceptual phenomenology of neglect patients. In this paper, I argue that the studies on visual neglect conducted thus far do not support Nanay’s thesis that when patients succeed in detecting the neglected object, it’s action properties are part of their perceptual (...)
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  • Zap! Magnetic Tricks on Conscious and Unconscious Vision.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (5):193-195.
  • A Role for the Anterior Insular Cortex in the Global Neuronal Workspace Model of Consciousness.Matthias Michel - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 49:333-346.
    According to the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, consciousness results from the global broadcast of information throughout the brain. The global neuronal workspace is mainly constituted by a fronto-parietal network. The anterior insular cortex is part of this global neuronal workspace, but the function of this region has not yet been defined within the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness. In this review, I hypothesize that the anterior insular cortex implements a cross-modal priority map, the function of which is (...)
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  • Consciousness Without Attention.Carolyn Dicey Jennings - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (2):276--295.
    This paper explores whether consciousness can exist without attention. This is a hot topic in philosophy of mind and cognitive science due to the popularity of theories that hold attention to be necessary for consciousness. The discovery of a form of consciousness that exists without the influence of attention would require a change in the way that many global workspace theorists, for example, understand the role and function of consciousness. Against this understanding, at least three forms of consciousness have been (...)
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  • Measures of Consciousness.Elizabeth Irvine - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (3):285-297.
    Consciousness is now a hot topic in both philosophy and the cognitive sciences, yet there is much controversy over how to measure it. First, it is not clear whether biased subjective reports should be taken as adequate for measuring consciousness, or if more objective measures are required. Ways to benefit from the advantages of both these measures in the form of ‘Type 2’ metacognitive measures are under development, but face criticism. Research into neurophysiological measures of consciousness is potentially very valuable, (...)
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  • Specifying the Self for Cognitive Neuroscience.Kalina Christoff, Diego Cosmelli, Dorothée Legrand & Evan Thompson - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):104-112.
  • Subliminal Gestalt Grouping: Evidence of Perceptual Grouping by Proximity and Similarity in Absence of Conscious Perception.Pedro R. Montoro, Dolores Luna & Juan J. Ortells - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 25:1-8.
    Previous studies making use of indirect processing measures have shown that perceptual grouping can occur outside the focus of attention. However, no previous study has examined the possibility of subliminal processing of perceptual grouping. The present work steps forward in the study of perceptual organization, reporting direct evidence of subliminal processing of Gestalt patterns. In two masked priming experiments, Gestalt patterns grouped by proximity or similarity that induced either a horizontal or vertical global orientation of the stimuli were presented as (...)
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  • Why, as Responsible for Figurativity, Seeing-in Can Only Be Inflected Seeing-In.Alberto Voltolini - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):651-667.
    In this paper, I want to argue for two main and related points. First, I want to defend Richard Wollheim’s well-known thesis that the twofold mental state of seeing-in is the distinctive pictorial experience that marks figurativity. Figurativity is what makes a representation pictorial, a depiction of its subject. Moreover, I want to show that insofar as it is a mark of figurativity, all seeing-in is inflected. That is to say, every mental state of seeing-in is such that the characterisation (...)
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