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  1. Species and the Good in Anne Conway's Metaethics.John R. T. Grey - 2020 - In Colin Marshall (ed.), Comparative Metaethics: Neglected Perspectives on the Foundations of Morality. New York: Routledge. pp. 102-118.
    Anne Conway rejects the view that creatures are essentially members of any natural kind more specific than the kind 'creature'. That is, she rejects essentialism about species membership. This chapter provides an analysis of one of Anne Conway's arguments against such essentialism, which (as I argue) is drawn from metaethical rather than metaphysical premises. In her view, if a creature's species or kind were inscribed in its essence, that essence would constitute a limit on the creature's potential to participate in (...)
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  • Monism and Individuation in Anne Conway as a Critique of Spinoza.Nastassja Pugliese - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (4):771-785.
    In chapter IX of the Principles, Anne Conway claims that her metaphysics is diametrically opposed to those of Descartes and Spinoza. Scholars have analyzed her rejection of Cartesianism, but not her critique of Spinoza. This paper proposes that two central points of Conway’s metaphysics can be understood as direct responses to Spinoza: (1) the relation between God, Christ, and the creatures in the tripartite division of being, and (2) the individuation of beings in the lowest species. I will argue that (...)
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  • What Kind of Monist is Anne Finch Conway?Jessica Gordon-Roth - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (3):280-297.