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Mind and Cognition: A Reader

Blackwell (1990)

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  1. A Defense of the Knowledge Argument.Brie Gertler - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 93 (3):317-336.
    This paper calls into question the viability of materialist reduction of the phenomenal. I revisit the 'Knowledge Argument', which claims that there is information about the phenomenal which is not reducible to, nor even inferable from, information about the physical. I demonstrate the failure of the two chief strategies for blocking the Knowledge Argument: analyzing phenomenal knowledge as an ability, and construing it as knowledge of facts which are ontologically reducible to physical facts. Materialist reduction of the phenomenal is, thus, (...)
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  • La experiencia. Volumen I: Sensaciones, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas-UNAM, México, 2003, 356 pp. [REVIEW]Maite Ezcurdia & Olbeth Hansberg - 1995 - Philosophy 75:477-496.
    Las sensaciones constituyen el mayor obstáculo para dar una explicación satisfactoria de la mente en términos no mentales, y se distinguen por la manera como se sienten, esto es, por sus qualia o su carácter fenoménico, que se resiste a ser explicado y que hace patente el hiato entre lo físico y lo mental. Pero, ¿en qué consiste este aspecto de las sensaciones? ¿Lograremos alguna vez dar cuenta de él adecuadamente? Éstas son dos de las preguntas fundamentales que se discuten (...)
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  • A Decade of Teleofunctionalism: Lycan's Consciousness and Consciousness and Experience. [REVIEW]Thomas W. Polger & Owen J. Flanagan - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (1):113-126.
    The 1990’s, we’ve been told, were the decade of the brain. But without anyone announcing or declaring, much less deciding that it should be so, the 90’s were also a breakthrough decade for the study of consciousness. (Of course we think the two are related, but that is another matter altogether.) William G. Lycan leads the charge with his 1987 book Consciousness (MIT Press), and he has weighed-in again with Consciousness and Experience (1996, MIT Press). Together these two books put (...)
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  • The Logic, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Emotion.Michelle Montague - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):171-192.
    My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognitions. (...)
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  • When Mechanistic Models Explain.Carl F. Craver - 2006 - Synthese 153 (3):355-376.
    Not all models are explanatory. Some models are data summaries. Some models sketch explanations but leave crucial details unspecified or hidden behind filler terms. Some models are used to conjecture a how-possibly explanation without regard to whether it is a how-actually explanation. I use the Hodgkin and Huxley model of the action potential to illustrate these ways that models can be useful without explaining. I then use the subsequent development of the explanation of the action potential to show what is (...)
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  • Phenomenal Concepts as Bare Recognitional Concepts: Harder to Debunk Than You Thought, …but Still Possible.Emmett L. Holman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):807-827.
    A popular defense of physicalist theories of consciousness against anti-physicalist arguments invokes the existence of ‘phenomenal concepts’. These are concepts that designate conscious experiences from a first person perspective, and hence differ from physicalistic concepts; but not in a way that precludes co-referentiality with them. On one version of this strategy phenomenal concepts are seen as (1) type demonstratives that have (2) no mode of presentation. However, 2 is possible without 1-call this the ‘bare recognitional concept’ view-and I will argue (...)
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  • Sensational Sentences Switched.Georges Rey - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):289 - 319.
  • Interpreting Delusions.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):25-48.
    This paper explores the phenomenology of the Capgras and Cotard delusions. The former is generally characterised as the belief that relatives or friends have been replaced by impostors, and the latter as the conviction that one is dead or has ceased to exist. A commonly reported feature of these delusions is an experienced ''defamiliarisation'' or even ''derealisation'' of things, which is associated with an absence or distortion of affect. I suggest that the importance attributed to affect by current explanations of (...)
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  • Epiphenomenalism, Laws, and Properties.Denis Robinson - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 69 (1):1-34.
  • Neural Computation and the Computational Theory of Cognition.Gualtiero Piccinini & Sonya Bahar - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (3):453-488.
    We begin by distinguishing computationalism from a number of other theses that are sometimes conflated with it. We also distinguish between several important kinds of computation: computation in a generic sense, digital computation, and analog computation. Then, we defend a weak version of computationalism—neural processes are computations in the generic sense. After that, we reject on empirical grounds the common assimilation of neural computation to either analog or digital computation, concluding that neural computation is sui generis. Analog computation requires continuous (...)
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  • Experience and Structure: Philosophical History and the Problem of Consciousness.Paul M. Livingston - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (3):15-33.
    Investigation and analysis of the history of the concepts employed in contemporary philosophy of mind could significantly change the contemporary debate about the explainability of consciousness. Philosophical investigation of the history of the concept of qualia and the concept of scientific explanation most often presupposed in contemporary discussions of consciousness reveals the origin of both concepts in some of the most interesting philosophical debates of the twentieth century. In particular, a historical investigation of the inheritance of concepts of the elements (...)
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  • Spirit in the Materialist World: On the Structure of Regard.John Ó Maoilearca - 2014 - Angelaki 19 (1):13-29.
    This essay interrogates recent materialist monisms, be they based on contingency, eliminativism, or objective phenomenology, on account of their metaphilosophical ramifications. It is argued that certain dualities must be retained, at least nominally, in order to have any explanatory purchase and escape velocity from philosophical circularity. Dyads such as “spirit” and “matter,” “manifest” and “scientific,” “living” and “dead,” or even “illusion” and “reality” are given an immanentist reading that treats them as equal parts of the Real. Following this revisionary metaphysics (...)
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  • Inverted Qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Qualia inversion thought experiments are ubiquitous in contemporary philosophy of mind. The most popular kind is one or another variant of Locke's hypothetical case of.
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  • Writing on the Page of Consciousness.Christoph Hoerl - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):187-209.
    I identify one particular strand of thought in Thomas Nagel's ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?’, which I think has helped shape a certain conception of perceptual consciousness that is still prevalent in the literature. On this conception, perceptual consciousness is to be explained in terms of a special class of properties perceptual experiences themselves exhibit. I also argue that this conception is in fact in conflict with one of the key ideas that supposedly animates Nagel's argument in (...)
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  • General Solution to All Philosophical Problems With Some Exceptions.Wayde Beasley - forthcoming - north of parallel 40: Numerous uncommitted.
    Philosophy is unsolved. My forthcoming book sets forth the final resolution, with some exceptions, to this 2,500 year crisis. I am currently close to finishing page 983.
     
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  • Is Experiencing Just Representing? [REVIEW]Ned Block - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):663-670.
    The first problem concerns the famous Swampman who comes into existence as a result of a cosmic accident in which particles from the swamp come together, forming a molecular duplicate of a typical human. Reasonable people can disagree on whether Swampman has intentional contents. Suppose that Swampman marries Swampwoman and they have children. Reasonable people will be inclined to agree that there is something it is like for Swampchild when "words" go through his mind or come out of his mouth. (...)
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  • Is Conceptual Analysis Needed for the Reduction of Qualitative States?Janet Levin - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):571-591.
    In this paper I discuss the claim that the successful reduction of qualitative to physical states requires some sort of intelligible connection between our qualitative and physical concepts, which in turn requires a conceptual analysis of our qualitative concepts in causal-functional terms. While I defend this claim against some of its recent critics, I ultimately dispute it, and propose a different way to get the requisite intelligible connection between qualitative and physical concepts.
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  • New Philosophies of Science in North America — Twenty Years Later.Joseph Rouse - 1998 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 29 (1):71-122.
    This survey of major developments in North American philosophy of science begins with the mid-1960s consolidation of the disciplinary synthesis of internalist history and philosophy of science (HPS) as a response to criticisms of logical empiricism. These developments are grouped for discussion under the following headings: historical metamethodologies, scientific realisms, philosophies of the special sciences, revivals of empiricism, cognitivist naturalisms, social epistemologies, feminist theories of science, studies of experiment and the disunity of science, and studies of science as practice and (...)
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  • Against Propositionalism.Michelle Montague - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):503–518.
    'Propositionalism' is the widely held view that all intentional mental relations-all intentional attitudes-are relations to propositions or something proposition-like. Paradigmatically, to think about the mountain is ipso facto to think that it is F, for some predicate 'F'. It seems, however, many intentional attitudes are not relations to propositions at all: Mary contemplates Jonah, adores New York, misses Athens, mourns her brother. I argue, following Brentano, Husserl, Church and Montague among others, that the way things seem is the way they (...)
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  • Nonconceptual Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal Computational States.José Luis Bermúdez - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (4):333-369.
    Philosophers have often argued that ascriptions of content are appropriate only to the personal level states of folk psychology. Against this, this paper defends the view that the familiar propositional attitudes and states defined over them are part of a larger set of cognitive proceses that do not make constitutive reference to concept possession. It does this by showing that states with nonconceptual content exist both in perceptual experience and in subpersonal information-processing systems. What makes these states content-involving is their (...)
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  • Developing Concepts of Consciousness.Aaron Sloman - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):694-695.
  • The Misuse of Sober's Selection for/Selection of Distinction.R. Goode & P. E. Griffiths - 1995 - Biology and Philosophy 10 (1):99-108.
    Elliott Sober''s selection for/selection of distinction has been widely used to clarify the idea that some properties of organisms are side-effects of selection processes. It has also been used, however, to choose between different descriptions of an evolutionary product when assigning biological functions to that product. We suggest that there is a characteristic error in these uses of the distinction. Complementary descriptions of function are misrepresented as mutually excluding one another. This error arises from a failure to appreciate that selection (...)
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  • Consciousness From a First-Person Perspective.Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):702-726.
    This paper replies to the first 36 commentaries on my target article on “Is human information processing conscious?” (Behavioral and Brain Sciences,1991, pp.651-669). The target article focused largely on experimental studies of how consciousness relates to human information processing, tracing their relation from input through to output, while discussion of the implications of the findings both for cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind was relatively brief. The commentaries reversed this emphasis, and so, correspondingly, did the reply. The sequence of topics (...)
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  • Misrepresenting and Malfunctioning.Karen Neander - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 79 (2):109-41.
  • The Computable Universe: From Prespace Metaphysics to Discrete Quantum Mechanics.Martin Leckey - 1997 - Dissertation, Monash University
    The central motivating idea behind the development of this work is the concept of prespace, a hypothetical structure that is postulated by some physicists to underlie the fabric of space or space-time. I consider how such a structure could relate to space and space-time, and the rest of reality as we know it, and the implications of the existence of this structure for quantum theory. Understanding how this structure could relate to space and to the rest of reality requires, I (...)
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  • The Teleological Notion of 'Function'.Karen Neander - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (4):454 – 468.
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  • Physicalism, Consciousness and the Antipathetic Fallacy.David Papineau - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):169-83.
  • Qualia: The Knowledge Argument.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 2002 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part. This doctrine is rooted in Aristotle's conception of the soul, and has antecedents in Hobbes's conception of the mind as a “calculating machine”, but it has become fully articulated (and popularly endorsed) only (...)
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  • Materialism, Dualism, and the Philosophy of Yoga.Gerald James Larson - 2013 - International Journal of Hindu Studies 17 (2):181-219.
  • Physics of Brain-Mind Interaction.John C. Eccles - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):662-663.
  • Gestalt Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind.William Epstein & Gary Hatfield - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):163-181.
    The Gestalt psychologists adopted a set of positions on mind-body issues that seem like an odd mix. They sought to combine a version of naturalism and physiological reductionism with an insistence on the reality of the phenomenal and the attribution of meanings to objects as natural characteristics. After reviewing basic positions in contemporary philosophy of mind, we examine the Gestalt position, characterizing it m terms of phenomenal realism and programmatic reductionism. We then distinguish Gestalt philosophy of mind from instrumentalism and (...)
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  • Problems in the Definition of 'Mental Disorder'.Derek Bolton - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):182-199.
  • Experience and Concept Attainment: Some Critical Remarks.Anna Papafragou - unknown
    The aim of this paper is to reconsider certain assumptions about conceptual structure which have become influential in recent Cognitive Science and which are associated in particular with the Cognitive Linguistics research agenda. I will outline three areas within the Cognitive Linguistics theory of concepts which seem to create some difficulties in their present formulation: the 'embodied cognition' idea, the function of imagery and the role of metaphor in the structure of concepts.
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  • What is It Like to Be a Phenomenologist?Kelly D. Jolley & Michael Watkins - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):204-9.
  • Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Paul Sheldon Davies, David C. Graves, Justin Leiber & Anat Matar - 1995 - Philosophia 24 (3-4):531-558.
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  • Is Mathematical Insight Algorithmic?Martin Davis - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):659-660.
  • Is Human Information Processing Conscious?Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.
    Investigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) where does consciousness enter into the information processing sequence and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing. Input analysis is thought to be initially "preconscious," "pre-attentive," fast, involuntary, and automatic. This is followed by "conscious," "focal-attentive" analysis which is relatively slow, voluntary, and flexible. It is thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but conscious processing is needed (...)
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  • Epi-Arguments for Epiphenomenalism.Bruce Mangan - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):689-690.
  • The Nonalgorithmic Mind.Roger Penrose - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):692-705.
  • Computability, Consciousness, and Algorithms.Robert Wilensky - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):690-691.
  • Minds Beyond Brains and Algorithms.Jan M. Zytkow - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):691-692.
  • Penrose's Grand Unified Mystery.David Waltz & James Pustejovsky - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):688-690.
  • Exactly Which Emperor is Penrose Talking About?John K. Tsotsos - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):686-687.
  • Between Turing and Quantum Mechanics There is Body to Be Found.Francisco J. Varela - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):687-688.
  • The Thinker Dreams of Being an Emperor.M. M. Taylor - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):685-686.
  • The Pretender's New Clothes.Tim Smithers - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):683-684.
  • And Then a Miracle Happens….Keith E. Stanovich - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):684-685.
  • Seeing Truth or Just Seeming True?Adina Roskies - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):682-683.
  • The Emperor's Old Hat.Don Perlis - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):680-681.