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  1. The Cognitive Economy: The Probabilistic Turn in Psychology and Human Cognition.Petko Kusev & Paul van Schaik - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):294-295.
    According to the foundations of economic theory, agents have stable and coherent preferences that guide their choices among alternatives. However, people are constrained by information-processing and memory limitations and hence have a propensity to avoid cognitive load. We propose that this in turn will encourage them to respond to preferences and goals influenced by context and memory representations.
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  • The Voting Paradox … with a Single Voter? Implications for Transitivity in Choice Under Risk.David Butler & Pavlo Blavatskyy - 2020 - Economics and Philosophy 36 (1):61-79.
    The voting paradox occurs when a democratic society seeking to aggregate individual preferences into asocialpreference reaches an intransitive ordering. However it is not widely known that the paradox may also manifest for anindividualaggregating over attributes of risky objects to form a preference over those objects. When this occurs, the relation ‘stochastically greater than’ is not always transitive and so transitivity need not hold between those objects. We discuss the impact of other decision paradoxes to address a series of philosophical and (...)
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  • Philosophical Foundations of Neuroeconomics: Economics and the Revolutionary Challenge From Neuroscience.Roberto Fumagalli - 2011 - Dissertation, London School of Economics
    This PhD thesis focuses on the philosophical foundations of Neuroeconomics, an innovative research program which combines findings and modelling tools from economics, psychology and neuroscience to account for human choice behaviour. The proponents of Neuroeconomics often manifest the ambition to foster radical modifications in the accounts of choice behaviour developed by its parent disciplines. This enquiry provides a philosophically informed appraisal of the potential for success and the relevance of neuroeconomic research for economics. My central claim is that neuroeconomists can (...)
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  • Interdisciplinary Influences in Behavioral Economics: A Bibliometric Analysis of Cross-Disciplinary Citations.Alexandre Truc - 2021 - Journal of Economic Methodology 29 (3):217-251.
    Interdisciplinarity in behavioral economics has often been described as limited or decreasing since the 1980s. In this article, we investigate the interdisciplinary influences of behavioral ec...
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  • Confidence Biases and Learning Among Intuitive Bayesians.Louis Lévy-Garboua, Muniza Askari & Marco Gazel - 2018 - Theory and Decision 84 (3):453-482.
    We design a double-or-quits game to compare the speed of learning one’s specific ability with the speed of rising confidence as the task gets increasingly difficult. We find that people on average learn to be overconfident faster than they learn their true ability and we present an intuitive-Bayesian model of confidence which integrates confidence biases and learning. Uncertainty about one’s true ability to perform a task in isolation can be responsible for large and stable confidence biases, namely limited discrimination, the (...)
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  • Desire.Timothy Schroeder - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 (6):631-639.
    To desire is to be in a particular state of mind. It is a state of mind familiar to everyone who has ever wanted to drink water or desired to know what has happened to an old friend, but its familiarity does not make it easy to give a theory of desire. Controversy immediately breaks out when asking whether wanting water and desiring knowledge are, at bottom, the same state of mind as others that seem somewhat similar: wishing never to (...)
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  • Philosophy of Economics.Daniel M. Hausman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This is a comprehensive anthology of works concerning the nature of economics as a science, including classic texts and essays exploring specific branches and schools of economics. Apart from the classics, most of the selections in the third edition are new, as are the introduction and bibliography. No other anthology spans the whole field and offers a comprehensive introduction to questions about economic methodology.
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  • Life and Death Decisions and COVID‐19: Investigating and Modeling the Effect of Framing, Experience, and Context on Preference Reversals in the Asian Disease Problem.Shashank Uttrani, Neha Sharma & Varun Dutt - forthcoming - Topics in Cognitive Science.
  • What Are Axiomatizations Good For?Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler - 2019 - Theory and Decision 86 (3-4):339-359.
    Do axiomatic derivations advance positive economics? If economists are interested in predicting how people behave, without a pretense to change individual decision making, how can they benefit from representation theorems, which are no more than equivalence results? We address these questions. We propose several ways in which representation results can be useful and discuss their implications for axiomatic decision theory.
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  • Reasoning and Choice in the Monty Hall Dilemma : Implications for Improving Bayesian Reasoning.Elisabet Tubau, David Aguilar-Lleyda & Eric D. Johnson - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
  • The Effects of Probability Ambiguity on Preferences for Uncertain Two-Outcome Prospects.Mark F. Stasson, William G. Hawkes, H. David Smith & Walter M. Lakey - 1993 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 31 (6):624-626.
  • Stronger Attentional Biases Can Be Linked to Higher Reward Rate in Preferential Choice.Veronika Zilker - 2022 - Cognition 225:105095.
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  • Evaluation Scale or Output Format: The Attentional Mechanism Underpinning Time Preference Reversal.Yan-Bang Zhou, Qiang Li, Qiu-Yue Li & Hong-Zhi Liu - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    Time preference reversals refers to systematic inconsistencies between preferences and valuations in intertemporal choice. When faced with a pair of intertemporal options, people preferred the smaller-sooner option but assign a higher price to the larger-later one. Different hypotheses postulate that the differences in evaluation scale or output format between the choice and the bid tasks cause the preference reversal. However, these hypotheses have not been distinguished. In the present study, we conducted a hybrid task, which shares the same evaluation scale (...)
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  • Reasoning About Outcome Probabilities and Values in Preference Reversals.Marcus Selart, Ole Boe & Tommy Garling - 1999 - Thinking and Reasoning 5 (2):175 – 188.
    Research on preference reversals has demonstrated a disproportionate influence of outcome probability on choices between monetary gambles. The aim was to investigate the hypothesis that this is a prominence effect originally demonstrated for riskless choice. Another aim was to test the structure compatibility hypothesis as an explanation of the effect. The hypothesis implies that probability should be the prominent attribute when compared with value attributes both in a choice and a preference rating procedure. In Experiment 1, two groups of undergraduates (...)
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  • “To Navigate Safely in the Vast Sea of Empirical Facts”: Ontology and Methodology in Behavioral Economics.Erik Angner - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3557-3575.
    This paper examines issues of ontology and methodology in behavioral economics: the attempt to increase the explanatory and predictive power of economic theory by providing it with more psychologically plausible foundations. Of special interest is the epistemological status of neoclassical economic theory within behavioral economics, the runaway success story of contemporary economics. Behavioral economists aspire to replace the fundamental assumptions of orthodox, neoclassical economic theory. Yet, behavioral economists have gone out of their way to praise those very assumptions. Matthew Rabin, (...)
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  • Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - Mind:fzab031.
    We offer a new motivation for imprecise probabilities. We argue that there are propositions to which precise probability cannot be assigned, but to which imprecise probability can be assigned. In such cases the alternative to imprecise probability is not precise probability, but no probability at all. And an imprecise probability is substantially better than no probability at all. Our argument is based on the mathematical phenomenon of non-measurable sets. Non-measurable propositions cannot receive precise probabilities, but there is a natural way (...)
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  • Predictive Success and Non-Individualist Models in Social Science.Richard Lauer - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (2):145-161.
    The predictive inadequacy of the social sciences is well documented, and philosophers have sought to diagnose it. This paper examines Brian Epstein’s recent diagnosis. He argues that the social sciences treat the social world as entirely composed of individual people. Instead, social scientists should recognize that material, non-individualistic entities determine the social world, as well. First, I argue that Epstein’s argument both begs the question against his opponents and is not sufficiently charitable. Second, I present doubts that his proposal will (...)
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  • Behavioral Economics and the Public Acceptance of Synthetic Biology.Adam Oliver - 2018 - Hastings Center Report 48 (S1):S50-S55.
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  • The Deductive Method.Daniel M. Hausman - 1990 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):372-388.
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  • The Locality and Globality of Instrumental Rationality: The Normative Significance of Preference Reversals.Brian Kim - 2014 - Synthese 191 (18):4353-4376.
    When we ask a decision maker to express her preferences, it is typically assumed that we are eliciting a pre-existing set of preferences. However, empirical research has suggested that our preferences are often constructed on the fly for the decision problem at hand. This paper explores the ramifications of this empirical research for our understanding of instrumental rationality. First, I argue that these results pose serious challenges for the traditional decision-theoretic view of instrumental rationality, which demands global coherence amongst all (...)
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  • Regret, Recrimination and Rationality.Robert Sugden - 1985 - Theory and Decision 19 (1):77-99.
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  • Wilde Heuristics and Rum Tum Tuggers: Preference Indeterminacy and Instability.Mark Alfano - 2012 - Synthese 189 (S1):5-15.
    Models in decision theory and game theory assume that preferences are determinate: for any pair of possible outcomes, a and b, an agent either prefers a to b, prefers b to a, or is indifferent as between a and b. Preferences are also assumed to be stable: provided the agent is fully informed, trivial situational influences will not shift the order of her preferences. Research by behavioral economists suggests, however, that economic and hedonic preferences are to some degree indeterminate and (...)
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  • Probability Learning, Event-Splitting Effects and the Economic Theory of Choice.Steven J. Humphrey - 1999 - Theory and Decision 46 (1):51-78.
    This paper reports an experiment which investigates a possible cognitive antecedent of event-splitting effects (ESEs) experimentally observed by Starmer and Sugden (1993) and Humphrey (1995) – the learning of absolute frequency of event category impacting on the learning of probability of event category – and reveals some evidence that it is responsible for observed ESEs. It is also suggested and empirically substantiated that stripped-down prospect theory will accurately predict ESEs in some decision making tasks, but will not perform well in (...)
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  • Unique Nontransitive Measurement on Finite Sets.Peter C. Fishburn - 1990 - Theory and Decision 28 (1):21-46.
  • Beyond Circularity and Normativity: Measurement and Progress in Behavioral Economics.Michiru Nagatsu - 2010 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (2):265-290.
    This article assesses two major conceptual arguments against theories of choice.The first argument concerns the circularity of belief-desire psychology, on which decision theory is based. The second argument concerns the normativity arising from the concept of rationality. Each argument is evaluated against experimental practice in economics and psychology, and it is concluded that both arguments fail to establish their skeptical conclusion that there can be no science of intentional human actions.
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  • The Problem of External Validity (or “Parallelism”) in Experimental Economics.Francesco Guala - 1999 - Social Science Information 38 (4):555-573.
    This article is in three parts: in the first section, a real case of laboratory experimentation in economics illustrates what experimentalists do in order to test the external validity of their results. Then, it is shown that such a practice presupposes a specific conception of the causal relations economists are seeking. Some general remarks about the notions of external validity and parallelism are provided in conclusion.
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  • Economics, Psychology, and the Unity of the Decision Sciences.Roberto Fumagalli - 2016 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (2):103-128.
    In recent years, several authors have reconstructed the relationship between 20th-century economic theory and neuro-psychological research in terms of a three-stage narrative of initial unity, increasing separation, and ongoing reunification. In this article, I draw on major developments in economic theory and neuro-psychological research to provide a descriptive and normative critique of this reconstruction. Moreover, I put forward a reconstruction of the relationship between economics and neuro-psychology that, I claim, better fits both the available empirical evidence and the methodological foundations (...)
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  • Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups.Norbert L. Kerr, Robert J. MacCoun & Geoffrey P. Kramer - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (4):687-719.
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  • Overrepresentation of Extreme Events in Decision Making Reflects Rational Use of Cognitive Resources.Lieder Falk, L. Griffiths Thomas & Hsu Ming - 2018 - Psychological Review 125 (1):1-32.
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  • Demonstrating Unselfishness: They Haven't Done It Yet.Stephen C. Stearns - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (4):722-722.
  • The Collapsing Choice Theory: Dissociating Choice and Judgment in Decision Making. [REVIEW]Jeffrey M. Stibel, Itiel E. Dror & Talia Ben-Zeev - 2009 - Theory and Decision 66 (2):149-179.
    Decision making theory in general, and mental models in particular, associate judgment and choice. Decision choice follows probability estimates and errors in choice derive mainly from errors in judgment. In the studies reported here we use the Monty Hall dilemma to illustrate that judgment and choice do not always go together, and that such a dissociation can lead to better decision-making. Specifically, we demonstrate that in certain decision problems, exceeding working memory limitations can actually improve decision choice. We show across (...)
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  • Prospect Relativity: How Choice Options Influence Decision Under Risk.Neil Stewart, Nick Chater, Henry P. Stott & Stian Reimers - 2003 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 132 (1):23.
  • Levi's Account of Preference Reversals.Erik Angner - 2002 - Economics and Philosophy 18 (2):287-302.
    This paper argues that Isaac Levi's account of preference reversals is only a limited success. Levi succeeds in showing that an agent acting in accord with his theory may exhibit reversals. Nevertheless, the specific account that Levi presents in order to accommodate the behavior of experimental subjects appears to be disconfirmed by available evidence.
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  • Can Quantum Probability Provide a New Direction for Cognitive Modeling?Emmanuel M. Pothos & Jerome R. Busemeyer - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):255-274.
    Classical (Bayesian) probability (CP) theory has led to an influential research tradition for modeling cognitive processes. Cognitive scientists have been trained to work with CP principles for so long that it is hard even to imagine alternative ways to formalize probabilities. However, in physics, quantum probability (QP) theory has been the dominant probabilistic approach for nearly 100 years. Could QP theory provide us with any advantages in cognitive modeling as well? Note first that both CP and QP theory share the (...)
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  • A Framework for the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences.Herbert Gintis - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):1-16.
    The various behavioral disciplines model human behavior in distinct and incompatible ways. Yet, recent theoretical and empirical developments have created the conditions for rendering coherent the areas of overlap of the various behavioral disciplines. The analytical tools deployed in this task incorporate core principles from several behavioral disciplines. The proposed framework recognizes evolutionary theory, covering both genetic and cultural evolution, as the integrating principle of behavioral science. Moreover, if decision theory and game theory are broadened to encompass other-regarding preferences, they (...)
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  • Varieties of Bayesianism.Jonathan Weisberg - 2011
    Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 10, eds. Dov Gabbay, Stephan Hartmann, and John Woods, forthcoming.
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  • Advancing the Rationality Debate.Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):701-717.
    In this response, we clarify several misunderstandings of the understanding/acceptance principle and defend our specific operationalization of that principle. We reiterate the importance of addressing the problem of rational task construal and we elaborate the notion of computational limitations contained in our target article. Our concept of thinking dispositions as variable intentional-level styles of epistemic and behavioral regulation is explained, as is its relation to the rationality debate. Many of the suggestions of the commentators for elaborating two-process models are easily (...)
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  • Preference Reversal in Quantum Decision Theory.Vyacheslav I. Yukalov & Didier Sornette - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • The Ratio Bias Phenomenon: Fact or Artifact? [REVIEW]Mathieu Lefebvre, Ferdinand M. Vieider & Marie Claire Villeval - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (4):615-641.
    The ratio bias—according to which individuals prefer to bet on probabilities expressed as a ratio of large numbers to normatively equivalent or superior probabilities expressed as a ratio of small numbers—has recently gained momentum, with researchers especially in health economics emphasizing the policy importance of the phenomenon. Although the bias has been replicated several times, some doubts remain about its economic significance. Our two experiments show that the bias disappears once order effects are excluded, and once salient and dominant incentives (...)
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  • Stability of Risk Preferences and the Reflection Effect of Prospect Theory.Manel Baucells & Antonio Villasís - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (1-2):193-211.
    Are risk preferences stable over time? To address this question we elicit risk preferences from the same pool of subjects at two different moments in time. To interpret the results, we use a Fechner stochastic choice model in which the revealed preference of individuals is governed by some underlying preference, together with a random error. We take cumulative prospect theory as the underlying preference model (Kahneman and Tversky, Econometrica 47:263–292, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5:297–323, 1992). (...)
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  • A Patchier Picture Still: Biases, Beliefs and Overlap on the Inferential Continuum.Sophie Stammers - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1829-1850.
    It has been proposed that, whilst implicit attitudes, alike beliefs, are propositionally structured, 629–658, 2016), the former respond to evidence and modulate other attitudes in a fragmented manner, and so constitute a sui generis class, the “patchy endorsements”, 800–823, 2015). In the following, I demonstrate that the patchy endorsements theorist is committed to the truth of two claims: no implicit attitude is responsive to content to the same extent as any belief; and there is a significant gap between the most (...)
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  • An Integrative Descriptive Model of Ethical Decision Making.Kelly C. Strong & G. Dale Meyer - 1992 - Journal of Business Ethics 11 (2):89 - 94.
    This paper presents an integrative, descriptive model of ethical decision making, with special attention given to issues of measurement. After building the model, hypotheses are developed from a portion of it. These hypotheses are tested in an exploratory analysis to determine if further research and testing of this model and the measurement instruments it employs are warranted.
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  • On the Study of Statistical Intuitions.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1982 - Cognition 11 (2):123-141.
  • Assertion, Belief, and Context.Roger Clarke - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4951-4977.
    This paper argues for a treatment of belief as essentially sensitive to certain features of context. The first part gives an argument that we must take belief to be context-sensitive in the same way that assertion is, if we are to preserve appealing principles tying belief to sincere assertion. In particular, whether an agent counts as believing that p in a context depends on the space of alternative possibilities the agent is considering in that context. One and the same doxastic (...)
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  • When More Is Better – Consumption Priming Decreases Responders’ Rejections in the Ultimatum Game.Zürn Michael & Strack Fritz - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  • Children Do Not Exhibit Ambiguity Aversion Despite Intact Familiarity Bias.Rosa Li, Elizabeth M. Brannon & Scott A. Huettel - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • Basic Processes in Dynamic Decision Making: How Experimental Findings About Risk, Uncertainty, and Emotion Can Contribute to Police Decision Making.Jason L. Harman, Don Zhang & Steven G. Greening - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
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  • Gamble Evaluation and Evoked Reference Sets: Why Adding a Small Loss to a Gamble Increases its Attractiveness.Craig R. M. McKenzie & Shlomi Sher - 2020 - Cognition 194:104043.
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  • Do We Make Decisions for Other People Based on Our Predictions of Their Preferences? Evidence From Financial and Medical Scenarios Involving Risk.Eleonore Batteux, Eamonn Ferguson & Richard J. Tunney - 2019 - Thinking and Reasoning 26 (2):188-217.
    The ways in which the decisions we make for others differ from the ones we make for ourselves has received much attention in the literature, although less is known about their relationship to our p...
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  • Representation Theorems and the Foundations of Decision Theory.Christopher J. G. Meacham & Jonathan Weisberg - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):641 - 663.
    Representation theorems are often taken to provide the foundations for decision theory. First, they are taken to characterize degrees of belief and utilities. Second, they are taken to justify two fundamental rules of rationality: that we should have probabilistic degrees of belief and that we should act as expected utility maximizers. We argue that representation theorems cannot serve either of these foundational purposes, and that recent attempts to defend the foundational importance of representation theorems are unsuccessful. As a result, we (...)
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