Switch to: References

Citations of:

Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account

Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann (2017)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Towards a Balanced Account of Expertise.Christian Quast - 2018 - Social Epistemology 32 (6):397-418.
    The interdisciplinary debate about the nature of expertise often conflates having expertise with either the individual possession of competences or a certain role ascription. In contrast to this, the paper attempts to demonstrate how different dimensions of expertise ascription are inextricably interwoven. As a result, a balanced account of expertise will be proposed that more accurately determines the closer relationship between the expert’s dispositions, their manifestations and the expert’s function. This finally results in an advanced understanding of expertise that views (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Agentive und andere Fähigkeiten: Bemerkungen zu Agents' Abilities von Romy Jaster.David Löwenstein - 2020 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 74 (3):448-453.
    Agents' Abilities ist ein Geschenk von einem Buch, das man nicht genug loben kann. Und deswegen versuche ich es erst gar nicht. Stattdessen beschränke ich mich auf einige konstruktiv-kritische Bemerkungen, die in zwei miteinander verbundenen Bereichen Perspektiven der Weiterentwicklung und Verfeinerung aufzeigen sollen.
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Thinking by Doing: Rylean Regress and the Metaphysics of Action.Markos Valaris - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3395-3412.
    Discussions of Ryle’s regress argument against the “intellectualist legend” have largely focused on whether it is effective against a certain view about knowledge how, namely, the view that knowledge how is a species of propositional knowledge. This is understandable, as this is how Ryle himself framed the issue. Nevertheless, this focus has tended to obscure some different concerns which are no less pressing—either for Ryle or for us today. More specifically, I argue that a version of Ryle’s regress confronts any (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Know-How, Action, and Luck.Carlotta Pavese - forthcoming - Synthese.
    A good surgeon knows how to perform a surgery; a good architect knows how to design a house. We value their know-how. We ordinarily look for it. What makes it so valuable? A natural response is that know-how is valuable because it explains success. A surgeon’s know-how explains their success at performing a surgery. And an architect’s know-how explains their success at designing houses that stand up. We value know-how because of its special explanatory link to success. But in virtue (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Knowing How, Basic Actions, and Ways of Doing Things.Kevin Lynch - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (8):956-977.
    This paper investigates whether we can know how to do basic actions, from the perspective according to which knowing how to do something requires knowledge of a way to do it. A key argument from this perspective against basic know-how is examined and is found to be unsound, involving the false premise that there are no ways of doing basic actions. However, a new argument along similar lines is then developed, which contends that there are no ways of doing basic (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Are Abilities Dispositions?Barbara Vetter - forthcoming - Synthese 196 (1).
    Abilities are in many ways central to what being an agent means, and they are appealed to in philosophical accounts of a great many different phenomena. It is often assumed that abilities are some kind of dispositional property, but it is rarely made explicit exactly which dispositional properties are our abilities. Two recent debates provide two different answers to that question: the new dispositionalism in the debate about free will, and virtue reliabilism in epistemology. This paper argues that both answers (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Agents’ Abilities.Romy Jaster - 2020 - Berlin, New York: De Gruyter.
    In the book, I provide an account of what it is for an agent to have an ability. According to the Success View, abilities are all about success across possible situations. In developing and applying the view, the book elucidates the relation between abilities on the one hand and possibility, counterfactuals, and dispositions on the other; it sheds light on the distinction between general and specific abilities; it offers an understanding of degrees of abilities; it explains which role intentions and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Concepts and Action. Know-How and Beyond.David Löwenstein - forthcoming - In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schröder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion. New Essays. London, Ontario, Kanada:
    Which role do concepts play in a person's actions? Do concepts underwrite the very idea of agency in somebody's acting? Or is the appeal to concepts in action a problematic form of over-intellectualization which obstructs a proper picture of genuine agency? Within the large and complicated terrain of these questions, the debate about know-how has been of special interest in recent years. In this paper, I shall try to spell out what know-how can tell us about the role of concepts (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):86-104.
    The debate about the nature of knowledge-how is standardly thought to be divided between intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of propositional knowledge, and anti-intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of ability. In this paper, I explore a compromise position—the interrogative capacity view—which claims that knowing how to do something is a certain kind of ability to generate answers to the question of how to do it. This view combines the intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • A Relational Account of Intellectual Autonomy.Benjamin Elzinga - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):22-47.
    According to relational views of autonomy, some social relations or forms of dependence are necessary for autonomous agency. Recent relational theorists have primarily focused on autonomy of action or practical autonomy, and the result has been a shift away from individualistic conceptions of autonomy in the practical realm. Despite these trends, individualistic conceptions are still the default when it comes to autonomy of belief or intellectual autonomy. In this paper, I argue for a relational account of intellectual autonomy. Specifically, I (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Know-how, Routinen und Automatismen. Ein Kommentar zu David Löwensteins Know-how as Competence.Eva-Maria Jung - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (1):105-109.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Précis Zu Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (1):95-99.
    This is a précis of my book "Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account".
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Regresse Und Routinen. Repliken Auf Brandt Und Jung.David Löwenstein - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (1):110-113.
    This paper responds to comments and criticisms by Stefan Brandt and Eva-Maria Jung, directed at the book "Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account".
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Wissen, Können und Verstehen.Hannes Worthmann - 2019 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67 (1):139-145.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 67 Heft: 1 Seiten: 139-145.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A Dispositional Account of Practical Knowledge.Constantin Jan - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2309-2329.
    Is knowledge-how, or “practical” knowledge, a species of knowledge-that, or “theoretical” knowledge? There is no comfortable position to take in the debate around this question. On the one hand, there are counterexamples against the anti-intellectualist thesis that practical knowledge is best analysed as an ability. They show that having an ability to ϕ is not necessary for knowing how to ϕ. On the other hand, the intellectualist analysis of practical knowledge as a subspecies of theoretical knowledge is threatened by its (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Intellectualizing Know How.Benjamin Elzinga - 2019 - Synthese:1-20.
    Following Gilbert Ryle’s arguments, many philosophers took it for granted that someone knows how to do something just in case they have the ability to do it. Within the last couple decades, new intellectualists have challenged this longstanding anti-intellectualist assumption. Their central contention is that mere abilities aren’t on the same rational, epistemic level as know how. My goal is to intellectualize know how without over-intellectualizing it. Intelligent behavior is characteristically flexible or responsive to novelty, and the distinctive feature of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • ‘Know-How as Competence: A Rylean Responsibilist Account’, by David Löwenstein. [REVIEW]Yuri Cath - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):633-634.
    Volume 97, Issue 3, September 2019, Page 633-634.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Verantwortliche Kontrolle und Ryleanische Regresse. Kommentar zu David Löwensteins Know-how as Competence.Stefan Brandt - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (1):100-104.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • ›Wissen, dass‹ und ›Wissen, wie‹.David Löwenstein - 2019 - In Martin Grajner & Guido Melchior (eds.), Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler. pp. 116-121.
    This is an introduction to the debate about Know-how.
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark