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Isaac Levi (1977). Subjunctives, Dispositions and Chances.

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  1.  8
    Four Ways in Which Theories of Belief Revision Could Benefit From Theories of Epistemic Justification.Gordian Haas - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    Belief revision theories aim to model the dynamics of epistemic states. Besides beliefs, epistemic states comprise most importantly justificational structures. Typically, belief revision theories, however, model the dynamics of beliefs while neglecting justificational structures over and above logical relations. Despite some awareness that this approach is problematic, how devastating the consequences of this neglect are has not yet been fully grasped. In this paper, I argue that taking justificational structures into account could solve four well-known problems of belief revision.
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  2.  1
    Back to Basics: Belief Revision Through Direct Selection.Sven Ove Hansson - forthcoming - Studia Logica:1-29.
    Traditionally, belief change is modelled as the construction of a belief set that satisfies a success condition. The success condition is usually that a specified sentence should be believed or not believed. Furthermore, most models of belief change employ a select-and-intersect strategy. This means that a selection is made among primary objects that satisfy the success condition, and the intersection of the selected objects is taken as outcome of the operation. However, the select-and-intersect method is difficult to justify, in particular (...)
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  3.  24
    AGM-Like Paraconsistent Belief Change.Rafael R. Testa, Marcelo E. Coniglio & Marcio M. Ribeiro - 2017 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 25 (4):632-672.
    Two systems of belief change based on paraconsistent logics are introduced in this article by means of AGM-like postulates. The first one, AGMp, is defined over any paraconsistent logic which extends classical logic such that the law of excluded middle holds w.r.t. the paraconsistent negation. The second one, AGMo , is specifically designed for paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs), which have a formal consistency operator that allows to recover all the classical inferences. Besides the three usual (...)
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  4.  37
    The Propensity Interpretation of Probability: A Re-Evaluation.Joseph Berkovitz - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (S3):629-711.
    Single-case and long-run propensity theories are among the main objective interpretations of probability. There have been various objections to these theories, e.g. that it is difficult to explain why propensities should satisfy the probability axioms and, worse, that propensities are at odds with these axioms, that the explication of propensities is circular and accordingly not informative, and that single-case propensities are metaphysical and accordingly non-scientific. We consider various propensity theories of probability and their prospects in light of these objections. We (...)
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  5.  52
    A Simulacrum Account of Dispositional Properties.Marco J. Nathan - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):253-274.
    This essay presents a model-theoretic account of dispositional properties, according to which dispositions are not ordinary properties of real entities; dispositions capture the behavior of abstract, idealized models. This account has several payoffs. First, it saves the simple conditional analysis of dispositions. Second, it preserves the general connection between dispositions and regularities, despite the fact that some dispositions are not grounded in actual regularities. Finally, it brings together the analysis and the explanation of dispositions under a unified framework.
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  6.  21
    Descriptor Revision.Sven Ove Hansson - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (5):955-980.
    A descriptor is a set of sentences that are truth-functional combinations of expressions of the form \ , where \ is a metalinguistic belief predicate and p a sentence in the object language in which beliefs are expressed. Descriptor revision ) is an operation of belief change that takes us from a belief set K to a new belief set \ where \ is a descriptor representing the success condition. Previously studied operations of belief change are special cases of descriptor (...)
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  7.  27
    Stratified Belief Bases Revision with Argumentative Inference.Marcelo Alejandro Falappa, Alejandro Javier García, Gabriele Kern-Isberner & Guillermo Ricardo Simari - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):161-193.
    We propose a revision operator on a stratified belief base, i.e., a belief base that stores beliefs in different strata corresponding to the value an agent assigns to these beliefs. Furthermore, the operator will be defined as to perform the revision in such a way that information is never lost upon revision but stored in a stratum or layer containing information perceived as having a lower value. In this manner, if the revision of one layer leads to the rejection of (...)
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  8.  23
    Blockage Contraction.Sven Ove Hansson - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):415-442.
    Blockage contraction is an operation of belief contraction that acts directly on the outcome set, i.e. the set of logically closed subsets of the original belief set K that are potential contraction outcomes. Blocking is represented by a binary relation on the outcome set. If a potential outcome X blocks another potential outcome Y, and X does not imply the sentence p to be contracted, then Y ≠ K ÷ p. The contraction outcome K ÷ p is equal to the (...)
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  9.  13
    Outcome Level Analysis of Belief Contraction.Sven Ove Hansson - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (2):183-204.
    The outcome set of a belief change operator is the set of outcomes that can be obtained with it. Axiomatic characterizations are reported for the outcome sets of the standard AGM contraction operators and eight types of base-generated contraction. These results throw new light on the properties of some of these operators.
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  10. Belief Revision I: The AGM Theory.Franz Huber - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):604-612.
    Belief revision theory studies how an ideal doxastic agent should revise her beliefs when she receives new information. In part I I will first present the AGM theory of belief revision (Alchourrón & Gärdenfors & Makinson 1985). Then I will focus on the problem of iterated belief revisions.
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  11.  69
    A Probabilistic Semantics for Counterfactuals. Part B.Hannes Leitgeb - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (1):85-121.
    This is part B of a paper in which we defend a semantics for counterfactuals which is probabilistic in the sense that the truth condition for counterfactuals refers to a probability measure. Because of its probabilistic nature, it allows a counterfactual to be true even in the presence of relevant -worlds, as long such exceptions are not too widely spread. The semantics is made precise and studied in different versions which are related to each other by representation theorems. Despite its (...)
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  12.  40
    Probabilistic Belief Contraction.Raghav Ramachandran, Arthur Ramer & Abhaya C. Nayak - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (4):325-351.
    Probabilistic belief contraction has been a much neglected topic in the field of probabilistic reasoning. This is due to the difficulty in establishing a reasonable reversal of the effect of Bayesian conditionalization on a probabilistic distribution. We show that indifferent contraction, a solution proposed by Ramer to this problem through a judicious use of the principle of maximum entropy, is a probabilistic version of a full meet contraction. We then propose variations of indifferent contraction, using both the Shannon entropy measure (...)
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  13.  50
    AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295 - 331.
    The 1985 paper by Carlos Alchourrón (1931–1996), Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson (AGM), "On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions" was the starting-point of a large and rapidly growing literature that employs formal models in the investigation of changes in belief states and databases. In this review, the first twentyfive years of this development are summarized. The topics covered include equivalent characterizations of AGM operations, extended representations of the belief states, change operators not included in (...)
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  14.  15
    AGM 25 Years.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295-331.
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  15.  25
    Norm-System Revision: Theory and Application. [REVIEW]Audun Stolpe - 2010 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 18 (3):247-283.
    This paper generalises classical revision theory of the AGM brand to sets of norms. This is achieved substituting input/output logic for classical logic and tracking the changes. Operations of derogation and amendment—analogues of contraction and revision—are defined and characterised, and the precise relationship between contraction and derogation, on the one hand, and derogation and amendment on the other, is established. It is argued that the notion of derogation, in particular, is a very important analytical tool, and that even core deontic (...)
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  16. New Surprises for the Ramsey Test.Malte Willer - 2010 - Synthese 176 (2):291 - 309.
    In contemporary discussions of the Ramsey Test for conditionals, it is commonly held that (i) supposing the antecedent of a conditional is adopting a potential state of full belief, and (ii) Modus Ponens is a valid rule of inference. I argue on the basis of Thomason Conditionals (such as ' If Sally is deceiving, I do not believe it') and Moore's Paradox that both claims are wrong. I then develop a double-indexed Update Semantics for conditionals which takes these two results (...)
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  17.  25
    On Revising Fuzzy Belief Bases.Richard Booth & Eva Richter - 2005 - Studia Logica 80 (1):29-61.
    We look at the problem of revising fuzzy belief bases, i.e., belief base revision in which both formulas in the base as well as revision-input formulas can come attached with varying degrees. Working within a very general framework for fuzzy logic which is able to capture certain types of uncertainty calculi as well as truth-functional fuzzy logics, we show how the idea of rational change from “crisp” base revision, as embodied by the idea of partial meet (base) revision, can be (...)
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  18.  49
    Defining Disposition Concepts: A Brief History of the Problem.W. Malzkorn - 2001 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 32 (2):335-353.
    The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, I give a brief account of the history of the debate on the problem of defining disposition concepts from its beginning in the late 1920s until today. This account is divided into four parts, corresponding with sections 2 to 5 of the paper, each of which deals with a major period of the debate. Section 2 reports up to the mid-1950s. Section 3 deals with important contributions to the discussion between 1955 and (...)
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  19.  1
    Defining Disposition Concepts: A Brief History of the Problem.Wolfgang Malzkorn - 2001 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 32 (2):335-353.
    The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, I give a brief account of the history of the debate on the problem of defining disposition concepts from its beginning in the late 1920s until today. This account is divided into four parts, corresponding with 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the paper, each of which deals with a major period of the debate. Section 2 reports up to the mid-1950s. Section 3 deals with important contributions to the discussion between 1955 (...)
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  20.  37
    Belief Revision Conditionals: Basic Iterated Systems.Horacio Arló-Costa - 1999 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 96 (1-3):3-28.
    It is now well known that, on pain of triviality, the probability of a conditional cannot be identified with the corresponding conditional probability [25]. This surprising impossibility result has a qualitative counterpart. In fact, Peter Gärdenfors showed in [13] that believing ‘If A then B’ cannot be equated with the act of believing B on the supposition that A — as long as supposing obeys minimal Bayesian constraints. Recent work has shown that in spite of these negative results, the question (...)
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  21.  58
    What's New Isn't Always Best.Sven Ove Hansson - 1997 - Theoria 63 (1-2):1-13.
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  22.  57
    Two Notions of Epistemic Validity.Horacio Arló Costa & Isaac Levi - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):217 - 262.
    How to accept a conditional? F. P. Ramsey proposed the following test in (Ramsey 1990).(RT) If A, then B must be accepted with respect to the current epistemic state iff the minimal hypothetical change of it needed to accept A also requires accepting B.
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  23.  37
    Reversing the Levi Identity.Sven Ove Hansson - 1993 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (6):637 - 669.
    The AGM (Alchourrón-Gärdenfors-Makinson) model of belief change is extended to cover changes on sets of beliefs that are not closed under logical consequence (belief bases). Three major types of change operations, namely contraction, internal revision, and external revision are axiomatically characterized, and their interrelations are studied. In external revision, the Levi identity is reversed in the sense that one first adds the new belief to the belief base, and afterwards contracts its negation. It is argued that external revision represents an (...)
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  24.  36
    In Defense of Base Contraction.Sven Ove Hansson - 1992 - Synthese 91 (3):239 - 245.
    In the most common approaches to belief dynamics, states of belief are represented by sets that are closed under logical consequence. In an alternative approach, they are represented by non-closed belief bases. This representation has attractive properties not shared by closed representations. Most importantly, it can account for repeated belief changes that have not yet been satisfactorily accounted for in the closed approach.
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  25.  12
    Similarity Semantics and Minimal Changes of Belief.Sven Ove Hansson - 1992 - Erkenntnis 37 (3):401-429.
    Different similarity relations on sets are introduced, and their logical properties are investigated. Close relationships are shown to hold between similarity relations that are based on symmetrical difference and operators of belief contraction that are based on relational selection functions. Two new rationality criteria for minimal belief contraction, the maximizing property and the reducing property, are proposed.
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  26.  84
    Belief Revision, Epistemic Conditionals and the Ramsey Test.Sten Lindström & Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz - 1992 - Synthese 91 (3):195-237.
    Epistemic conditionals have often been thought to satisfy the Ramsey test : If A, then B is acceptable in a belief state G if and only if B should be accepted upon revising G with A. But as Peter Gärdenfors has shown, RT conflicts with the intuitively plausible condition of Preservation on belief revision. We investigate what happens if RT is retained while Preservation is weakened, or vice versa. We also generalize Gärdenfors' approach by treating belief revision as a relation (...)
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  27.  55
    Normative Conflicts in Legal Reasoning.Giovanni Sartor - 1992 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 1 (2-3):209-235.
    This article proposes a formal analysis of a fundamental aspect of legal reasoning: dealing with normative conflicts. Firstly, examples are illustrated concerning the dynamics of legal systems, the application of rules and exceptions, and the semantic indeterminacy of legal sources. Then two approaches to cope with conflicting information are presented: the preferred theories of Brewka, and the belief change functions of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson. The relations between those approaches are closely examined, and some aspects of a model of reasoning (...)
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  28.  2
    Formalizing Falsification: Three Delete Operations.Rüdiger Schätz - 1990 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 36 (5):455-470.
  29.  16
    Formalizing Falsification: Three Delete Operations.Rüdiger Schätz - 1990 - Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 36 (5):455-470.
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  30.  63
    Strategic Behavior and Counterfactuals.Cristina Bicchieri - 1988 - Synthese 76 (1):135 - 169.
    The difficulty of defining rational behavior in game situations is that the players'' strategies will depend on their expectations about other players'' strategies. These expectations are beliefs the players come to the game with. Game theorists assume these beliefs to be rational in the very special sense of beingobjectively correct but no explanation is offered of the mechanism generating this property of the belief system. In many interesting cases, however, such a rationality requirement is not enough to guarantee that an (...)
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  31.  46
    Reflections on Deliberative Coherence.Leigh B. Kelley - 1988 - Synthese 76 (1):83 - 121.
    This paper treats two problem cases in decision theory, the Newcomb problem and Reed Richter''s Button III. Although I argue that, contrary to Richter, the latter case does not constitute a genuine counterexample to a standard general proposition of (causal) decision theory, I agree with and undertake to amplify his solution to the decision problem in Button III. I then apply the conclusions and distinctions in the foregoing treatment of Button III to the Newcomb problem and argue that a familiar (...)
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  32.  71
    Iteration of Conditionals and the Ramsey Test.Isaac Levi - 1988 - Synthese 76 (1):49 - 81.
  33.  52
    The Dynamics of Belief: Contractions and Revisions of Probability Functions.Peter Gärdenfors - 1986 - Topoi 5 (1):29-37.
    Using probability functions defined over a simple language as models of states of belief, my goal in this article has been to analyse contractions and revisions of beliefs. My first strategy was to formulate postulates for these processes. Close parallels between the postulates for contractions and the postulates for revisions have been established - the results in Section 5 show that contractions and revisions are interchangeable. As a second strategy, some suggestions for more or less explicit constructive definitions of the (...)
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  34.  29
    Consensus as Shared Agreement and Outcome of Inquiry.Isaac Levi - 1985 - Synthese 62 (1):3 - 11.
  35.  28
    Epistemic Importance and Minimal Changes of Belief.Peter Gärdenfors - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):136 – 157.
  36.  69
    On the Logic of Theory Change: Contraction Functions and Their Associated Revision Functions.Carlos E. Alchourron & David Makinson - 1982 - Theoria 48 (1):14-37.
  37.  50
    Probability and Explanation.James H. Fetzer - 1981 - Synthese 48 (3):371 - 408.