This paper examines whether one can accept Quine's critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction while rejecting his indeterminacy of translation thesis. I argue that this is possible, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. Holding that linguistic synonymy is a well‐defined relation, and that translation is thus a determinate matter, does not commit one to the existence of an analytic‐synthetic distinction capable of playing the explanatory role that the traditional distinction was supposed to play, unless one holds that logical truths have distinctive epistemological (...) or semantic properties that other truths do not. It is therefore possible to deny that logical truths have any such properties, thus to deny the existence of an explanatorily significant analytic/synthetic distinction, while holding that linguistic synonymy is a well‐defined relation. A corollary of this position is that the indeterminacy thesis is false. (shrink)

This paper examines whether one can accept Quine's critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction while rejecting his indeterminacy of translation thesis. I argue that this is possible, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. Holding that linguistic synonymy is a well‐defined relation, and that translation is thus a determinate matter, does not commit one to the existence of an analytic‐synthetic distinction capable of playing the explanatory role that the traditional distinction was supposed to play, unless one holds that logical truths have distinctive epistemological (...) or semantic properties that other truths do not. It is therefore possible to deny that logical truths have any such properties, thus to deny the existence of an explanatorily significant analytic/synthetic distinction, while holding that linguistic synonymy is a well‐defined relation. A corollary of this position is that the indeterminacy thesis is false. (shrink)

The “observational categoricals” constitute a very special set of sentences of great importance in the last phase of Quine’s work. According to Quine, the grammatical structure and therefore the role played by these sentences considered by the philosopher as the neutral empirical content of theories would solve several difficulties in semantics and epistemology. Most urgent among them would be: the incommensurability of theories, their empirical verifiability, as well as explaining the language learning process. In consequence of the importance of their (...) task and their rather late appearance, we consider quite relevant to investigate in details the origin of these choice, as well as the structure and function of these sentences, very peculiars to Quine’s semantical approach. (shrink)