When one looks at the extensive literature on collectivity in philosophy, it may seem that every item in the family of collective states, traits and entities has been examined, but one crucial state has largely been left out of focus: collective intellectual self-trust. In this article I propose a novel conception of collective intellectual self-trust and explain the role of collective intellectual self-trust in groups. I start with a short overview of individual intellectual self-trust, then I introduce what kinds of (...) groups are capable of having collective intellectual self-trust. Against this background I develop the constituents of collective intellectual self-trust. Then I turn to the differences between warranted and unwarranted collective intellectual self-trust and their function in different groups. I close by discussing an objection about the acquisition of collective intellectual self-trust. These are first steps in an epistemology of collective intellectual self-trust that aim to provide the ground for further work in this field. (shrink)