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  1. Flow Fragmentalism.Giuliano Torrengo & Samuele Iaquinto - 2019 - Theoria 85 (3):185-201.
    In this paper, we articulate a version of non-standard A-theory – which we call Flow Fragmentalism – in relation to its take on the issue of supervenience of truth on being. According to the Truth Supervenes on Being (TSB) Principle, the truth of past- and future-tensed propositions supervenes, respectively, on past and future facts. Since the standard presentist denies the existence of past and future entities and facts concerning them that do not obtain in the present, she seems to lack (...)
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  • The Problem of Temporal Unity: An Examination of the Problem and Case Study on Ersatzer Presentism.Robert E. Pezet - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):791-821.
    This paper elaborates the problem of temporal unity for dynamic presentism and diagnoses the source of that problem in the dynamic presentist’s discarding the traditional C-series in its avoidance of McTaggart’s A-series paradox. This C-series provided the fixed structure of time which the transitory aspects of time then followed, and thereby unify those transitory aspects. It then considers ersatzer presentism as an ostensible solution to the problem of temporal unity by providing a new abstract C-series for dynamic presentism. However, after (...)
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  • Thinking in and About Time: A Dual Systems Perspective on Temporal Cognition.Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences:1-77.
    We outline a dual systems approach to temporal cognition, which distinguishes between two cognitive systems for dealing with how things unfold over time – a temporal updating system and a temporal reasoning system – of which the former is both phylogenetically and ontogenetically more primitive than the latter, and which are at work alongside each other in adult human cognition. We describe the main features of each of the two systems, the types of behavior the more primitive temporal updating system (...)
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  • Objective Becoming: In Search of A-Ness.Lisa Leininger - 2018 - Analysis 78 (1):108-117.
    © The Author 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.comIn Objective Becoming, Bradford Skow declares that he aims to defend the ‘anaemic’ passage of time in the block universe. This is in contrast to the ‘robust’ kind of passage – normally understood as the change in an objectively privileged present moment, the NOW – associated with A-theories of time. The defence of any sense of passage in the (...)
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  • The Virtues of Thisness Presentism.David Ingram - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2867-2888.
    Presentists believe that only present things exist. But opponents insist this view has unacceptable implications: if only present things exist, we can’t express singular propositions about the past, since the obvious propositional constituents don’t exist, nor can we account for temporal passage, or the openness of the future. According to such opponents, and in spite of the apparent ‘common sense’ status of the view, presentism should be rejected on the basis of these unacceptable implications. In this paper, I present and (...)
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  • Against Non‐Ludovician Time.Robert E. Pezet - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (4):330-359.
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  • Perspectival Tenses and Dynamic Tenses.Giuliano Torrengo - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (5):1045-1061.
    As far as our experience goes, we live in a dynamic present. Those two phenomenal features of experience—presentness and dynamism—are obviously connected. However, how they are connected is not obvious at all. In this paper, I criticise the view according to which the former can explain the latter, which I call sophisticated representationalism. My criticism will be based on an ambiguity in the notion of tense found in the philosophical literature, that between the perspectival understanding and the dynamic understanding of (...)
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  • Hyper-Russellian Skepticism.Giuliano Torrengo - 2018 - Metaphysica 19 (1):1-17.
    The hyper-Russellian skeptic is someone who thinks that only one of all your experiences was, is, and will ever be conscious. Which one? The very one you are having now. Before you were always a zombie, and you will be a zombie for ever after. In the present literature on the metaphysics of passage of time, there is disagreement on whether our feeling that time passes — the “dynamic flavor” of our ordinary experience — provides support to the A-theory, that (...)
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