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Hannes Leitgeb & Krister Segerberg (2007). Dynamic Doxastic Logic: Why, How, and Where To?

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  1. Truth in Fiction, Impossible Worlds, and Belief Revision.Christopher Badura & Francesco Berto - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them.
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  2.  77
    Simple Hyperintensional Belief Revision.F. Berto - 2018 - Erkenntnis:1-17.
    I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to (...)
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    Forgetting Complex Propositions.David Fernández–Duque, Ángel Nepomuceno–Fernández, Enrique Sarrión–Morrillo, Fernando Soler–Toscano & Fernando R. Velázquez–Quesada - 2015 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 23 (6):942-965.
  4.  43
    A DDL Approach to Pluralistic Ignorance and Collective Belief.Carlo Proietti & Erik J. Olsson - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):499-515.
    A group is in a state of pluralistic ignorance (PI) if, roughly speaking, every member of the group thinks that his or her belief or desire is different from the beliefs or desires of the other members of the group. PI has been invoked to explain many otherwise puzzling phenomena in social psychology. The main purpose of this article is to shed light on the nature of PI states – their structure, internal consistency and opacity – using the formal apparatus (...)
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  5. An Impossibility Theorem for Amalgamating Evidence.Jacob Stegenga - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2391-2411.
    Amalgamating evidence of different kinds for the same hypothesis into an overall confirmation is analogous, I argue, to amalgamating individuals’ preferences into a group preference. The latter faces well-known impossibility theorems, most famously “Arrow’s Theorem”. Once the analogy between amalgamating evidence and amalgamating preferences is tight, it is obvious that amalgamating evidence might face a theorem similar to Arrow’s. I prove that this is so, and end by discussing the plausibility of the axioms required for the theorem.
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  6.  59
    Belief Change in Branching Time: AGM-Consistency and Iterated Revision. [REVIEW]Giacomo Bonanno - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):201-236.
    We study belief change in the branching-time structures introduced in Bonanno (Artif Intell 171:144–160, 2007 ). First, we identify a property of branching-time frames that is equivalent (when the set of states is finite) to AGM-consistency, which is defined as follows. A frame is AGM-consistent if the partial belief revision function associated with an arbitrary state-instant pair and an arbitrary model based on that frame can be extended to a full belief revision function that satisfies the AGM postulates. Second, we (...)
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    Interrogative Belief Revision Based on Epistemic Strategies.Sebastian Enqvist - 2012 - Studia Logica 100 (3):453-479.
    I develop a dynamic logic for reasoning about "interrogative belief revision", a new branch of belief revision theory that has been developed in a small number of papers, beginning with E. J. Olsson and D. Westlund's paper "On the role of the research agenda in epistemic change" [12]. In interrogative belief revision, epistemic states are taken to include a research agenda, consisting of questions the agent seeks to answer. I present a logic for revision of such epistemic states based on (...)
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    Modelling Phenomena and Dynamic Logic of Phenomena.Boris Kovalerchuk, Leonid Perlovsky & Gregory Wheeler - 2012 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 22 (1-2):53-82.
    Modelling a complex phenomenon such as the mind presents tremendous computational complexity challenges. Modelling field theory addresses these challenges in a non-traditional way. The main idea behind MFT is to match levels of uncertainty of the model with levels of uncertainty of the evaluation criterion used to identify that model. When a model becomes more certain, then the evaluation criterion is adjusted dynamically to match that change to the model. This process is called the Dynamic Logic of Phenomena for model (...)
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    Dynamic Logics of Evidence-Based Beliefs.J. Benthem & E. Pacuit - 2011 - Studia Logica 99 (1-3):61-92.
    This paper adds evidence structure to standard models of belief, in the form of families of sets of worlds. We show how these more fine-grained models support natural actions of “evidence management”, ranging from update with external new information to internal rearrangement. We show how this perspective leads to new richer languages for existing neighborhood semantics for modal logic. Our main results are relative completeness theorems for the resulting dynamic logic of evidence.
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    Modeling of Phenomena and Dynamic Logic of Phenomena.Boris Kovalerchuk, Leonid Perlovsky & Gregory Wheeler - 2011 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logic 22 (1):1-82.
    Modeling a complex phenomena such as the mind presents tremendous computational complexity challenges. Modeling field theory (MFT) addresses these challenges in a non-traditional way. The main idea behind MFT is to match levels of uncertainty of the model (also, a problem or some theory) with levels of uncertainty of the evaluation criterion used to identify that model. When a model becomes more certain, then the evaluation criterion is adjusted dynamically to match that change to the model. This process is called (...)
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    Logic in General Philosophy of Science: Old Things and New Things.Hannes Leitgeb - 2011 - Synthese 179 (2):339 - 350.
    This is a personal, incomplete, and very informal take on the role of logic in general philosophy of science, which is aimed at a broader audience. We defend and advertise the application of logical methods in philosophy of science, starting with the beginnings in the Vienna Circle and ending with some more recent logical developments.
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  12.  28
    Dynamic Logics of Evidence-Based Beliefs.Johan van Benthem & Eric Pacuit - 2011 - Studia Logica 99 (1-3):61-92.
  13.  97
    Interrogative Belief Revision in Modal Logic.Sebastian Enqvist - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (5):527-548.
    The well known AGM framework for belief revision has recently been extended to include a model of the research agenda of the agent, i.e. a set of questions to which the agent wishes to find answers (Olsson & Westlund in Erkenntnis , 65 , 165–183, 2006 ). The resulting model has later come to be called interrogative belief revision . While belief revision has been studied extensively from the point of view of modal logic, so far interrogative belief revision has (...)
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