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The prediction paradox

Mind 68 (272):510-517 (1959)

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  1. The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox.Ken Levy - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):131-158.
    The Surprise Exam Paradox continues to perplex and torment despite the many solutions that have been offered. This paper proposes to end the intrigue once and for all by refuting one of the central pillars of the Surprise Exam Paradox, the 'No Friday Argument,' which concludes that an exam given on the last day of the testing period cannot be a surprise. This refutation consists of three arguments, all of which are borrowed from the literature: the 'Unprojectible Announcement Argument,' the (...)
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  • Expecting the Unexpected.Avishai Margalit & Maya Bar-Hillel - 1983 - Philosophia 13 (3-4):263-288.
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  • On Paradoxes and a Surprise Exam.Richard L. Kirkham - 1991 - Philosophia 21 (1-2):31-51.
  • Another Look at the Problem of the Unexpected Examination.Matthew H. Kramer - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (3):491-.
    RÉSUMÉ: Les philosophes, au cours des cinquante dernières années, se sont efforcés de démontrer qu’un professeur peut, d’une manière cohérente et exacte, annoncer à ses étudiants qu’un examen surprise aura lieu lors d’une journée non spécifiée d’une période donnée, le problème étant qu’une telle annonce peut sembler s’annuler ellemême lorsqu’elle est soumise à une induction régressive. Deux grandes approches, l’une épistémique et l’autre logique, one été développées à ce propos. Le présent article adopte une approche logique, mais repose aussi d’une (...)
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  • Conflict and Co-Ordination in the Aftermath of Oracular Statements.Mariam Thalos - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):212-226.
    Can victims of the oracle paradox, which is known primarily through its unexpected hanging and surprise examination versions, extricate themselves from their difficulties of reasoning? No. For they do not, contrary to recent opinion, commit errors of fallacious elimination. As I shall argue, the difficulties of reasoning faced by these victims do not originate in the domain of concepts, propositions and their entailment relations; nor do they result from misapprehensions about limitations on what can be known. The difficulties of reasoning (...)
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