Current world migration is disrupting conceptual boundaries of national democratic polities. One area where the traditional sense of political community is being challenged concerns electoral rights for non-resident citizens and non-citizen residents. With the right to vote being an ultimate expression of political membership in a democratic nation-state, any debates about these two groupsck. It provides direct empirical evidence that undermines the conventional wisdom that Koreans define their polity purely on the basis of their ethnicity. Contrary to our expectations, a (...) close scrutiny of the Korean debates in question reveals ample references to the civic ideals of political community. The line of reasoning that emphasizes duties towards the welfare of the polity has produced powerful justifications for denying political franchise to overseas compatriots, while granting limited electoral rights to qualified resident foreigners. A broader implication of this empirical finding is that it highlights a fundamental limitation of Baubck's scheme should be modified to address both the rights-based logics and the somewhat obsolete duty-based logic of franchise extension. (shrink)

In his 2007 Ethics article, “Responsibility Incorporated,” Philip Pettit argued that corporations qualify as morally responsible agents because they possess autonomy, normative judgment, and the capacity for self-control. Although there is ongoing debate over whether corporations have these capacities, both proponents and opponents of corporate moral agency appear to agree that Pettit correctly identified the requirements for moral agency. In this article, I do not take issue with either the claim that autonomy, normative judgment, and self-control are the requirements for (...) moral agency or the claim that corporations possess them. I claim that if both of these claims are correct, then corporate moral agency entails that, in a liberal democracy, corporations should have the right to vote. I show that under the conception of democracy supported by most liberal political theorists, all parties subject to the law are entitled to the right to vote, and all parties that possess autonomy, normative judgment, and self-control are subject to the law. Therefore, if the proponents of corporate moral agency are correct, then corporations satisfy the requirements for the right to vote. I then consider potential objections to this argument. I show that the strongest objection to the corporate right to vote is undermined by Pettit’s own argument for corporate autonomy. I then show that objections derived from other arguments for limiting the rights of corporations are equally unavailing. I conclude with some observations about the implications of my argument for the question of corporate speech rights. (shrink)

The distribution of voting rights in the UK is an artefact of history rather than a product of clear legal or philosophical principles. Consequently, some resident aliens have the right to vote in all UK elections; others can vote in local elections but are excluded from national elections; still others are excluded from all elections. In England and Wales alone, roughly 2.3 million immigrants are excluded from voting in national elections. This exclusion is inconsistent with the founding principle of democracy (...) and distorts political discourse. What if all immigrants could vote in national elections? We estimate that up to ninety-five parliamentary seats could have been won by a different party in the 2015 general election. More substantially, enfranchising all immigrants would require re-drawing UK constituency boundaries. The new electoral map would increase the relative power of urban constituencies and would incentivise some political entrepreneurs and parties to temper anti-immigration rhetoric. (shrink)