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John R. Lucas (1968). Satan Stultified: A Rejoinder to Paul Benacerraf.

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  1.  57
    Consistency, Mechanicalness, and the Logic of the Mind.Qiuen Yu - 1992 - Synthese 90 (1):145-79.
    G. Priest's anti-consistency argument (Priest 1979, 1984, 1987) and J. R. Lucas's anti-mechanist argument (Lucas 1961, 1968, 1970, 1984) both appeal to Gödel incompleteness. By way of refuting them, this paper defends the thesis of quartet compatibility, viz., that the logic of the mind can simultaneously be Gödel incomplete, consistent, mechanical, and recursion complete (capable of all means of recursion). A representational approach is pursued, which owes its origin to works by, among others, J. Myhill (1964), P. Benacerraf (1967), J. (...)
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  2.  27
    Minds, Machines and Self-Reference.Peter Slezak - 1984 - Dialectica 38 (1):17-34.
    SummaryJ.R. Lucas has argued that it follows from Godel's Theorem that the mind cannot be a machine or represented by any formal system. Although this notorious argument against the mechanism thesis has received considerable attention in the literature, it has not been decisively rebutted, even though mechanism is generally thought to be the only plausible view of the mind. In this paper I offer an analysis of Lucas's argument which shows that it derives its persuasiveness from a subtle confusion. In (...)
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