Switch to: References

Citations of:

Mind and Cognition: A Reader

Blackwell (1990)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Minds Beyond Brains and Algorithms.Jan M. Zytkow - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):691-692.
  • Consciousness: Limited but Consequential.Timothy D. Wilson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):701-701.
  • Computability, Consciousness, and Algorithms.Robert Wilensky - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):690-691.
  • Penrose's Grand Unified Mystery.David Waltz & James Pustejovsky - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):688-690.
  • No Conscious or Co-Conscious?Graham F. Wagstaff - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):700-700.
  • Is Human Information Processing Conscious?Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.
    Investigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) where does consciousness enter into the information processing sequence and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing. Input analysis is thought to be initially "preconscious," "pre-attentive," fast, involuntary, and automatic. This is followed by "conscious," "focal-attentive" analysis which is relatively slow, voluntary, and flexible. It is thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but conscious processing is needed (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   339 citations  
  • Consciousness From a First-Person Perspective.Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):702-726.
    This paper replies to the first 36 commentaries on my target article on “Is human information processing conscious?” (Behavioral and Brain Sciences,1991, pp.651-669). The target article focused largely on experimental studies of how consciousness relates to human information processing, tracing their relation from input through to output, while discussion of the implications of the findings both for cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind was relatively brief. The commentaries reversed this emphasis, and so, correspondingly, did the reply. The sequence of topics (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   128 citations  
  • Between Turing and Quantum Mechanics There is Body to Be Found.Francisco J. Varela - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):687-688.
  • Attention is Necessary for Word Integration.Geoffrey Underwood - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):698-698.
  • Exactly Which Emperor is Penrose Talking About?John K. Tsotsos - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):686-687.
  • The Thinker Dreams of Being an Emperor.M. M. Taylor - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):685-686.
  • Damn! There Goes That Ghost Again!Keith E. Stanovich - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):696-698.
  • And Then a Miracle Happens….Keith E. Stanovich - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):684-685.
  • Dissociating Consciousness From Cognition.David Spiegel - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):695-696.
  • The Pretender's New Clothes.Tim Smithers - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):683-684.
  • Developing Concepts of Consciousness.Aaron Sloman - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):694-695.
  • A Lawful First-Person Psychology Involving a Causal Consciousness: A Psychoanalytic Solution.Howard Shevrin - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):693-694.
  • Verification, Skepticism, and Consciousness.William E. Seager - 1993 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (1-2):113-133.
    I argue that Daniel Dennett's latest book, Consciousness Explained, presents a radically eliminativist view of conscious experience in which experience or, in Dennett's own words, actual phenomenology, becomes a merely intentional object of our own and others? judgments ?about? experience. This strategy of ?intentionalizing? consciousness dovetails nicely with Dennett's background model of brain function: cognitive pandemonium, but does not follow from it. Thus Dennett is driven to a series of independent attacks on the notion of conscious experience, many of which (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Isn't the First-Person Perspective a Bad Third-Person Perspective?W. Schaeken & G. D'Ydewalle - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):692-693.
  • New Philosophies of Science in North America — Twenty Years Later.Joseph Rouse - 1998 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 29 (1):71-122.
    This survey of major developments in North American philosophy of science begins with the mid-1960s consolidation of the disciplinary synthesis of internalist history and philosophy of science (HPS) as a response to criticisms of logical empiricism. These developments are grouped for discussion under the following headings: historical metamethodologies, scientific realisms, philosophies of the special sciences, revivals of empiricism, cognitivist naturalisms, social epistemologies, feminist theories of science, studies of experiment and the disunity of science, and studies of science as practice and (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Seeing Truth or Just Seeming True?Adina Roskies - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):682-683.
  • Systematic, Unconscious Thought is the Place to Anchor Quantum Mechanics in the Mind.Thomas Roeper - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):681-682.
  • Epiphenomenalism, Laws, and Properties.Denis Robinson - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 69 (1):1-34.
  • A Limitation of the Reflex-Arc Approach to Consciousness.J. Steven Reznick & Philip David Zelazo - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):692-692.
  • Sensational Sentences Switched.Georges Rey - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):289 - 319.
  • Reasons for Doubting the Existence of Even Epiphenomenal Consciousness.Georges Rey - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):691-692.
  • The Know-How Response to Jackson’s Knowledge Argument.Paul Raymont - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Research 24 (January):113-26.
    I defend Frank Jackson's knowledge argument against physicalism in the philosophy of mind from a criticism that has been advanced by Laurence Nemirow and David Lewis. According to their criticism, what Mary lacked when she was in her black and white room was a set of abilities; she did not know how to recognize or imagine certain types of experience from a first-person perspective. Her subsequent discovery of what it is like to experience redness amounts to no more than her (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Interpreting Delusions.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):25-48.
    This paper explores the phenomenology of the Capgras and Cotard delusions. The former is generally characterised as the belief that relatives or friends have been replaced by impostors, and the latter as the conviction that one is dead or has ceased to exist. A commonly reported feature of these delusions is an experienced ''defamiliarisation'' or even ''derealisation'' of things, which is associated with an absence or distortion of affect. I suggest that the importance attributed to affect by current explanations of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • A Decade of Teleofunctionalism: Lycan's Consciousness and Consciousness and Experience. [REVIEW]Thomas W. Polger & Owen J. Flanagan - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (1):113-126.
    The 1990’s, we’ve been told, were the decade of the brain. But without anyone announcing or declaring, much less deciding that it should be so, the 90’s were also a breakthrough decade for the study of consciousness. (Of course we think the two are related, but that is another matter altogether.) William G. Lycan leads the charge with his 1987 book Consciousness (MIT Press), and he has weighed-in again with Consciousness and Experience (1996, MIT Press). Together these two books put (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Neural Computation and the Computational Theory of Cognition.Gualtiero Piccinini & Sonya Bahar - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (3):453-488.
    We begin by distinguishing computationalism from a number of other theses that are sometimes conflated with it. We also distinguish between several important kinds of computation: computation in a generic sense, digital computation, and analog computation. Then, we defend a weak version of computationalism—neural processes are computations in the generic sense. After that, we reject on empirical grounds the common assimilation of neural computation to either analog or digital computation, concluding that neural computation is sui generis. Analog computation requires continuous (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  • The Emperor's Old Hat.Don Perlis - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):680-681.
  • The Nonalgorithmic Mind.Roger Penrose - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):692-705.
  • Precis of the Emperor's New Mind.Roger Penrose - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):643-705.
    The emperor's new mind (hereafter Emperor) is an attempt to put forward a scientific alternative to the viewpoint of according to which mental activity is merely the acting out of some algorithmic procedure. John Searle and other thinkers have likewise argued that mere calculation does not, of itself, evoke conscious mental attributes, such as understanding or intentionality, but they are still prepared to accept the action the brain, like that of any other physical object, could in principle be simulated by (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  • Physicalism, Consciousness and the Antipathetic Fallacy.David Papineau - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):169-83.
  • Steadfast Intentions.Keith K. Niall - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):679-680.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Teleological Notion of 'Function'.Karen Neander - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (4):454 – 468.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   190 citations  
  • Misrepresenting and Malfunctioning.Karen Neander - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 79 (2):109-41.
  • Ellis and Lierse on Dispositional Essentialism.Stephen Mumford - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (4):606 – 612.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Powers of Machines and Minds.Chris Mortensen - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):678-679.
  • The Logic, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Emotion.Michelle Montague - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):171-192.
    My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognitions. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   67 citations  
  • Against Propositionalism.Michelle Montague - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):503–518.
    'Propositionalism' is the widely held view that all intentional mental relations-all intentional attitudes-are relations to propositions or something proposition-like. Paradigmatically, to think about the mountain is ipso facto to think that it is F, for some predicate 'F'. It seems, however, many intentional attitudes are not relations to propositions at all: Mary contemplates Jonah, adores New York, misses Athens, mourns her brother. I argue, following Brentano, Husserl, Church and Montague among others, that the way things seem is the way they (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   68 citations  
  • Computation and Consciousness.Drew McDermott - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):676-678.
  • Spirit in the Materialist World: On the Structure of Regard.John Ó Maoilearca - 2014 - Angelaki 19 (1):13-29.
    This essay interrogates recent materialist monisms, be they based on contingency, eliminativism, or objective phenomenology, on account of their metaphilosophical ramifications. It is argued that certain dualities must be retained, at least nominally, in order to have any explanatory purchase and escape velocity from philosophical circularity. Dyads such as “spirit” and “matter,” “manifest” and “scientific,” “living” and “dead,” or even “illusion” and “reality” are given an immanentist reading that treats them as equal parts of the Real. Following this revisionary metaphysics (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Processing of Information is Not Conscious, but its Products Often Are.George Mandler - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):688-689.
  • Gödel redux.Alexis Manaster-Ramer, Walter J. Savitch & Wlodek Zadrozny - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):675-676.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Epi-Arguments for Epiphenomenalism.Bruce Mangan - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):689-690.
  • Uncertainty About Quantum Mechanics.Mark S. Madsen - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):674-675.
  • The Discomforts of Dualism.Bruce MacLennan - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):673-674.
  • Consciousness is King of the Neuronal Processors.William A. MacKay - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):687-688.