- Coping rationally with ambiguity: Robustness versus ambiguity-aversion.Klaus Nehring - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):303-334.details
|
|
A Gentle Approach to Imprecise Probabilities.Gregory Wheeler - 2022 - In Thomas Augustin, Fabio Gagliardi Cozman & Gregory Wheeler (eds.), Reflections on the Foundations of Probability and Statistics: Essays in Honor of Teddy Seidenfeld. Springer. pp. 37-67.details
|
|
Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
|
|
Keynes, Uncertainty and Interest Rates.Brian Weatherson - 2002 - Cambridge Journal of Economics 26 (1):47-62.details
|
|
The Bayesian and the Dogmatist.Brian Weatherson - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):169-185.details
|
|
How Degrees of Belief Reflect Evidence.James M. Joyce - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):153-179.details
|
|
What conditional probability could not be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.details
|
|
On Uncertainty.Brian Weatherson - 1998 - Dissertation, Monash Universitydetails
|
|
Deference Principles for Imprecise Credences.Giacomo Molinari - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Uncertainty, Rationality, and Agency.Wiebe van der Hoek - 2006 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
|
|
Descriptor Revision: Belief Change Through Direct Choice.Sven Ove Hansson - 2017 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.details
|
|
Peirce, Pedigree, Probability.Rush T. Stewart & Tom F. Sterkenburg - 2022 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 58 (2):138-166.details
|
|
Texting ECHO on historical data.Jan M. Zytkow - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):489-490.details
|
|
Old evidence and new theories.Lyle Zynda - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):67 - 95.details
|
|
Subjective causal networks and indeterminate suppositional credences.Jiji Zhang, Teddy Seidenfeld & Hailin Liu - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 27):6571-6597.details
|
|
On the impossibility of events of zero probability.Asad Zaman - 1987 - Theory and Decision 23 (2):157-159.details
|
|
Unphilosophical probability.Sandy L. Zabell - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):358-359.details
|
|
New surprises for the Ramsey Test.Malte Willer - 2010 - Synthese 176 (2):291 - 309.details
|
|
Objective Bayesian Calibration and the Problem of Non-convex Evidence.Gregory Wheeler - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (4):841-850.details
|
|
On the imprecision of full conditional probabilities.Gregory Wheeler & Fabio G. Cozman - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3761-3782.details
|
|
Psychology, or sociology of science?N. E. Wetherick - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):489-489.details
|
|
Cohen on contraposition.N. E. Wetherick - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):358-358.details
|
|
You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
|
|
Locating IBE in the Bayesian Framework.Jonathan Weisberg - 2009 - Synthese 167 (1):125-143.details
|
|
Competence, performance, and ignorance.Robert W. Weisberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-358.details
|
|
Bootstrapping in General.Jonathan Weisberg - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):525-548.details
|
|
Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
|
|
Should we respond to evil with indifference?Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):613–635.details
|
|
The importance of cognitive illusions.Peter Wason - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-356.details
|
|
On the formal properties of weighted averaging as a method of aggregation.Carl Wagner - 1985 - Synthese 62 (1):97 - 108.details
|
|
Independent forebrain and brainstem controls for arousal and sleep.Jaime R. Villablanca - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):494-496.details
|
|
Standard Decision Theory Corrected: Assessing Options When Probability is Infinitely and Uniformly Spread.Peter Vallentyne - 2000 - Synthese 122 (3):261-290.details
|
|
Psychology and the foundations of rational belief.Ryan D. Tweney, Michael E. Doherty & Clifford R. Mynatt - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):262-263.details
|
|
L. J. Cohen, again: On the evaluation of inductive intuitions.Amos Tversky - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):354-356.details
|
|
Extending explanatory coherence.Paul Thagard - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):490-502.details
|
|
Explanatory coherence (plus commentary).Paul Thagard - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):435-467.details
|
|
When adjunction fails.Choh Man Teng - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):501-510.details
|
|
Changing the theory of theory change: Towards a computational approach.Neil Tennant - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (3):865-897.details
|
|
Rejoinder.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1988 - Economics and Philosophy 4 (2):309.details
|
|
Decision Theory Without “Independence” or Without “Ordering”.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1988 - Economics and Philosophy 4 (2):267.details
|
|
Katz’s revisability paradox dissolved.Allard Tamminga & Sander Verhaegh - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):771-784.details
|
|
Two principles of bayesian epistemology.William Talbott - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (2):135-150.details
|
|
Is epistemic circularity a fallacy?William J. Talbott - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2277-2298.details
|
|
A non-probabilist principle of higher-order reasoning.William J. Talbott - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10).details
|
|
The Application of Constraint Semantics to the Language of Subjective Uncertainty.Eric Swanson - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (2):121-146.details
|
|
A critique of empiricist propensity theories.Mauricio Suárez - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (2):215-231.details
|
|
Inferential and non-inferential reasoning.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):1-29.details
|
|
Bayesian confirmation theory: Inductive logic, or mere inductive framework?Michael Strevens - 2004 - Synthese 141 (3):365 - 379.details
|
|
Satisficing, preferences, and social interaction: a new perspective.Wynn C. Stirling & Teppo Felin - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (2):279-308.details
|
|
Inferential competence: right you are, if you think you are.Stephen P. Stich - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):353-354.details
|
|