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  1. Anomalous Monism.Steven Yalowitz - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Free Will and Epistemology: A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Robert Lockie - 2018 - London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.
    This is a work concerned with justification and freedom and the relationship between these. Its summational aim is to defend a transcendental argument for free will – that we could not be epistemically justified in undermining a strong notion of free will, as a strong notion of free will would be required for any such process of undermining to be itself epistemically justified. The book advances two transcendental arguments – for a deontically internalist conception of epistemic justification and the aforementioned (...)
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  • Reasons-Responsiveness and Ownership-of-Agency: Fischer and Ravizza's Historicist Theory of Responsibility. [REVIEW]David Zimmerman - 2002 - The Journal of Ethics 6 (3):199-234.
    No one has done more than John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza to advance our understanding of the important dispute in the theory of responsibility between structuralists and historicists. This makes it all the more important to take the measure of Responsibility and Control, their most recent contribution to the historicist side of the discussion. In this paper I examine some novel features of their most recent version of responsiblity-historicism, especially their new notions of "moderate reasons-responsiveness" and "ownership-of-agency." Fischer and (...)
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  • Passionate Yearning Theory as a Theory of Meaning in Life.Aribiah David Attoe - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-21.
    In this paper, I offer an original account of meaning in life, which I call the passionate yearning theory. Within the framework of the passionate yearning theory, meaning is understood as the intrinsically derived yearning, and passionate striving, for something that possesses some plausible objective claim to truth or facticity, which makes it worth pursuing for its own sake. To properly delineate the view, I present the various criteria that serve as the foundation for the passionate yearning view. These include (...)
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  • Blame Mitigation: A Less Tidy Take and its Philosophical Implications.Jennifer L. Daigle & Joanna Demaree-Cotton - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (4):490-521.
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  • Free Will and the Structure of Motivation.David Shatz - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):451-482.
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  • Education for Critical Thinking: Can It Be Non‐Indoctrinative?Stefaan E. Cuypers & Ishtiyaque Haji - 2006 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 38 (6):723–743.
    An ideal of education is to ensure that our children develop into autonomous critical thinkers. The ‘indoctrination objection’, however, calls into question whether education, aimed at cultivating autonomous critical thinkers, is possible. The core of the concern is that since the young child lacks even modest capacities for assessing reasons, the constituent components of critical thinking have to be indoctrinated if there is to be any hope of the child's attaining the ideal. Our primary objective is to defuse this objection. (...)
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  • What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree?Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):563-593.
    Incompatibilists and compatibilists (mostly) agree that there is a strong intuition that a manipulated agent, i.e., an agent who is the victim of methods such as indoctrination or brainwashing, is unfree. They differ however on why exactly this intuition arises. Incompatibilists claim our intuitions in these cases are sensitive to the manipulated agent’s lack of ultimate control over her actions, while many compatibilists argue that our intuitions respond to damage inflicted by manipulation on the agent’s psychological and volitional capacities. Much (...)
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  • Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.
    In this article we survey six recent developments in the philosophical literature on free will and moral responsibility: (1) Harry Frankfurt's argument that moral responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise; (2) the heightened focus upon the source of free actions; (3) the debate over whether moral responsibility is an essentially historical concept; (4) recent compatibilist attempts to resurrect the thesis that moral responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise; (5) the role of the control condition in free (...)
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  • The Many Faces of Autonomy.H. Tristram Engelhardt - 2001 - Health Care Analysis 9 (3):283-297.
    The challenge in maintaining patient autonomy regarding medical decision-making and confidentiality lies not only in control over information transferred to and regarding patients, but in the ambiguity of autonomy itself. post-modernity is characterized by the recognition of not just numerous accounts of autonomy, but by the inability in a principled fashion to select one as canonical. Autonomy is understood as a good, a right-making condition, and an element of human flourishing. In each case, it can have a different content, depending (...)
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  • Authentic Springs of Action and Obligation.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):239 - 261.
    What is the connection between action that is caused by inauthentic antecedent springs of action, such as surreptitiously engineered-in desires and beliefs, and moral obligation? If, for example, an agent performs an action that derives from such antecedent springs can it be that the agent is not obligated to perform this action owing to the inauthenticity of its causal antecedents? I defend an affirmative response, assuming that we morally ought to bring about the states of affairs that occur in the (...)
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  • Frankfurt, Responsibility, and Reflexivity.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2005 - Philosophia 32 (1-4):369-382.
  • Consumer Autonomy and Sufficiency of Gmf Labeling.Helena Siipi & Susanne Uusitalo - 2008 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 21 (4):353-369.
    Individuals’ food choices are intimately connected to their self-images and world views. Some dietary choices adopted by consumers pose restrictions on their use of genetically modified food (GMF). It is quite generally agreed that some kind of labeling is necessary for respecting consumers’ autonomy of choice regarding GMF. In this paper, we ask whether the current practice of mandatory labeling of GMF products in the European Union is a sufficient administrative procedure for respecting consumers’ autonomy. Three issues concerning this question (...)
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  • The Myth of Source.Bernard Berofsky - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):3 - 18.
    If determinism is a threat to freedom, that threat derives solely from its alleged eradication of power. The source incompatibilist mistakenly supposes that special views about the self are required to insure that we are the ultimate source of and in control of our decisions and actions. Source incompatibilism fails whether it takes the form of Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarianism or the various agent-causal varieties defended by Derk Pereboom and Randolph Clarke. It is argued that the sort of control free (...)
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  • Identification and Responsibility.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (4):349-376.
    Real-self accounts of moral responsibility distinguish between various types of motivational elements. They claim that an agent is responsible for acts suitably related to elements that constitute the agent's real self. While such accounts have certain advantages from a compatibilist perspective, they are problematic in various ways. First, in it, authority and authenticity conceptions of the real self are often inadequately distinguished. Both of these conceptions inform discourse on identification, but only the former is relevant to moral responsibility. Second, authority (...)
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  • Initial Design, Manipulation, and Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer - 2021 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 15 (2):255-270.
    This is a critical notice of Alfred Mele’s, Manipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility. I agree with Mele that moral responsibility is a historical phenomenon, but give some considerations in favor of a positive, rather than negative, historical condition for moral responsibility. I focus on Mele’s Zygote Argument, which is intended to present a challenge for compatibilism. I contend that the challenge can be met, and I offer an error theory of the appeal of the Zygote Argument.
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  • Semicompatibilismo, Responsabilidade e Manipulação.Leonardo Mello Ribeiro - 2011 - [email protected] - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 10 (2):255-279.
    Uma forte objeção a uma estratégia compatibilista da responsabilidade moral — isto é, à tese de que responsabilidade é compatível com uma explicação causal determinista do mundo — diz que, ao defender a possibilidade de agentes responsáveis determinados causalmente por fatos prévios às suas ações, uma estratégia compatibilista não dispõe dos recursos conceituais necessários para refutar a tese intuitiva de que agentes manipulados tacitamente não são responsáveis por suas ações. Neste artigo, fornecemos uma resposta a esta objeção, sugerindo como uma (...)
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  • Taking the Self Out of Self-Rule.Michael Garnett - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):21-33.
    Many philosophers believe that agents are self-ruled only when ruled by their (authentic) selves. Though this view is rarely argued for explicitly, one tempting line of thought suggests that self-rule is just obviously equivalent to rule by the self . However, the plausibility of this thought evaporates upon close examination of the logic of ‘self-rule’ and similar reflexives. Moreover, attempts to rescue the account by recasting it in negative terms are unpromising. In light of these problems, this paper instead proposes (...)
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  • Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of Nonhistorical Compatibilism. [REVIEW]Michael McKenna - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):145-174.
    Manipulation arguments for incompatibilism all build upon some example or other in which an agent is covertly manipulated into acquiring a psychic structure on the basis of which she performs an action. The featured agent, it is alleged, is manipulated into satisfying conditions compatibilists would take to be sufficient for acting freely. Such an example used in the context of an argument for incompatibilism is meant to elicit the intuition that, due to the pervasiveness of the manipulation, the agent does (...)
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  • Compatibilism and Personal Identity.Benjamin Matheson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):317-334.
    Compatibilists disagree over whether there are historical conditions on moral responsibility. Historicists claim there are, whilst structuralists deny this. Historicists motivate their position by claiming to avoid the counter-intuitive implications of structuralism. I do two things in this paper. First, I argue that historicism has just as counter-intuitive implications as structuralism when faced with thought experiments inspired by those found in the personal identity literature. Hence, historicism is not automatically preferable to structuralism. Second, I argue that structuralism is much more (...)
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  • Freedom as Satisfaction? A Critique of Frankfurt's Hierarchical Theory of Freedom.Christian F. Rostbøll - 2004 - SATS 5 (1):131-146.
  • Compatibilism, Evil, and the Free-Will Defense.A. A. Howsepian - 2007 - Sophia 46 (3):217-236.
    It is widely believed that (1) if theological determinism were true, in virtue of God’s role in determining created agents to perform evil actions, created agents would be neither free nor morally responsible for their evil actions and God would not be perfectly good; (2) if metaphysical compatibilism were true, the free-will defense against the deductive problem of evil would fail; and (3) on the assumption of metaphysical compatibilism, God could have actualized just any one of those myriad possible worlds (...)
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  • Towards a Structural Ownership Condition on Moral Responsibility.Benjamin Matheson - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):458-480.
    In this paper, I propose and defend a structural ownership condition on moral responsibility. According to the condition I propose, an agent owns a mental item if and only if it is part of or is partly grounded by a coherent set of psychological states. As I discuss, other theorists have proposed or alluded to conditions like psychological coherence, but each proposal is unsatisfactory in some way. My account appeals to narrative explanation to elucidate the relevant sense of psychological coherence.
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  • Liberty of the Higher-Order Will: Frankfurt and Augustine.John J. Davenport - 2002 - Faith and Philosophy 19 (4):437-461.
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  • Hard- and Soft-Line Responses to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument.Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):19 - 35.
    Derk Pereboom has advanced a four-case manipulation argument that, he claims, undermines both libertarian accounts of free action not committed to agent-causation and compatibilist accounts of such action. The first two cases are meant to be ones in which the key agent is not responsible for his actions owing to his being manipulated. We first consider a “hard-line” response to this argument that denies that the agent is not morally responsible in these cases. We argue that this response invites a (...)
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  • Unable or Unwilling to Exercise Self-Control? The Impact of Neuroscience on Perceptions of Impulsive Offenders.Robert Blakey & Tobias P. Kremsmayer - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
  • Fischer and Ravizza on History and Ownership.Seth Shabo - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):103-114.
  • The Principle of Alternate Possibilities.Phillip Gosselin - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):91-104.
    The standard argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility employs the following two premises:A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise:A person could have done otherwise only if his action was not causally determined.While premise two has been the focus of an enormous amount of controversy, premise one until recently has remained virtually unchallenged. However, since Harry Frankfurt’s provocative paper in 1969, premise one, which he dubbed the principle of (...)
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  • Criticisms to the Causal Approach of the Action Proposed by Harry Frankfurt.Jorge Gregorio Posada Ramírez - 2010 - Discusiones Filosóficas 11 (17):167-179.
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  • Responsibility and the Self-Made Self.Bruce N. Waller - 1993 - Analysis 53 (1):45 - 51.