RESUMEN En primer lugar, se presenta el fenómeno de los desacuerdos básicos entre pares epistémicos y se argumenta que son relevantes y merecen atención. En segundo lugar, se discute el argumento estándar a favor del conciliacionismo. Finalmente, se defiende que las razones típicas para conciliar no se aplican en los desacuerdos básicos entre pares, de manera que en estos casos está permitido ser obstinado. ABSTRACT The article starts out by introducing the phenomenon of basic disagreements among epistemic peers and arguing (...) that they are relevant and deserve attention. Secondly, it discusses the standard argument in favor of conciliationism. Finally, it holds that the typical reasons for conciliating do not apply to basic disagreements among peers, so that in these cases it is possible to be obstinate. (shrink)

Philosophers of science have often favoured reductive approaches to how-possibly explanation. This article identifies three alternative conceptions making how-possibly explanation an interesting phenomenon in its own right. The first variety approaches “how possibly X?” by showing that X is not epistemically impossible. This can sometimes be achieved by removing misunderstandings concerning the implications of one’s current belief system but involves characteristically a modification of this belief system so that acceptance of X does not result in contradiction. The second variety offers (...) a potential how-explanation of X. It is usually followed by a range of further potential how-explanations of the same phenomenon. In recent literature the factual claims implied by the second variety have been downplayed whereas the heuristic role of mapping the space of conceptual possibilities has been emphasized. I will focus especially on this truth-bracketing sense of potentiality when looking closer at the second variety in the paper. The third variety has attracted less interest. It presents a partial how-explanation of X. Typically it aims to establish the existence of a mechanism by which X could be and was generated. The third conception stands out as the natural alternative for the advocate of ontic how-possibly explanations. This article transfers Salmon’s view that explanation-concepts can be broadly divided into epistemic, modal, and ontic to the context of how-possibly explanations. Moreover, it is argued that each of the three above-mentioned varieties of how-possibly explanation occurs in science. To recognize this may be especially relevant for philosophers. We are often misled by the promises of various why-explanation accounts, and seem to have forgotten nearly everything about the diversity of how-possibly explanations. (shrink)

The object of this paper is twofold: to show that resistance to scientific change on the part of scientists need signal neither irrationality nor the presence of extra-scientific influences; and to show how such resistance can be accommodated within a theory of rational choice. After considerations have been outlined suggesting that scientists cannot rationally resist new scientific theories unless theory choice is subjectivistic (section I), evidence is adduced favoring the contrary view (section II). In section III, a non-subjectivistic, non-relativistic conception (...) of rational choice is proposed which recognizes the possibility of scientists' rationally resisting new scientific developments. Finally, in section IV, some minor misunderstandings concerning resistance are discussed. (shrink)

O debate epistemológico ocorrido recentemente sobre o que veio a ser chamado de "o problema do desacordo racional" retomou a discussão, presente no ceticismo antigo, relativa ao significado epistêmico do desacordo. Similar ao cético pirrônico, alguns autores envolvidos no debate contemporâneo argumentaram que em contextos controversos, onde há desacordo sobre alguma questão específica, a atitude racional de ambos os lados do debate é a suspensão do juízo. Para esses autores, tal veredito deve ser estendido a diversas áreas do conhecimento humano, (...) resultando num ceticismo local relativo a tópicos controversos. Este artigo trata dessa problemática no campo científico. Em diversos episódios de controvérsia científica, cientistas exibem desacordos persistentes em que cada lado do debate mantém sua posição em face do desacordo. Nesse contexto, coloca-se a pergunta pela possibilidade do desacordo racional entre cientistas considerados pares epistêmicos. A partir da característica estrutural e dinâmica da ciência, argumenta-se que o desacordo racional entre cientistas é possível. Ou seja, diferente do que sustentam autores contemporâneos, no contexto científico o significado epistêmico do desacordo não é, necessariamente, o agnosticismo. Recent epistemological debate about what came to be called "the problem of rational disagreement" resumed the discussion, present among the ancient skeptics, on the epistemic significance of disagreement. Similar to the Pyrrhonian skeptic, some authors involved in the contemporary debate argued that in controversial contexts, where there is disagreement on some specific matter, the rational attitude of both sides of the debate is the suspension of judgment. For these authors, such a verdict should be extended to several fields of human knowledge, resulting in local skepticism regarding controversial topics. This article addresses this problematic in the scientific field. In several episodes of scientific controversy, scientists exhibit persistent disagreements where each side of the debate maintains his position in the face of disagreement. In this context, the question of the possibility of rational disagreement among scientists considered epistemic peers arises. From the structural and dynamic characteristics of science, it is argued that rational disagreement between scientists is possible. In other words, unlike the claims of contemporary authors, in the scientific context the epistemic significance of disagreement is not, necessarily, agnosticism. (shrink)

Inconsistencies between scientific theories have been studied, by and large, from the perspective of paraconsistent logic. This approach considered the formal properties of theories and the structure of inferences one can legitimately draw from theories. However, inconsistencies can be also analysed from the perspective of modelling practices, in particular how modelling practices may lead scientists to form opinions and attitudes that are different, but not necessarily inconsistent. In such cases, it is preferable to talk about disagreement, rather than inconsistency. Disagreement (...) may originate in, or concern, a number of epistemic, socio-political or psychological factors. In this paper, we offer an account of the ‘loci and reasons’ for disagreement at different stages of the scientific process. We then present a controversial episode in the health sciences: the studies on hypercholesterolemia. The causes and effects of high levels of cholesterol in blood have been long and hotly debated, to the point of deserving the name of ‘cholesterol wars’; the debate, to be sure, isn’t settled yet. In this contribution, we focus on some selected loci and reasons for disagreement that occurred between 1920 and 1994 in the studies on hypercholesterolemia. We hope that our analysis of ‘loci and reasons’ for disagreement may shed light on the cholesterol wars, and possibly on other episodes of scientific disagreement. (shrink)