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J. L. Mackie (1980). Hume's Moral Theory.

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  1. Taking Moral Skepticism Seriously.Richard Joyce - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):843-851.
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  2.  23
    Rationalism Vs. Sentimentalism: Reviewing Price's Review.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Philosophical Papers 43 (3):429-445.
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    Sympathy for the Error Theorist: Parfit and Mackie. [REVIEW]David Phillips - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):559-566.
    Derek Parfit claims that “Williams and Mackie…do not use the normative concepts that I and other Non-Naturalists use.” Whatever we think of Parfit’s interpretation of Williams, his interpretation of Mackie should be rejected. For understandable historical reasons, Mackie’s texts are ambiguous. But if we apply to the interpretation of Mackie the same principle of charity Parfit employs in interpreting Williams, we find decisive reason to interpret Mackie as using the same normative concepts as Non-Naturalists.
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    From Small Groups to Large Societies: How to Construct a Simulator? [REVIEW]Rainer Hegselmann & Oliver Will - 2013 - Biological Theory 8 (2):185-194.
    There seems to be an overarching historical process in which life in small groups has evolved into life in large societies. This paper describes the design of a simulator for the study of that process. The simulator is named after David Hume (1711–1776), who presented a rich, informal, and still modern theory about the problems, useful inventions, and driving mechanisms in the evolution from small groups to large societies. HUME1.0 is a simulator that is meant to cover the interplay of (...)
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  5.  38
    Hume's Theory of Business Ethics Revisited.William Kline - 2012 - Journal of Business Ethics 105 (2):163-174.
    Hume’s examination of the conventions of property, trade, and contract addresses the moral foundations that make business possible. In this light, Hume’s theory of justice is also a foundational work in business ethics. In Hume’s analysis of these conventions, both philosophers and game theorists have correctly identified “proto” game-theoretic elements. One of the few attempts to offer a Humean theory of business ethics rests on this game-theoretic interpretation of Hume’s argument. This article argues that game-theoretic reasoning is only one part (...)
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    Hierarchical Motive Structures and Their Role in Moral Choices.Richard P. Bagozzi, Leslie E. Sekerka & Vanessa Hill - 2009 - Journal of Business Ethics 90 (4):461 - 486.
    Leader-managers face a myriad of competing values when they engage in ethical decision-making. Few studies help us understand why certain reasons for action are justified, taking precedence over others when people choose to respond to an ethical dilemma. To help address this matter we began with a qualitative approach to disclose leader-managers' moral motives when they decide to address a work-related ethical dilemma. One hundred and nine military officers were asked to provide their reasons for taking action, justifications of their (...)
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  7.  72
    Meaning(Fullness) Without Metaphysics: Another Look at Hume's “Meaning Empiricism”.William Edward Morris - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (3):441-454.
    Although Hume has no developed semantic theory, in the heyday of analytic philosophy he was criticized for his “meaning empiricism,” which supposedly committed him to a private world of ideas, led him to champion a genetic account of meaning instead of an analytic one, and confused “impressions” with “perceptions of an objective realm.” But another look at Hume’s “meaning empiricism” reveals that his criterion for cognitive content, the cornerstone both of his resolutely anti-metaphysical stance and his naturalistic “science of human (...)
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  8. Rebutting Formally Valid Counterexamples to the Humean “is-Ought” Dictum.Daniel Guevara - 2008 - Synthese 164 (1):45-60.
    Various formally valid counterexamples have been adduced against the Humean dictum that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.” There are formal rebuttals—some very sophisticated now (e.g., Charles R. Pigden’s and Gerhard Schurz’s)—to such counterexamples. But what follows is an intuitive and informal argument against them. I maintain that it is better than these sophisticated formal defenses of the Humean dictum and that it also helps us see why it implausible to think that we can be as decisive about (...)
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  9.  36
    Is You Is or Is You Ain't Hart's Baby? Epstein's Minimum Content of Natural Law.James Allan - 2007 - Ratio Juris 20 (2):213-229.
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  10.  66
    Non-Cognitivism and Validity.David Alm - 2007 - Theoria 73 (2):121-147.
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  11. Abolishing Morality.Richard Garner - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):499-513.
    Moral anti-realism comes in two forms – noncognitivism and the error theory. The noncognitivist says that when we make moral judgments we aren’t even trying to state moral facts. The error theorist says that when we make moral judgments we are making statements about what is objectively good, bad, right, or wrong but, since there are no moral facts, our moral judgments are uniformly false. This development of moral anti-realism was first seriously defended by John Mackie. In this paper I (...)
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  12. Moral Internalism and Moral Cognitivism in Hume's Metaethics.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):353 - 370.
    Most naturalists think that the belief/desire model from Hume is the best framework for making sense of motivation. As Smith has argued, given that the cognitive state (belief) and the conative state (desire) are separate on this model, if a moral judgment is cognitive, it could not also be motivating by itself. So, it looks as though Hume and Humeans cannot hold that moral judgments are states of belief (moral cognitivism) and internally motivating (moral internalism). My chief claim is that (...)
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    Correcting Our Sentiments About Hume's Moral Point of View.Kate Abramson - 1999 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):333-361.
  14.  62
    The Informal Game Theory in Hume's Account of Convention.Peter Vanderschraaf - 1998 - Economics and Philosophy 14 (2):215.
    Hume is rightly credited with giving a brilliant, and perhaps the best, account of justice as convention. Hume's importance as a forerunner of modern economics has also long been recognized. However, most of Hume's readers have not fully appreciated how closely Hume's analysis of convention foreshadows a particular branch of economic theory, namely, game theory. Starting with the work of Barry, Runciman and Sen and Lewis, there has been a flowering of literature on the informal game-theoretic insights to be found (...)
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  15.  39
    Gibbard's Evolutionary Theory of Rationality and its Ethical Implications.Stephen W. Ball - 1995 - Biology and Philosophy 10 (2):129-180.
    Gibbard''s theory of rationality is evolutionary in terms of its result as well as its underpinning argument. The result is that judgments about what is rational are analyzed as being similar to judgments of morality — in view of what Darwin suggests concerning the latter. According to the Darwinian theory, moral judgments are based on sentiments which evolve to promote the survival and welfare of human societies. On Gibbard''s theory, rationality judgments should be similarly regarded as expressing emotional attachments to (...)
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  16.  66
    Evolutionary Theory and Christian Ethics: Are They in Harmony?Michael Ruse - 1994 - Zygon 29 (1):5-24.
  17.  33
    From Belief to Unbelief-and Halfway Back.Michael Ruse - 1994 - Zygon 29 (1):25-35.
  18.  13
    Categorical Desires and the Future.Yossi Yonah - 1994 - Dialogue 33 (04):581-.
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    Evolutionary Naturalism and the Objectivity of Morality.John Collier & Michael Stingl - 1993 - Biology and Philosophy 8 (1):47-60.
    We propose an objective and justifiable ethics that is contingent on the truth of evolutionary theory. We do not argue for the truth of this position, which depends on the empirical question of whether moral functions form a natural class, but for its cogency and possibility. The position we propose combines the advantages of Kantian objectivity with the explanatory and motivational advantages of moral naturalism. It avoids problems with the epistemological inaccessibility of transcendent values, while avoiding the relativism or subjectivism (...)
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  20. Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived.Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons - 1992 - Synthese 92 (2):221 - 260.
    J. L. Mackie argued that if there were objective moral properties or facts, then the supervenience relation linking the nonmoral to the moral would be metaphysically queer. Moral realists reply that objective supervenience relations are ubiquitous according to contemporary versions of metaphysical naturalism and, hence, that there is nothing especially queer about moral supervenience. In this paper we revive Mackie's challenge to moral realism. We argue: (i) that objective supervenience relations of any kind, moral or otherwise, should be explainable rather (...)
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  21. Logic and the Autonomy of Ethics.Charles R. Pigden - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (2):127 – 151.
    My first paper on the Is/Ought issue. The young Arthur Prior endorsed the Autonomy of Ethics, in the form of Hume’s No-Ought-From-Is (NOFI) but the later Prior developed a seemingly devastating counter-argument. I defend Prior's earlier logical thesis (albeit in a modified form) against his later self. However it is important to distinguish between three versions of the Autonomy of Ethics: Ontological, Semantic and Ontological. Ontological Autonomy is the thesis that moral judgments, to be true, must answer to a realm (...)
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    Darwinism and Determinism.Michael Ruse - 1987 - Zygon 22 (4):419-442.
  23.  28
    Utilitarian Principles for Imperfect Agents.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1982 - Theoria 48 (3):113-126.