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  1. Inferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):1-29.
    It is sometimes suggested that there are two kinds of reasoning: inferential reasoning and non-inferential reasoning. However, it is not entirely clear what the difference between these two kinds of reasoning is. In this paper, I try to answer the question what this difference is. I first discuss three answers to this question that I argue are unsatisfactory. I then give a different answer to this question, and I argue that this answer is satisfactory. I end by showing that this (...)
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  • Not Giving the Skeptic a Hearing: Pragmatism and Radical Doubt.Erik J. Olsson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):98–126.
    Pragmatist responses to radical skepticism do not receive much attention in contemporary analytic epistemology. This observation is my motivation for undertaking a search for a coherent pragmatist reply to radical doubt, one that can compete, in terms of clarity and sophistication, with the currently most popular approaches, such as contextualism and relevant alternatives theory. As my point of departure I take the texts of C. S. Peirce and William James. The Jamesian response is seen to consist in the application of (...)
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  • The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - forthcoming - Philosophy Compass.
    Sometimes epistemologists theorize about belief, a tripartite attitude on which one can believe, withhold belief, or disbelieve a proposition. In other cases, epistemologists theorize about credence, a fine-grained attitude that represents one’s subjective probability or confidence level toward a proposition. How do these two attitudes relate to each other? This article explores the relationship between belief and credence in two categories: descriptive and normative. It then explains the broader significance of the belief-credence connection and concludes with general lessons from the (...)
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  • Don't Ask, Look! Linguistic Corpora as a Tool for Conceptual Analysis.Roland Bluhm - 2013 - In Migue Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. DuEPublico. pp. 7-15.
    Ordinary Language Philosophy has largely fallen out of favour, and with it the belief in the primary importance of analyses of ordinary language for philosophical purposes. Still, in their various endeavours, philosophers not only from analytic but also from other backgrounds refer to the use and meaning of terms of interest in ordinary parlance. In doing so, they most commonly appeal to their own linguistic intuitions. Often, the appeal to individual intuitions is supplemented by reference to dictionaries. In recent times, (...)
     
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  • In Defense of the Conditional Probability Solution to the Swamping Problem.Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):93-114.
    Knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Many authors contend, however, that reliabilism is incompatible with this item of common sense. If a belief is true, adding that it was reliably produced doesn't seem to make it more valuable. The value of reliability is swamped by the value of truth. In Goldman and Olsson (2009), two independent solutions to the problem were suggested. According to the conditional probability solution, reliabilist knowledge is more valuable in virtue of being a stronger (...)
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  • Barcan Marcus on Belief and Rationality.Erik J. Olsson - unknown
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  • Theory and Reality : Metaphysics as Second Science.Staffan Angere - unknown
    Theory and Reality is about the connection between true theories and the world. A mathematical framefork for such connections is given, and it is shown how that framework can be used to infer facts about the structure of reality from facts about the structure of true theories, The book starts with an overview of various approaches to metaphysics. Beginning with Quine's programmatic "On what there is", the first chapter then discusses the perils involved in going from language to metaphysics. It (...)
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  • Making Ranking Theory Useful for Psychology of Reasoning.Niels Skovgaard Olsen - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Konstanz
    An organizing theme of the dissertation is the issue of how to make philosophical theories useful for scientific purposes. An argument for the contention is presented that it doesn’t suffice merely to theoretically motivate one’s theories, and make them compatible with existing data, but that philosophers having this aim should ideally contribute to identifying unique and hard to vary predictions of their theories. This methodological recommendation is applied to the ranking-theoretic approach to conditionals, which emphasizes the epistemic relevance and the (...)
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  • Where’s the Bridge? Epistemology and Epistemic Logic.Vincent F. Hendricks & John Symons - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):137-167.
    Epistemic logic begins with the recognition that our everyday talk about knowing and believing has some systematic features that we can track and re‡ect upon. Epistemic logicians have studied and extended these glints of systematic structure in fascinating and important ways since the early 1960s. However, for one reason or another, mainstream epistemologists have shown little interest. It is striking to contrast the marginal role of epistemic logic in contemporary epistemology with the centrality of modal logic for metaphysicians. This article (...)
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  • Curiosity Was Framed.Dennis Whitcomb - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):664-687.
    This paper explores the nature of curiosity from an epistemological point of view. First it motivates this exploration by explaining why epistemologists do and should care about what curiosity is. Then it surveys the relevant literature and develops a particular approach.
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  • Unanimous Consensus Against AGM?Rush T. Stewart - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):222-231.
    Given the role consensus is supposed to play in the social aspects of inquiry and deliberation, it is important that we may always identify a consensus as the basis of joint inquiry and deliberation. However, it turns out that if we think of an agent revising her beliefs to reach a consensus, then, on the received view of belief revision, AGM belief revision theory, certain simple and compelling consensus positions are not always available.
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  • Conditional Choice with a Vacuous Second Tier.Rush Stewart - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):219-243.
    This paper studies a generalization of rational choice theory. I briefly review the motivations that Helzner gives for his conditional choice construction . Then, I focus on the important class of conditional choice functions with vacuous second tiers. This class is interesting for both formal and philosophical reasons. I argue that this class makes explicit one of conditional choice’s normative motivations in terms of an account of neutrality advocated within a certain tradition in decision theory. The observations recorded—several of which (...)
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  • Rationality, Reasoning and Group Agency.Philip Pettit - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (4):495-519.
    The rationality of individual agents is secured for the most part by their make-up or design. Some agents, however – in particular, human beings – rely on the intentional exercise of thinking or reasoning in order to promote their rationality further; this is the activity that is classically exemplified in Rodin’s sculpture of Le Penseur. Do group agents have to rely on reasoning in order to maintain a rational profile? Recent results in the theory of judgment aggregation show that under (...)
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  • Norm-System Revision: Theory and Application. [REVIEW]Audun Stolpe - 2010 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 18 (3):247-283.
    This paper generalises classical revision theory of the AGM brand to sets of norms. This is achieved substituting input/output logic for classical logic and tracking the changes. Operations of derogation and amendment—analogues of contraction and revision—are defined and characterised, and the precise relationship between contraction and derogation, on the one hand, and derogation and amendment on the other, is established. It is argued that the notion of derogation, in particular, is a very important analytical tool, and that even core deontic (...)
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  • Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.
    In this paper, I argue that the relationship between belief and credence is a central question in epistemology. This is because the belief-credence relationship has significant implications for a number of current epistemological issues. I focus on five controversies: permissivism, disagreement, pragmatic encroachment, doxastic voluntarism, and the relationship between doxastic attitudes and prudential rationality. I argue that each debate is constrained in particular ways, depending on whether the relevant attitude is belief or credence. This means that epistemologists should pay attention (...)
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  • A Defence of the Ramsey Test.Richard Bradley - 2007 - Mind 116 (461):1-21.
    According to the Ramsey Test hypothesis the conditional claim that if A then B is credible just in case it is credible that B, on the supposition that A. If true the hypothesis helps explain the way in which we evaluate and use ordinary language conditionals. But impossibility results for the Ramsey Test hypothesis in its various forms suggest that it is untenable. In this paper, I argue that these results do not in fact have this implication, on the grounds (...)
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  • Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    I explore how rational belief and rational credence relate to evidence. I begin by looking at three cases where rational belief and credence seem to respond differently to evidence: cases of naked statistical evidence, lotteries, and hedged assertions. I consider an explanation for these cases, namely, that one ought not form beliefs on the basis of statistical evidence alone, and raise worries for this view. Then, I suggest another view that explains how belief and credence relate to evidence. My view (...)
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  • How Not to Change the Theory of Theory Change: A Reply to Tennant.Sven Ove Hansson & Hans Rott - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3):361-380.
    A number of seminal papers on the logic of belief change by Alchourrön, Gärden-fors, and Makinson have given rise to what is now known as the AGM paradigm. The present discussion note is a response to Neil Tennant's [1994], which aims at a critical appraisal of the AGM approach and the introduction of an alternative approach. We show that important parts of Tennants's critical remarks are based on misunderstandings or on lack of information. In the course of doing this, we (...)
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  • Conservatism, Basic Beliefs, and the Diachronic and Social Nature of Epistemic Justification.Jeremy Koons - 2006 - Episteme 2 (3):203-218.
    Discussions of conservatism in epistemology often fail to demonstrate that the principle of conservatism is supported by epistemic considerations. In this paper, I hope to show two things. First, there is a defensible version of the principle of conservatism, a version that applies only to what I will call our basic beliefs. Those who deny that conservatism is supported by epistemic considerations do so because they fail to take into account the necessarily social, diachronic and self-correcting nature of our epistemic (...)
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  • Estándares múltiples de prueba en medicina y derecho.Andrés Páez - 2015 - In Hechos, evidencia y estándares de prueba. Ensayos de epistemolgía jurídica. Ediciones Uniandes. pp. 123-152.
    Varios teóricos del derecho han propuesto el uso de umbrales o estándares de prueba más flexibles y más finamente discriminados. En la medicina es común utilizar estándares que poseen estas características en los procedimientos diagnósticos y en los exámenes médicos. Esta ponencia ofrece un marco probabilístico para establecer estándares de prueba múltiples en cualquier disciplina. La tesis principal es que la evidencia es un concepto umbral con respecto a la probabilidad. Múltiples umbrales pueden ser establecidos en un marco de intervalos (...)
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  • Statistics is Not Enough: Revisiting Ronald A. Fisher's Critique (1936) of Mendel's Experimental Results (1866).Avital Pilpel - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 38 (3):618-626.
    This paper is concerned with the role of rational belief change theory in the philosophical understanding of experimental error. Today, philosophers seek insight about error in the investigation of specific experiments, rather than in general theories. Nevertheless, rational belief change theory adds to our understanding of just such cases: R. A. Fisher’s criticism of Mendel’s experiments being a case in point. After an historical introduction, the main part of this paper investigates Fisher’s paper from the point of view of rational (...)
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  • Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    Belief is a familiar attitude: taking something to be the case or regarding it as true. But we are more confident in some of our beliefs than in others. For this reason, many epistemologists appeal to a second attitude, called credence, similar to a degree of confidence. This raises the question: how do belief and credence relate to each other? On a belief-first view, beliefs are more fundamental and credences are a species of beliefs, e.g. beliefs about probabilities. On a (...)
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  • Epistemic Conservativity and Imprecise Credence.Jason Konek - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Unspecific evidence calls for imprecise credence. My aim is to vindicate this thought. First, I will pin down what it is that makes one's imprecise credences more or less epistemically valuable. Then I will use this account of epistemic value to delineate a class of reasonable epistemic scoring rules for imprecise credences. Finally, I will show that if we plump for one of these scoring rules as our measure of epistemic value or utility, then a popular family of decision rules (...)
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  • Review of Isaac Levi's "Pragmatism and Inquiry".Jason Konek - forthcoming - Mind.
    The twin pillars of Levi’s epistemology are his infallibilism and his corrigibilism. According to infallibilism, any agent is committed to being absolutely certain about anything she fully believes. From her own perspective, there is no serious possibility that any proposition she believes is false. She takes her own beliefs to be infallible, in this sense. But this need not make her dogmatic, on Levi’s view. According to his corrigibilism, an agent might come to have good reason to change her beliefs (...)
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  • Reductionism About Understanding Why.Insa Lawler - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (2):229-236.
    Paulina Sliwa (2015) argues that knowing why p is necessary and sufficient for understanding why p. She tries to rebut recent attacks against the necessity and sufficiency claims, and explains the gradability of understanding why in terms of knowledge. I argue that her attempts do not succeed, but I indicate more promising ways to defend reductionism about understanding why throughout the discussion.
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  • Consenso como sinécdoque y consenso como signo. Una crítica a la concepción rortyana de la verdad, la justificación y el consenso.Óscar L. González-Castán - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 39 (2):33-56.
    En este ensayo propongo un modelo teórico para comprender el significado y alcance de los acuerdos racionales a partir de una concepción determinada de las relaciones entre justificación y verdad. Desde este modelo, al que denomino “acuerdo como signo”, se puede sostener que no todo consenso racional que surge dentro de una comunidad humana, incluidas las científicas, tiene por qué remitir única y exclusivamente a las creencias de ese grupo social y a sus modos internos de justificarlas sin que ellas (...)
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  • An Epistemic Value Theory.Dennis Whitcomb - 2007 - Dissertation, Rutgers
    For any normative domain, we can theorize about what is good in that domain. Such theories include utilitarianism, a view about what is good morally. But there are many domains other than the moral; these include the prudential, the aesthetic, and the intellectual or epistemic. In this last domain, it is good to be knowledgeable and bad to ignore evidence, quite apart from the morality, prudence, and aesthetics of these things. This dissertation builds a theory that stands to the epistemic (...)
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  • Functional Vs. Relational Approaches to Belief Revision.Erik J. Olsson - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 253--268.
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  • Computers in Mathematical Inquiry.Jeremy Avigad - manuscript
    In Section 2, I survey some of the ways that computers are used in mathematics. These raise questions that seem to have a generally epistemological character, although they do not fall squarely under a traditional philosophical purview. The goal of this article is to try to articulate some of these questions more clearly, and assess the philosophical methods that may be brought to bear. In Section 3, I note that most of the issues can be classified under two headings: some (...)
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  • A Non-Probabilist Principle of Higher-Order Reasoning.William Talbott - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10).
    The author uses a series of examples to illustrate two versions of a new, nonprobabilist principle of epistemic rationality, the special and general versions of the metacognitive, expected relative frequency principle. These are used to explain the rationality of revisions to an agent’s degrees of confidence in propositions based on evidence of the reliability or unreliability of the cognitive processes responsible for them—especially reductions in confidence assignments to propositions antecedently regarded as certain—including certainty-reductions to instances of the law of excluded (...)
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  • In Pursuit of Resistance: Pragmatic Recommendations for Doing Science Within One’s Means. [REVIEW]Amy McLaughlin - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (3):353-371.
    Charles Peirce’s model of inquiry is supposed to demarcate appropriate methods of inquiry from specious ones. Cheryl Misak points out that Peirce’s explicit account fails, but can nevertheless be rescued by elements of his own system. While Misak’s criticism is a propos, her own attempt to fortify Peirce’s account does not succeed, as it falls prey to the same criticism she raises against Peirce’s explicit account. The account provided in this paper—the ‘open path’ alternative—draws from Peirce’s corollary to his “first (...)
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  • Truth-Conditional Pragmatics: An Overview.Francois Recanati - 2008 - In Richmond Thomason, Paolo Bouquet & Luciano Serafini (eds.), Perspectives on Context. CSLI Stanford. pp. 171-188.
  • How (Not) to Write the History of Pragmatist Philosophy of Science?Sami Pihlström - 2008 - Perspectives on Science 16 (1):26-69.
    This survey article discusses the pragmatist tradition in twentieth century philosophy of science. Pragmatism, originating with Charles Peirce's writings on the pragmatic maxim in the 1870s, is a background both for scientific realism and, via the views of William James and John Dewey, for the relativist and/or constructivist forms of neopragmatism that have often been seen as challenging the very ideas of scientific rationality and objectivity. The paper shows how the issue of realism arises in pragmatist philosophy of science and (...)
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  • On Non-Prioritized Multiple Belief Revision.Li Zhang - 2018 - Dissertation, KTH Royal Institute of Technology
    This thesis investigates a sort of non-prioritized multiple revision, the operation of making up one's mind, and its generalization, the operation of choice revision. Making up one's mind about a sentence is a belief change that takes the agent to a belief state in which either the sentence or its negation is believed. In choice revision, the input information is represented by a set of sentences, and the agent should make a choice on which sentences to be accepted. Apart from (...)
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  • Arguments as Belief Structures: Towards a Toulmin Layout of Doxastic Dynamics?Fabio Paglieri & Cristiano Castelfranchi - unknown
    Argumentation is a dialogical attempt to bring about a desired change in the beliefs of another agent – that is, to trigger a specific belief revision process in the mind of such agent. However, so far formal models of belief revision widely neglected any systematic comparison with argumentation theories, to the point that even the simplest argumentation structures cannot be captured within such models. In this essay, we endeavour to bring together argumentation and belief revision in the same formal framework, (...)
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  • Awareness and Equilibrium.Brian Hill - 2013 - Synthese 190 (5):851-869.
    There has been a recent surge of interest among economists in developing models of doxastic states that can account for some aspects of human cognitive limitations that are ignored by standard formal models, such as awareness. Epistemologists purport to have a principled reason for ignoring the question of awareness: under the equilibrium conception of doxastic states they favour, a doxastic state comprises the doxastic commitments an agent would recognise were he fully aware, so the question of awareness plays no role. (...)
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  • Knowability as Potential Knowledge.André Fuhrmann - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1627-1648.
    The thesis that every truth is knowable is usually glossed by decomposing knowability into possibility and knowledge. Under elementary assumptions about possibility and knowledge, considered as modal operators, the thesis collapses the distinction between truth and knowledge (as shown by the so-called Fitch-argument). We show that there is a more plausible interpretation of knowability—one that does not decompose the notion in the usual way—to which the Fitch-argument does not apply. We call this the potential knowledge-interpretation of knowability. We compare our (...)
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  • Probability Logic, Logical Probability, and Inductive Support.Isaac Levi - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):97-118.
    This paper seeks to defend the following conclusions: The program advanced by Carnap and other necessarians for probability logic has little to recommend it except for one important point. Credal probability judgments ought to be adapted to changes in evidence or states of full belief in a principled manner in conformity with the inquirer’s confirmational commitments—except when the inquirer has good reason to modify his or her confirmational commitment. Probability logic ought to spell out the constraints on rationally coherent confirmational (...)
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  • Notes on the History of Ideas Behind AGM.Peter Gärdenfors - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):115 - 120.
  • A General Family of Preferential Belief Removal Operators.Richard Booth, Thomas Meyer & Chattrakul Sombattheera - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (4):711 - 733.
    Most belief change operators in the AGM tradition assume an underlying plausibility ordering over the possible worlds which is transitive and complete. A unifying structure for these operators, based on supplementing the plausibility ordering with a second, guiding, relation over the worlds was presented in Booth et al. (Artif Intell 174:1339-1368, 2010). However it is not always reasonable to assume completeness of the underlying ordering. In this paper we generalise the structure of Booth et al. (Artif Intell 174: 1339-1368, 2010) (...)
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  • Blockage Contraction.Sven Ove Hansson - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):415-442.
    Blockage contraction is an operation of belief contraction that acts directly on the outcome set, i.e. the set of logically closed subsets of the original belief set K that are potential contraction outcomes. Blocking is represented by a binary relation on the outcome set. If a potential outcome X blocks another potential outcome Y, and X does not imply the sentence p to be contracted, then Y ≠ K ÷ p. The contraction outcome K ÷ p is equal to the (...)
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  • Verisimilitude and Belief Revision. With a Focus on the Relevant Element Account.Gerhard Schurz - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (2):203-221.
    The expansion or revision of false theories by true evidence does not always increase their verisimilitude. After a comparison of different notions of verisimilitude the relation between verisimilitude and belief expansion or revision is investigated within the framework of the relevant element account. We are able to find certain interesting conditions under which both the expansion and the revision of theories by true evidence is guaranteed to increase their verisimilitude.
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  • Contraction in Interrogative Belief Revision.Sebastian Enqvist - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (3):315 - 335.
    In the paper "On the role of the research agenda in epistemic change", Olsson and Westlund have suggested that the notion of epistemic state employed in the standard framework of belief revision (Alchourrón et al. 1985; Gärdenfors 1988) should be extended to include a representation of the agent's research agenda (Olsson and Westlund 2006). The resulting framework will here be referred to as interrogative belief revision. In this paper, I attempt to deal with the problem of how research agendas should (...)
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  • The Impossibility of Coherence.Erik J. Olsson - 2005 - Erkenntnis 63 (3):387-412.
    There is an emerging consensus in the literature on probabilistic coherence that such coherence cannot be truth conducive unless the information sources providing the cohering information are individually credible and collectively independent. Furthermore, coherence can at best be truth conducive in a ceteris paribus sense. Bovens and Hartmann have argued that there cannot be any measure of coherence that is truth conducive even in this very weak sense. In this paper, I give an alternative impossibility proof. I provide a relatively (...)
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  • F. P. Ramsey on Knowledge and Fallibilism.Erik J. Olsson - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (4):549–557.
    The paper deals mainly with two problems in the epistemology of Frank Plumpton Ramsey. One concerns his account of knowledge, the other his fallibilism. I argue that Ramsey failed to make room for the social aspect of knowledge and, furthermore, that he did not separate the fallibility of our view from its corrigibility. My positive proposal is to combine social reliabilism and corrigibilism with a rejection of fallibilism.
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  • Coherentist Contraction.SvenOve Hansson - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (3):315-330.
    A model of coherentist belief contraction is constructed. The outcome of belief contraction is required to be one of the coherent subsets of the original belief set, and a set of plausible properties is proposed for this set of coherent subsets. The contraction operators obtained in this way are shown to coincide with well-known belief base operations. This connection between coherentist and foundationalist approaches to belief change has important implications for the philosophical interpretation of models of belief change.
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  • Replacement—A Sheffer Stroke for Belief Change.Sven Ove Hansson - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (2):127-149.
    By replacement is meant an operation that replaces one sentence by another in a belief set. Replacement can be used as a kind of Sheffer stroke for belief change, since contraction, revision, and expansion can all be defined in terms of it. Replacement can also be defined either in terms of contraction or in terms of revision. Close connections are shown to hold between axioms for replacement and axioms for contraction and revision. Partial meet replacement is axiomatically characterized. It is (...)
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  • Severe Withdrawal (and Recovery).Hans Rott & Maurice Pagnucco - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):501-547.
    The problem of how to remove information from an agent's stock of beliefs is of paramount concern in the belief change literature. An inquiring agent may remove beliefs for a variety of reasons: a belief may be called into doubt or the agent may simply wish to entertain other possibilities. In the prominent AGM framework for belief change, upon which the work here is based, one of the three central operations, contraction, addresses this concern (the other two deal with the (...)
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  • Iterative Probability Kinematics.Horacio Arló-Costa & Richmond Thomason - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (5):479-524.
    Following the pioneer work of Bruno De Finetti [12], conditional probability spaces (allowing for conditioning with events of measure zero) have been studied since (at least) the 1950's. Perhaps the most salient axiomatizations are Karl Popper's in [31], and Alfred Renyi's in [33]. Nonstandard probability spaces [34] are a well know alternative to this approach. Vann McGee proposed in [30] a result relating both approaches by showing that the standard values of infinitesimal probability functions are representable as Popper functions, and (...)
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  • A Survey of Multiple Contractions.André Fuhrmann & Sven Ove Hansson - 1994 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 3 (1):39-75.
    The AGM theory of belief contraction is extended tomultiple contraction, i.e. to contraction by a set of sentences rather than by a single sentence. There are two major variants: Inpackage contraction all the sentences must be removed from the belief set, whereas inchoice contraction it is sufficient that at least one of them is removed. Constructions of both types of multiple contraction are offered and axiomatically characterized. Neither package nor choice contraction can in general be reduced to contractions by single (...)
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