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  1. Phenomenological dimensions of bodily self–consciousness.Dorothée Legrand - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press. pp. 204--227.
    This article examines the multi-dimensions of bodily self-consciousness. It explains the distinction between the self-as-subject and the self-as-object and argues that each act of consciousness is adequately characterized by two modes of givenness. These are the intentional mode of givenness by which the subject is conscious of intentional objects and the subjective mode by which the subject is conscious of intentional objects as experienced by him. It clarifies the relationship of these modes of givenness to the transitivity and non-transitivity of (...)
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  • The missing pieces in the scientific study of bodily awareness.Lana Kühle - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (5):571-593.
    Research on bodily awareness has focused on body illusions with an aim to explore the possible dissociation of our bodily awareness from our own body. It has provided insights into how our sensory modalities shape our sense of embodiment, and it has raised important questions regarding the malleability of our sense of ownership over our own body. The issue, however, is that this research fails to consider an important distinction in how we experience our body. There are indeed two ways (...)
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  • Molecular neuroscience to my rescue (again): Reply to looren de Jong and Schouten.John Bickle - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):487-494.
    In their review essay (published in this issue), Looren de Jong and Schouten take my 2003 book to task for (among other things) neglecting to keep up with the latest developments in my favorite scientific case study (memory consolidation). They claim that these developments have been guided by psychological theorizing and have replaced neurobiology's traditional 'static' view of consolidation with a 'dynamic' alternative. This shows that my 'essential but entirely heuristic' treatment of higher-level cognitive theorizing is a mistaken view of (...)
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