Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Branching actualism and cosmological arguments.Joseph C. Schmid & Alex Malpass - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):1951-1973.
    We draw out significant consequences of a relatively popular theory of metaphysical modality—branching actualism—for cosmological arguments for God’s existence. According to branching actualism, every possible world shares an initial history with the actual world and diverges only because causal powers (or dispositions, or some such) are differentially exercised. We argue that branching actualism undergirds successful responses to two recent cosmological arguments: the Grim Reaper Kalam argument and a modal argument from contingency. We also argue that branching actualism affords a response (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Andrew Loke’s indirect defence of the successive addition argument.Alex Malpass - 2023 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 94 (1):43-61.
    In this paper, we consider Andrew Loke’s recent contributions to the successive addition argument. Although he claims to develop the discussion, we conclude that he fails to provide anything that goes beyond the position critiqued by Fellipe Leon. When analysing Loke’s position, we find that his proposals either directly collapse back into those critiqued by Leon, or beg the relevant question at hand. We conclude with some speculations about why this sort of mistake may have arisen.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • A modified philosophical argument for a beginning of the universe.Andrew Loke - 2014 - Think 13 (36):71-83.
    Craig's second philosophical argument for a beginning of the universe presupposes a dynamic theory of time, a limitation which makes the argument unacceptable for those who do not hold this theory. I argue that the argument can be modified thus: If time is beginning -less, then it would be the case that a person existing and counting as long as time exists would count an actual infinite by counting one element after another successively, but the consequent is metaphysically impossible, hence (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations