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  1. Is the Mind Bayesian? The Case for Agnosticism.Jean Baratgin & Guy Politzer - 2006 - Mind and Society 5 (1):1-38.
    This paper aims to make explicit the methodological conditions that should be satisfied for the Bayesian model to be used as a normative model of human probability judgment. After noticing the lack of a clear definition of Bayesianism in the psychological literature and the lack of justification for using it, a classic definition of subjective Bayesianism is recalled, based on the following three criteria: an epistemic criterion, a static coherence criterion and a dynamic coherence criterion. Then it is shown that (...)
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  • Sample-Size Salience and Statistical Inference.John Murray, Marie Iding, Hilary Farris & Russ Revlin - 1987 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 25 (5):367-369.
  • Issues for the Next Generation of Base Rate Research.Jonathan J. Koehler - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):41-53.
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  • Base Rates Do Not Constrain Nonprobability Judgments.Paul D. Windschitl & Gary L. Wells - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):40-41.
  • The Perils of Reconstructive Remembering and the Value of Representative Design.Kim J. Vicente - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):40-40.
  • Throwing Out the Baby with the Bathwater? Let's Not Overstate the Overselling of the Base Rate Fallacy.Cynthia J. Thomsen & Eugene Borgida - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):39-40.
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  • Where Do You Stand on the Base Rate Issue?Douglas Stalker - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):38-39.
  • The Implicit Use of Base Rates in Experiential and Ecologically Valid Tasks.Barbara A. Spellman - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):38-38.
  • Improving Decision Accuracy Where Base Rates Matter: The Prediction of Violent Recidivism.Vernon L. Quinsey - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):37-38.
  • Conservatism Revisited: Base Rates, Prior Probabilities, and Averaging Strategies.Nancy Paule Melone & Timothy W. McGuire - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):36-37.
  • How Are Base Rates Used? Interactive and Group Effects.Peter J. McLeod & Margo Watt - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):35-36.
  • Which Reference Class is Evoked?Craig R. M. McKenzie & Jack B. Soll - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):34-35.
  • First Things First: What is a Base Rate?Clark McCauley - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):33-34.
  • Nuancing Should Not Imply Neglecting.Howard Margolis - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):32-33.
  • Fallacy and Controversy About Base Rates.Isaac Levi - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):31-32.
  • Probabilistic Fallacies.Henry E. Kyburg - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):31-31.
  • Studying the Use of Base Rates: Normal Science or Shifting Paradigm?Joachim Krueger - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):30-30.
  • Base Rates in the Applied Domain of Accounting.Lisa Koonce - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):29-30.
  • Critical and Natural Sensitivity to Base Rates.Gernot D. Kleiter - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):27-29.
  • P, P, and Base Rate Consideration.Yechiel Klar - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):26-27.
  • The Base Rate Controversy: Is the Glass Half-Full or Half-Empty?Gideon Keren & Lambert J. Thijs - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):26-26.
  • Physicians Neglect Base Rates, and It Matters.Robert M. Hamm - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):25-26.
  • Judgment Under Uncertainty: Evolution May Not Favor a Probabilistic Calculus.Lev R. Ginzburg, Charles Janson & Scott Ferson - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):24-25.
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  • Why Do Frequency Formats Improve Bayesian Reasoning? Cognitive Algorithms Work on Information, Which Needs Representation.Gerd Gigerenzer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):23-24.
  • Base Rates, Stereotypes, and Judgmental Accuracy.David C. Funder - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):22-23.
  • How to Reconsider the Base Rate Fallacy Without Forgetting the Concept of Systematic Processing.Pablo Fernandez-Berrocal, Julian Almaraz & Susana Segura - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):21-22.
  • Base Rates, Experience, and the Big Picture.Stephen E. Edgell, Robert M. Roe & Clayton H. Dodd - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):21-21.
  • The Purpose of Experiments: Ecological Validity Versus Comparing Hypotheses.Robyn M. Dawes - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):20-20.
  • Are Base Rates a Natural Category of Information?Terry Connolly - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):19-20.
  • The Need for a Theory of Evidential Weight.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):18-19.
  • The Implications of Koehler's Approach for Fact Finding.Craig R. Callen - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):18-18.
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  • Cognitive Algebra Versus Representativeness Heuristic.Norman H. Anderson - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):17-17.
  • The Base Rate Fallacy Reconsidered: Descriptive, Normative, and Methodological Challenges.Jonathan J. Koehler - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):1-17.
  • Advancing the Rationality Debate.Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):701-717.
    In this response, we clarify several misunderstandings of the understanding/acceptance principle and defend our specific operationalization of that principle. We reiterate the importance of addressing the problem of rational task construal and we elaborate the notion of computational limitations contained in our target article. Our concept of thinking dispositions as variable intentional-level styles of epistemic and behavioral regulation is explained, as is its relation to the rationality debate. Many of the suggestions of the commentators for elaborating two-process models are easily (...)
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  • How Can We Be Moral When We Are so Irrational?Nils-Eric Sahlin & Johan Brännmark - unknown
    Normative ethics usually presupposes background accounts of human agency, and although different ethical theorists might have different pictures of human agency in mind, there is still something like a standard account that most of mainstream normative ethics can be understood to rest on. Ethical theorists tend to have Rational Man, or at least some close relative to him, in mind when constructing normative theories. It will be argued here that empirical findings raise doubts about the accuracy of this kind of (...)
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