In this article, I endeavor to analyze Wittgenstein’s remarks on certain aspects of Freud’s theory in the hope to show that his criticism can be epistemologically fruitful to pinpoint some insurmountable theoretical difficulties in the metapsychological aspect of psychoanalysis, especially with regard to Freud’s insistent remarks that his deep psychology must be viewed as a scientific approach of psychic phenomena.

I demonstrate that analogies, both explicit and implicit, between Wittgenstein’s discussion of rituals, aesthetics, and psychoanalysis (and, indeed, his own philosophical methodology) suggest that he entertained the idea that Freud’s psychoanalytic project, when understood correctly—that is, as a descriptive project rather than an explanatory-hypothetical one—provides a “surveyable representation” (übersichtliche Darstellung) of certain psychological facts (as opposed to psychological concepts). The consequences of this account are that it offers an explanation of Wittgenstein’s admiration for and self-perceived affinity to Freud, as well (...) as of his apparent “know-nothing approach” to empirical psychology. (shrink)