Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Joint attention and perceptual experience.Lucas Battich & Bart Geurts - 2021 - Synthese 198 (9):8809-8822.
    Joint attention customarily refers to the coordinated focus of attention between two or more individuals on a common object or event, where it is mutually “open” to all attenders that they are so engaged. We identify two broad approaches to analyse joint attention, one in terms of cognitive notions like common knowledge and common awareness, and one according to which joint attention is fundamentally a primitive phenomenon of sensory experience. John Campbell’s relational theory is a prominent representative of the latter (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Becoming closer to one another: Shared emotions and social relationships.Vivian Puusepp - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Many authors acknowledge that people share emotions in various social contexts. However, the deeper role of social relationships for shared emotions is poorly understood. I argue that shared emotions are affected by the social relationships in which they emerge. Moreover, shared emotions help people to bond. In order to do so, emotional experiences involve an intentional component that tracks the state of our social relationships. I introduce some new terminology that helps us to clearly distinguish between different kinds of emotional (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Introduction: Empathy, Shared Emotions, and Social Identity.Thomas Szanto & Joel Krueger - 2019 - Topoi 38 (1):153-162.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • We in Me or Me in We? Collective Intentionality and Selfhood.Dan Zahavi - 2021 - Journal of Social Ontology 7 (1):1-20.
    The article takes issue with the proposal that dominant accounts of collective intentionality suffer from an individualist bias and that one should instead reverse the order of explanation and give primacy to the we and the community. It discusses different versions of the community first view and argues that they fail because they operate with too simplistic a conception of what it means to be a self and misunderstand what it means to be a we. In presenting this argument, the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Pairing and sharing: The birth of the sense of us.Stefano Vincini - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-24.
    The goal of this paper is to show that a particular view of emotion sharing and a specific hypothesis on infant social perception strengthen each other. The view of emotion sharing is called “the straightforward view.” The hypothesis on infant social perception is called “the pairing account.” The straightforward view suggests that participants in emotion sharing undergo one and the same overarching emotion. The pairing account posits that infants perceive others’ embodied experiences as belonging to someone other than the self (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Feeling togetherness online: a phenomenological sketch of online communal experiences.Lucy Osler - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (3):569-588.
    The internet provides us with a multitude of ways of interacting with one another. In discussions about how technological innovations impact and shape our interpersonal interactions, there is a tendency to assume that encountering people online is essentially different to encountering people offline. Yet, individuals report feeling a sense of togetherness with one another online that echoes offline descriptions. I consider how we can understand people’s experiences of being together with others online, at least in certain instances, as arising out (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Interpersonal and Collective Affective Niche Construction: Empirical and Normative Perspectives on Social Media.Michiru Nagatsu & Mikko Salmela - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-28.
    This paper contributes to the interdisciplinary theory of collective affective niche construction, which extends the extended mind thesis from cognitive to affective phenomena. Although theoretically innovative, the theory lacks a detailed psychological account of how collective affectivity is scaffolded. It has also been criticized for its uncritical assumption of the subject qua the autonomous user of the affective scaffolding as disposable resources, abstracting away from embedded subjectivity in particular techno-political arrangements. We propose that the social motivation hypothesis, an account grounded (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Emotion sharing as empathic.Maxwell Gatyas - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (1):85-108.
    Emotion sharing plays a key role in many accounts of empathy. However, some equate emotion sharing with emotional “contagion” and thereby discount it as a form of empathy. In what follows, I clarify the nature of empathic emotion sharing and differentiate it from contagion. I first reflect on the notions of sharing an object and of sharing a life, arguing that each has four core features. I then argue that emotion sharing also has those features. These characteristics allow me to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Joint attention without recursive mindreading: On the role of second-person engagement.Felipe León - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (4):550-580.
    On a widely held characterization, triadic joint attention is the capacity to perceptually attend to an object or event together with another subject. In the last four decades, research in developmental psychology has provided increasing evidence of the crucial role that this capacity plays in socio-cognitive development, early language acquisition, and the development of perspective-taking. Yet, there is a striking discrepancy between the general agreement that joint attention is critical in various domains, and the lack of theoretical consensus on how (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Collective Intentionality and Plural Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness.Dan Zahavi - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):61-75.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Towards a Taxonomy of Collective Emotions.Gerhard Thonhauser - 2022 - Emotion Review 14 (1):31-42.
    Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 1, Page 31-42, January 2022. This paper distinguishes collective emotions from other phenomena pertaining to the social and interactive nature of emotion and proposes a taxonomy of different types of collective emotion. First, it emphasizes the distinction between collective emotions as affective experiences and underpinning mechanisms. Second, it elaborates on other types of affective experience, namely the social sharing of emotion, group-based emotions, and joint emotions. Then, it proposes a working definition of collective emotion via (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Towards a Taxonomy of Collective Emotions.Gerhard Thonhauser - 2022 - Sage Publications: Emotion Review 14 (1):31-42.
    Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 1, Page 31-42, January 2022. This paper distinguishes collective emotions from other phenomena pertaining to the social and interactive nature of emotion and proposes a taxonomy of different types of collective emotion. First, it emphasizes the distinction between collective emotions as affective experiences and underpinning mechanisms. Second, it elaborates on other types of affective experience, namely the social sharing of emotion, group-based emotions, and joint emotions. Then, it proposes a working definition of collective emotion via (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Shared emotions: a Steinian proposal.Gerhard Thonhauser - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (5):997-1015.
    The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of shared emotion. After contextualizing this notion within the broader research landscape on collective affective intentionality, I suggest that we reserve the term shared emotion to an affective experience that is phenomenologically and functionally ours: we experience it together as our emotion, and it is also constitutively not mine and yours, but ours. I focus on the three approaches that have dominated the philosophical discussion on shared emotions: cognitivist accounts, concern-based (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • In hate we trust: The collectivization and habitualization of hatred.Thomas Szanto - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-28.
    In the face of longstanding philosophical debates on the nature of hatred and an ever-growing interest in the underlying social-psychological function of group-directed or genocidal hatred, the peculiar affective intentionality of hatred is still very little understood. By drawing on resources from classical phenomenology, recent social-scientific research and analytic philosophy of emotions, I shall argue that the affective intentionality of hatred is distinctive in three interrelated ways: it has an overgeneralizing, indeterminate affective focus, which typically leads to a form of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • In hate we trust: The collectivization and habitualization of hatred.Thomas Szanto - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (3):453-480.
    In the face of longstanding philosophical debates on the nature of hatred and an ever-growing interest in the underlying social-psychological function of group-directed or genocidal hatred, the peculiar affective intentionality of hatred is still very little understood. By drawing on resources from classical phenomenology, recent social-scientific research and analytic philosophy of emotions, I shall argue that the affective intentionality of hatred is distinctive in three interrelated ways: it has an overgeneralizing, indeterminate affective focus, which typically leads to a form of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Emotional Self‐Alienation.Thomas Szanto - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):260-286.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Phenomenality and Intentional Structure of We-Experiences.Alessandro Salice - 2022 - Topoi 41 (1):195-205.
  • The Phenomenality and Intentional Structure of We-Experiences.Alessandro Salice - 2020 - Topoi 41 (1):1-11.
    When you and I share an experience, each of us lives through a we-experience. The paper claims that we-experiences have unique phenomenality and structure. First, we-experiences’ phenomenality is characterised by the fact that they feel like ours to their subject. This specific phenomenality is contended to derive from the way these experiences self-represent: a we-experience exemplifies us-ness or togetherness because it self-represents as mine qua ours. Second, living through a we-experience together with somebody else is not to have this experience (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • “An illness of isolation, a disease of disconnection”: Depression and the erosion of we-experiences.Lucy Osler - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    Depression is an affective disorder involving a significant change in an individual’s emotional and affective experiences. While the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition mentions that social impairment may occur in depression, first-person reports of depression consistently name isolation from others as a key feature of depression. I present a phenomenological analysis of how certain interpersonal relations are experienced in depression. In particular, I consider whether depressed individuals are able to enter into “we-experiences” with other people. We-experiences (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Why the extended mind is nothing special but is central.Giulio Ongaro, Doug Hardman & Ivan Deschenaux - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-23.
    The extended mind thesis states that the mind is not brain-bound but extends into the physical world. The philosophical debate around the thesis has mostly focused on extension towards epistemic artefacts, treating the phenomenon as a special capacity of the human organism to recruit external physical resources to solve individual tasks. This paper argues that if the mind extends to artefacts in the pursuit of individual tasks, it extends to other humans in the pursuit of collective tasks. Mind extension to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • For-Me-Ness, For-Us-Ness, and the We-Relationship.Felipe León - 2020 - Topoi 39 (3):547-558.
    This article investigates the relationship between for-me-ness and sociality. I start by pointing out some ambiguities in claims pursued by critics that have recently pressed on the relationship between the two notions. I next articulate a question concerning for-me-ness and sociality that builds on the idea that, occasionally at least, there is something it is like ‘for us’ to have an experience. This idea has been explored in recent literature on shared experiences and collective intentionality, and it gestures towards the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Extended emotions.Joel Krueger & Thomas Szanto - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):863-878.
    Until recently, philosophers and psychologists conceived of emotions as brain- and body-bound affairs. But researchers have started to challenge this internalist and individualist orthodoxy. A rapidly growing body of work suggests that some emotions incorporate external resources and thus extend beyond the neurophysiological confines of organisms; some even argue that emotions can be socially extended and shared by multiple agents. Call this the extended emotions thesis. In this article, we consider different ways of understanding ExE in philosophy, psychology, and the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • The moral value of feeling-with.Maxwell Gatyas - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (9):2901-2919.
    Recent work on empathy has focused on the phenomenon of feeling on behalf of, or for, others, and on determining the role it ought to play in our moral lives. Much less attention, however, has been paid to ‘feeling-with.’ In this paper, I distinguish ‘feeling-with’ from ‘feeling-for.’ I identify three distinguishing features of ‘feeling-with,’ all of which serve to make it distinct from empathy. Then, drawing on work in feminist moral psychology and feminist ethics, I argue that ‘feeling-with’ has unique (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Phenomenological approaches to personal identity.Jakub Čapek & Sophie Loidolt - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (2):217-234.
    This special issue addresses the debate on personal identity from a phenomenological viewpoint, especially contemporary phenomenological research on selfhood. In the introduction, we first offer a brief survey of the various classic questions related to personal identity according to Locke’s initial proposal and sketch out key concepts and distinctions of the debate that came after Locke. We then characterize the types of approach represented by post-Hegelian, German and French philosophies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. We argue that whereas the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The other at the threshold: A Husserlian analysis of ethics and violence in the home/alien encounter.Hora Zabarjadisar - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Queensland
    In a world where, as Martin Heidegger puts it, ‘homelessness’ has become its destiny, the colonized/Oriental Other that once exclusively constituted and was neglected from the matrix of the Western imaginary has no longer maintained its distance as ‘out there’. Instead it is embodied as a ‘refugee’ appearing on the borders of the ‘home’ with its complex cultural, colonial history. The majority of refugee studies feature the refugee as the outcome of the interplay of the two concepts of the ‘rights (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Social Ontology. Emotional Sharing as the Foundation of Care Relationships.Guido Cusinato - 2018 - In S. Bourgault & E. Pulcini, Emotions and Care: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Peeters.
    The origin of the concept of “emotional sharing” can be traced back to the first edition of Sympathiebuch [1913/23], in which Max Scheler paved the way to a phenomenology of emotions and to social ontology. The importance of his findings is evident: consider the central role of emotional sharing in Michael Tomasello’s analysis and the lively debate on social ontology and collective intentionality.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark