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  1. Knowledge of Objective 'Oughts': Monotonicity and the New Miners Puzzle.Daniel Muñoz & Jack Spencer - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    In the classic Miners case, an agent subjectively ought to do what they know is objectively wrong. This case shows that the subjective and objective ‘oughts’ are somewhat independent. But there remains a powerful intuition that the guidance of objective ‘oughts’ is more authoritative—so long as we know what they tell us. We argue that this intuition must be given up in light of a monotonicity principle, which undercuts the rationale for saying that objective ‘oughts’ are an authoritative guide for (...)
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  • One Desire Too Many.Nathan Robert Howard - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    I defend the widely-held view that morally worthy action need not be motivated by a desire to promote rightness as such. Some have recently come to reject this view, arguing that desires for rightness as such are necessary for avoiding a certain kind of luck thought incompatible with morally worthy action. I show that those who defend desires for rightness as such on the basis of this argument misunderstand the relationship between moral worth and the kind of luck that their (...)
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  • Two Roles for Reasons: Cause for Divorce?Wooram Lee - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    An increasingly popular view in the literature on rationality attempts to vindicate the strong normativity of rationality by giving a unifying account of rational requirements and what one ought to do in terms of reasons that fall within one’s perspective. In this paper, I pose a dilemma for such a view: one’s rationality is determined by a narrower set of reasons, such as the set of reasons that one is attending to, whereas what one ought to do is determined by (...)
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  • The Importance of Being Rational, by Errol Lord. [REVIEW]Julia Staffel - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (4):523-527.
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  • Can Worsnip’s Strategy Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Apparent Evidence?Paul Silva - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-13.
    It's plausible to think that we're rationally required to follow our total evidence. It's also plausible to think that there are coherence requirements on rationality. It's also plausible to think that higher-order evidence can be misleading. Several epistemologists have recognized the puzzle these claims generate, and the puzzle seems to have only startling and unattractive solutions that involve the rejection of intuitive principles. Yet Alex Worsnip (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming) has recently argued that this puzzle has a tidy, attractive, (...)
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