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  1. Abductive logics in a belief revision framework.Bernard Walliser, Denis Zwirn & Hervé Zwirn - 2004 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 14 (1):87-117.
    Abduction was first introduced in the epistemological context of scientific discovery. It was more recently analyzed in artificial intelligence, especially with respect to diagnosis analysis or ordinary reasoning. These two fields share a common view of abduction as a general process of hypotheses formation. More precisely, abduction is conceived as a kind of reverse explanation where a hypothesis H can be abduced from events E if H is a good explanation of E. The paper surveys four known schemes for abduction (...)
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  • Reasoning Processes as Epistemic Dynamics.Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (1):41-60.
    This work proposes an understanding of deductive, default and abductive reasoning as different instances of the same phenomenon: epistemic dynamics. It discusses the main intuitions behind each one of these reasoning processes, and suggest how they can be understood as different epistemic actions that modify an agent’s knowledge and/or beliefs in a different way, making formal the discussion with the use of the dynamic epistemic logic framework. The ideas in this paper put the studied processes under the same umbrella, thus (...)
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  • An epistemic and dynamic approach to abductive reasoning: Abductive problem and abductive solution.Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada, Fernando Soler-Toscano & Ángel Nepomuceno-Fernández - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):505-522.
  • On representation theorems for nonmonotonic consequence relations.Ramón Pino Pérez & Carlos Uzcátegui - 2000 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (3):1321-1337.
    One of the main tools in the study of nonmonotonic consequence relations is the representation of such relations in terms of preferential models. In this paper we give an unified and simpler framework to obtain such representation theorems.
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  • Reasoning Processes as Epistemic Dynamics.Olga Pombo - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (1):41-60.
    This work proposes an understanding of deductive, default and abductive reasoning as different instances of the same phenomenon: epistemic dynamics. It discusses the main intuitions behind each one of these reasoning processes, and suggest how they can be understood as different epistemic actions that modify an agent’s knowledge and/or beliefs in a different way, making formal the discussion with the use of the dynamic epistemic logic framework. The ideas in this paper put the studied processes under the same umbrella, thus (...)
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  • Preferences and explanations.Ramón Pino-Pérez & Carlos Uzcátegui - 2003 - Artificial Intelligence 149 (1):1-30.
  • A Logic for Best Explanations.Jared Millson & Christian Straßer - 2019 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 29 (2):184-231.
    Efforts to formalize qualitative accounts of inference to the best explanation (IBE) confront two obstacles: the imprecise nature of such accounts and the unusual logical properties that explanations exhibit, such as contradiction-intolerance and irreflexivity. This paper aims to surmount these challenges by utilising a new, more precise theory that treats explanations as expressions that codify defeasible inferences. To formalise this account, we provide a sequent calculus in which IBE serves as an elimination rule for a connective that exhibits many of (...)
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  • Abductive inference in defeasible reasoning: a model for research programmes.Claudio Delrieux - 2004 - Journal of Applied Logic 2 (4):409-437.