Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Boyle’s Reductive Occasionalism.Daniel Layman - 2019 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 1 (1):2.
    Was Robert Boyle an occasionalist? And if so, what kind of occasionalist was he? These questions have long troubled commentators, as Boyle’s texts often seem to offer both endorsements of occasionalism and affirmations of bodies’ causal powers. I argue that Boyle’s position is best understood as reductive occasionalism, according to which bodily powers are relations between bodies and God’s action in the world, and there is no causal efficacy in bodies that is not strictly identical to God’s nomological causal efficacy.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Computer Science and Philosophy: Did Plato Foresee Object-Oriented Programming?Wojciech Tylman - 2018 - Foundations of Science 23 (1):159-172.
    This paper contains a discussion of striking similarities between influential philosophical concepts of the past and the approaches currently employed in selected areas of computer science. In particular, works of the Pythagoreans, Plato, Abelard, Ash’arites, Malebranche and Berkeley are presented and contrasted with such computer science ideas as digital computers, object-oriented programming, the modelling of an object’s actions and causality in virtual environments, and 3D graphics rendering. The intention of this paper is to provoke the computer science community to go (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Exclusion.Daniel Lim - 2015 - In God and Mental Causation. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.
    Jaegwon Kim’s (2005) most recent formulation of the so-called Supervenience Argument against Non-Reductive Physicalism is discussed. The two stages of Kim’s argument can be seen as instances of, what I will call, the Generalized Exclusion Argument.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Causal and Logical Necessity in Malebranche’s Occasionalism.A. Fisher - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):523-548.
    The famous Cartesian Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) espoused the occasionalist doctrine that ‘there is only one true cause because there is only one true God; that the nature or power of each thing is nothing but the will of God; that all natural causes are not true causes but only occasional causes’ (LO, 448, original italics). One of Malebranche’s well-known arguments for occasionalism, known as, the ‘no necessary connection’ argument (or, NNC ) stems from the principle that ‘a true cause… is (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Occasionalism and Non-Reductive Physicalism: Another Look at the Continuous Creation Argument.Daniel Lim - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (1):39-57.
    Malebranche’s so-called conservation is continuous creation (CCC) argument has been celebrated as a powerful and persuasive argument for Occasionalism—the claim that only God has and exercises causal powers. In this paper I want to examine the CCC argument for Occasionalism by comparing it to Jaegwon Kim’s so-called Supervenience argument against non-reductive physicalism. Because the arguments have deep similarities it is interesting and fruitful to consider them in tandem. First I argue that both the CCC argument and the Supervenience argument turn (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Continuous Creation and Secondary Causation: The Threat of Occasionalism.Timothy D. Miller - 2011 - Religious Studies 47 (1):3-22.
    One standard criticism of the doctrine of continuous creation is that it entails the occasionalist position that God alone is a true cause and that the events we commonly identify as causes are merely the occasions upon which God brings about effects. I begin by clearly stating Malebranche's argument from continuous creation to occasionalism. Next, I examine two strategies for resisting Malebranche's argument – strong and weak concurrentism – and argue that weak concurrentism is the more promising strategy. Finally, I (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations