Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Function of Modal Judgment and the Kantian Gap.Jessica Leech - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 13):3193-3212.
    What is the function of modal judgment? Why do we make judgments of possibility and necessity? Or are such judgments, in fact, dispensable? This paper introduces and develops an answer to these questions based on Kant’s remarks in section 76 of the Critique of Judgment. Here, Kant appears to argue the following: that a capacity to make modal judgments using modal concepts is required for a capacity for objective representation, in light of our split cognitive architecture. This split cognitive architecture (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Mereology of Representation.Jessica Leech - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (2):205-228.
    Mental representations—like many other things—seem to have parts. However, it isn’t clear how to properly understand the idea of a part of a representation. In this paper I shed new light on how representations can have a mereology. In particular, it has been recognized that there is a mereological element to Kant’s distinction between two kinds of representations: intuitions and concepts. A concept depends upon its parts, whereas an intuition is prior to its parts. The paper thus focuses on an (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Kant and the Concept of an Object.Nicholas F. Stang - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):299-322.
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Elevating the Determinations of Thought Above This Anxious, Incomplete Standpoint: On Kant’s Concept of an Intuitive Understanding and its Articulation in Hegel’s Objective Thought.Sandra V. Palermo & Natalia Lerussi - 2021 - Comparative and Continental Philosophy 13 (1):47-60.
    ABSTRACT In this paper, we show that Kant’s complex concept of an “intuitive understanding”, which operates in his work as a tool for defining the peculiar character of our understanding, is critically absorbed by Hegel’s concept of “objective thought.” By means of this concept, Hegel first rejects the representational conception of thought that is implied by the Kantian concept of an intuitive understanding and, second, he proposes a way of comprehending thought that allows a new conception of the relationship between (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Kant on Intuitive Understanding and Things in Themselves.Reed Winegar - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1238-1252.
    Kant claims that an intuitive understanding—such as God would possess—could cognize things in themselves. This claim has prompted many interpreters of Kant's theoretical philosophy to propose that things in themselves correspond to how an intuitive understanding would cognize things. In contrast, I argue that Kant's theoretical philosophy does not endorse the common proposal that all things in themselves correspond to how an intuitive understanding would cognize things. Instead, Kant's theoretical philosophy maintains that things in themselves might or might not correspond (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Kantian Conceptualism/Nonconceptualism.Colin McLear - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Overview of the (non)conceptualism debate in Kant studies.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Kant on God’s Intuitive Understanding: Interpreting CJ §76’s Modal Claims.Reed Winegar - 2017 - Kantian Review 22 (2):305-329.
    In §76 of the 3rd Critique, Kant claims that an intuitive understanding would represent no distinction between possible and actual things. Prior interpretations of §76 take Kant to claim that an intuitive understanding would produce things merely in virtue of thinking about them and, thus, could not think of merely possible things. In contrast, I argue that §76’s modal claims hinge on Kant’s suggestion that God represents things in their thoroughgoing determination, including in their connection to God’s actual will. I (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation