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Christian List & Philip Pettit (2004). Aggregating Sets of Judgments: Two Impossibility Results Compared.

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  1.  10
    Democratic Institutions and Recognition of Individual Identities.Onni Hirvonen - 2016 - Thesis Eleven 134 (1):28-41.
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  2.  25
    The Logic of Group Decisions: Judgment Aggregation.Gabriella Pigozzi - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):755-769.
    Judgment aggregation studies how individual opinions on a given set of propositions can be aggregated to form a consistent group judgment on the same propositions. Despite the simplicity of the problem, seemingly natural aggregation procedures fail to return consistent collective outcomes, leading to what is now known as the doctrinal paradox. The first occurrences of the paradox were discovered in the legal realm. However, the interest of judgment aggregation is much broader and extends to political philosophy, epistemology, social choice theory, (...)
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  3. Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.
    Decision-making typically requires judgments about causal relations: we need to know the causal effects of our actions and the causal relevance of various environmental factors. We investigate how several individuals' causal judgments can be aggregated into collective causal judgments. First, we consider the aggregation of causal judgments via the aggregation of probabilistic judgments, and identify the limitations of this approach. We then explore the possibility of aggregating causal judgments independently of probabilistic ones. Formally, we introduce the problem of causal-network aggregation. (...)
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  4.  85
    A New Prospect for Epistemic Aggregation.Daniel Berntson & Yoaav Isaacs - 2013 - Episteme 10 (3):269-281.
    How should the opinion of a group be related to the opinions of the group members? In this article, we will defend a package of four norms pairs of prior probabilities and evidence. We show that there is a method of aggregating credal pairs that possesses all four virtues.
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  5. The Theory of Judgment Aggregation: An Introductory Review.Christian List - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):179-207.
    This paper provides an introductory review of the theory of judgment aggregation. It introduces the paradoxes of majority voting that originally motivated the field, explains several key results on the impossibility of propositionwise judgment aggregation, presents a pedagogical proof of one of those results, discusses escape routes from the impossibility and relates judgment aggregation to some other salient aggregation problems, such as preference aggregation, abstract aggregation and probability aggregation. The present illustrative rather than exhaustive review is intended to give readers (...)
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  6.  85
    Judgment Aggregation.Fabrizio Cariani - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (1):22-32.
  7. Group Communication and the Transformation of Judgments: An Impossibility Result.Christian List - 2011 - Journal of Political Philosophy 19 (1):1-27.
    While a large social-choice-theoretic literature discusses the aggregation of individual judgments into collective ones, there is much less formal work on the transformation of judgments in group communication. I develop a model of judgment transformation and prove a baseline impossibility theorem: Any judgment transformation function satisfying some initially plausible conditions is the identity function, under which no opinion change occurs. I identify escape routes from this impossibility and argue that the kind of group communication envisaged by deliberative democats must be (...)
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  8. The Impossibility of Unbiased Judgment Aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (3):281-299.
    Standard impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions either use a controversial systematicity condition or apply only to agendas of propositions with rich logical connections. Are there any serious impossibilities without these restrictions? We prove an impossibility theorem without requiring systematicity that applies to most standard agendas: Every judgment aggregation function (with rational inputs and outputs) satisfying a condition called unbiasedness is dictatorial (or effectively dictatorial if we remove one of the agenda conditions). Our agenda conditions are tight. (...)
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  9.  62
    Advances in Belief Dynamics: Introduction.F. Liu & O. Roy - 2010 - Synthese 173 (2):123-126.
    This is the introduction of the special issue,.
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  10.  74
    Ranking Judgments in Arrow’s Setting.Daniele Porello - 2010 - Synthese 173 (2):199-210.
    In this paper, I investigate the relationship between preference and judgment aggregation, using the notion of ranking judgment introduced in List and Pettit. Ranking judgments were introduced in order to state the logical connections between the impossibility theorem of aggregating sets of judgments and Arrow’s theorem. I present a proof of the theorem concerning ranking judgments as a corollary of Arrow’s theorem, extending the translation between preferences and judgments defined in List and Pettit to the conditions on the aggregation procedure.
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  11. Decision Framing in Judgment Aggregation.Fabrizio Cariani, Marc Pauly & Josh Snyder - 2008 - Synthese 163 (1):1 - 24.
    Judgment aggregation problems are language dependent in that they may be framed in different yet equivalent ways. We formalize this dependence via the notion of translation invariance, adopted from the philosophy of science, and we argue for the normative desirability of translation invariance. We characterize the class of translation invariant aggregation functions in the canonical judgment aggregation model, which requires collective judgments to be complete. Since there are reasonable translation invariant aggregation functions, our result can be viewed as a possibility (...)
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  12.  26
    The Budget-Voting Paradox.Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé - 2008 - Theory and Decision 64 (4):447-478.
    The budget-voting paradox states that, when social alternatives are proper subsets of a finite set of decisions, choosing decision-wise according to the majority rule may select an alternative that is covered in the majority tournament among alternatives. Individual preferences are defined on single decisions, and are extended to preferences over the alternative set by means of a preference extension rule. We prove the existence of the paradox for any rank-based, monotone, and independent extension rule.
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  13.  84
    Which Worlds Are Possible? A Judgment Aggregation Problem.Christian List - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (1):57 - 65.
    Suppose the members of a group (e.g., committee, jury, expert panel) each form a judgment on which worlds in a given set are possible, subject to the constraint that at least one world is possible but not all are. The group seeks to aggregate these individual judgments into a collective judgment, subject to the same constraint. I show that no judgment aggregation rule can solve this problem in accordance with three conditions: “unanimity,” “independence” and “non-dictatorship,” Although the result is a (...)
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  14.  15
    Judgment Aggregation and Subjective Decision-Making.Michael K. Miller - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (2):205-231.
    I present an original model in judgment aggregation theory that demonstrates the general impossibility of consistently describing decision-making purely at the group level. Only a type of unanimity rule can guarantee a group decision is consistent with supporting reasons, and even this possibility is limited to a small class of reasoning methods. The key innovation is that this result holds when individuals can reason in different ways, an allowance not previously considered in the literature. This generalizes judgment aggregation to subjective (...)
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  15. Strategy-Proof Judgment Aggregation.Christian List & Franz Dietrich - 2007 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (3):269-300.
    Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem. We also discuss weaker forms of non-manipulability and strategy-proofness. Comparing two frequently discussed aggregation rules, we show that “conclusion-based voting” is less vulnerable to manipulation than “premise-based voting”, (...)
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  16. Rawls' Idea of Public Reason and Democratic Legitimacy.Fabienne Peter - 2007 - Politics and Ethics Review 3 (1):129-143.
    Critics and defenders of Rawls' idea of public reason have tended to neglect the relationship between this idea and his conception of democratic legitimacy. I shall argue that Rawls' idea of public reason can be interpreted in two different ways, and that the two interpretations support two different conceptions of legitimacy. What I call the substantive interpretation of Rawls' idea of public reason demands that it applies not just to the process of democratic decision-making, but that it extends to the (...)
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  17.  30
    Right Decisions or Happy Decision-Makers?Katie Steele, Helen M. Regan, Mark Colyvan & Mark A. Burgman - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (4):349 – 368.
    Group decisions raise a number of substantial philosophical and methodological issues. We focus on the goal of the group decision exercise itself. We ask: What should be counted as a good group decision-making result? The right decision might not be accessible to, or please, any of the group members. Conversely, a popular decision can fail to be the correct decision. In this paper we discuss what it means for a decision to be "right" and what components are required in a (...)
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  18.  90
    Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision.Johan van Benthem - 2007 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):129-155.
    We show how belief revision can be treated systematically in the format of dynamicepistemic logic, when operators of conditional belief are added. The core engine consists of definable update rules for changing plausibility relations between worlds, which have been proposed independently in the dynamic-epistemic literature on preference change. Our analysis yields two new types of modal result. First, we obtain complete logics for concrete mechanisms of belief revision, based on compositional reduction axioms. Next, we show how various abstract postulates for (...)
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  19.  40
    Multiple Objectives: A Neglected Problem in the Theory of Human Action.Stephen Ellis - 2006 - Synthese 153 (2):313-338.
    The options that people face are rarely ideal: they are good in some ways and poor in others. People have problems choosing among such options because they don’t know which ends to favor. Multiple objectives pose a problem not only for decision makers, but also for our account of decision making. People act to achieve their ends given their beliefs. In order to handle decisions with multiple objectives, however, this story must be supplemented by an account of which ends are (...)
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  20. The Discursive Dilemma and Public Reason.Christian List - 2006 - Ethics 116 (2):362-402.
    Political theorists have offered many accounts of collective decision-making under pluralism. I discuss a key dimension on which such accounts differ: the importance assigned not only to the choices made but also to the reasons underlying those choices. On that dimension, different accounts lie in between two extremes. The ‘minimal liberal account’ holds that collective decisions should be made only on practical actions or policies and that underlying reasons should be kept private. The ‘comprehensive deliberative account’ stresses the importance of (...)
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  21. Belief Merging and the Discursive Dilemma: An Argument-Based Account to Paradoxes of Judgment Aggregation.Gabriella Pigozzi - 2006 - Synthese 152 (2):285-298.
    The aggregation of individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective decision on the same propositions is called judgment aggregation. Literature in social choice and political theory has claimed that judgment aggregation raises serious concerns. For example, consider a set of premises and a conclusion where the latter is logically equivalent to the former. When majority voting is applied to some propositions (the premises) it may give a different outcome than majority voting applied to another set of propositions (the (...)
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  22. Group Knowledge and Group Rationality: A Judgment Aggregation Perspective.Christian List - 2005 - Episteme 2 (1):25-38.
    In this paper, I introduce the emerging theory of judgment aggregation as a framework for studying institutional design in social epistemology. When a group or collective organization is given an epistemic task, its performance may depend on its ‘aggregation procedure’, i.e. its mechanism for aggregating the group members’ individual beliefs or judgments into corresponding collective beliefs or judgments endorsed by the group as a whole. I argue that a group’s aggregation procedure plays an important role in determining whether the group (...)
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  23.  78
    On the Many as One: A Reply to Kornhauser and Sager.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2005 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (4):377–390.
    In a recent paper on ‘The Many as One’, Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager look at an issue that we take to be of great importance in political theory. How far should groups in public life try to speak with one voice, and act with one mind? How far should public groups try to display what Ronald Dworkin calls integrity? We do not expect the many on the market to be integrated in this sense. But should we expect (...)
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  24.  46
    Changing the Rules of Play.Marc Pauly - 2005 - Topoi 24 (2):209-220.
    Social processes like voting procedures, debates, etc. depend crucially on the precise rules which define them. This rule sensitivity is illustrated by two examples, in the case of preference aggregation by the parliamentary debate concerning the German capital, and in the case of judgement aggregation by the doctrinal paradox or discursive dilemma. Using social choice functions and the theory of mechanism design, one can formulate what it means for a particular set of rules to be correct under a given game-theoretic (...)
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