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Inattentional Blindness

MIT Press (1998)

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  1. L'attention et la justification des croyances perceptives.Emile Thalabard - 2020 - Lato Sensu, Revue de la Société de Philosophie des Sciences 7:1-15.
    This essay defends the claim that endogenous attention is necessary for the justification of perceptual beliefs. I criticize the so-called phenomenal approach, according to which perceptual experiences provide justification in virtue of being phenomenally conscious. I specifically target Siegel and Silins’ (2014 ; 2019) version of the phenomenal approach. As against their view, I claim that perceptual justification cannot be understood without reference to the cognitive mechanisms which underlie the mobilization of reasons in support of propositional attitudes – attention being (...)
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  • Perception is Not All-Purpose.Bence Nanay - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 17):4069-4080.
    I aim to show that perception depends counterfactually on the action we want to perform. Perception is not all-purpose: what we want to do does influence what we see. After clarifying how this claim is different from the one at stake in the cognitive penetrability debate and what counterfactual dependence means in my claim, I will give a two-step argument: one’s perceptual attention depends counterfactually on one’s intention to perform an action and one’s perceptual processing depends counterfactually on one’s perceptual (...)
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  • Tracking the Processes Behind Conscious Perception: A Review of Event-Related Potential Correlates of Visual Consciousness. [REVIEW]Henry Railo, Mika Koivisto & Antti Revonsuo - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):972-983.
    Event-related potential studies have attempted to discover the processes that underlie conscious visual perception by contrasting ERPs produced by stimuli that are consciously perceived with those that are not. Variability of the proposed ERP correlates of consciousness is considerable: the earliest proposed ERP correlate of consciousness coincides with sensory processes and the last one marks postperceptual processes. A negative difference wave called visual awareness negativity , typically observed around 200 ms after stimulus onset in occipitotemporal sites, gains strong support for (...)
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  • Introduction: The Hard Problem of Consciousness.Glenn Carruthers & Elizabeth Schier - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):1-3.
    In this paper we try to diagnose one reason why the debate regarding the Hard Problem of consciousness inevitably leads to a stalemate: namely that the characterisation of consciousness assumed by the Hard Problem is unjustified and probably unjustifiable. Following Dennett : 4–6, 1996, Cognition 79:221–237, 2001, J Conscious Stud 19:86, 2012) and Churchland :402–408, 1996, Brainwise: studies in neurophilosophy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002), we argue that there is in fact no non-question begging argument for the claim that consciousness (...)
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  • Threefoldness.Bence Nanay - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):163-182.
    Theories of picture perception aim to understand our perceptual relation to both the picture surface and the depicted object. I argue that we should talk about not two, but three entities when understanding picture perception: the picture surface, the three dimensional object the picture surface visually encodes and the three dimensional depicted object. As and can come apart, we get a more complex picture of picture perception than normally assumed and one where the notion of twofoldness, which has played an (...)
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  • The Reinterpretation of Dreams: An Evolutionary Hypothesis of the Function of Dreaming.Antti Revonsuo - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):877-901.
    Several theories claim that dreaming is a random by-product of REM sleep physiology and that it does not serve any natural function. Phenomenal dream content, however, is not as disorganized as such views imply. The form and content of dreams is not random but organized and selective: during dreaming, the brain constructs a complex model of the world in which certain types of elements, when compared to waking life, are underrepresented whereas others are over represented. Furthermore, dream content is consistently (...)
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  • Knowledge in Motion: How Procedural Control of Knowledge Usage Entails Selectivity and Bias.Ulrich Ansorge - 2021 - Journal of Knowledge Structures and Systems 2 (1):3-28.
    The use and acquisition of knowledge appears to be influenced by what humans pay attention to. Thus, looking at attention will tell us something about the mechanisms involved in knowledge (usage). According to the present review, attention reflects selectivity in information processing and it is not necessarily also reflected in a user’s consciousness, as it is rooted in skill memory or other implicit procedural memory forms–that is, attention is rooted in the necessity of human control of mental operations and actions. (...)
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  • Ethical Blindness.Guido Palazzo, Franciska Krings & Ulrich Hoffrage - 2012 - Journal of Business Ethics 109 (3):323-338.
    Many models of (un)ethical decision making assume that people decide rationally and are in principle able to evaluate their decisions from a moral point of view. However, people might behave unethically without being aware of it. They are ethically blind. Adopting a sensemaking approach, we argue that ethical blindness results from a complex interplay between individual sensemaking activities and context factors.
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  • Levels of Processing During Non-Conscious Perception: A Critical Review of Visual Masking.Sid Kouider & Stanislas Dehaene - 2007 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, B 362 (1481):857-875.
  • La atención y los límites de la experiencia consciente.Francisco Pereira - 2015 - Filosofia Unisinos 16 (2):145-163.
    La concepción fenomenológica del sentido común inspirada por James sostiene que atender es esencialmente un fenómeno mental consciente. Las implicancias filosóficas modales de esta tesis sobre la naturaleza de la atención son claras. No es posible atender una cosa, sin ser consciente de ella. Sobre la base de estudios clásicos en torno a patologías visuales como la vista ciega y a experimentos recientes con sujetos no patológicos, este artículo argumenta que la conclusión filosófica jamesiana acerca de la metafísica de la (...)
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  • Phenomenology-Friendly Neuroscience: The Return to Merleau-Ponty as Psychologist.Ralph D. Ellis - 2006 - Human Studies 29 (1):33 - 55.
    This paper reports on the Kuhnian revolution now occurring in neuropsychology that is finally supportive of and friendly to phenomenology – the “enactive” approach to the mind-body relation, grounded in the notion of self-organization, which is consistent with Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on virtually every point. According to the enactive approach, human minds understand the world by virtue of the ways our bodies can act relative to it, or the ways we can imagine acting. This requires that action be distinguished from (...)
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  • Against Intentionalism.Bernard Nickel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):279 - 304.
    Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenological properties of a perceptual experience supervene on its intentional properties. The paper presents a counterexample to this claim, one that concerns visual grouping phenomenology. I argue that this example is superior to super?cially similar examples involving grouping phenomenology offered by Peacocke (1983), because the standard intentionalist responses to Peacocke.
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  • Cognition Does Not Affect Perception: Evaluating the Evidence for “Top-Down” Effects.Chaz Firestone & Brian J. Scholl - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39:1-72.
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  • Unconscious Perceptual Justification.Jacob Berger, Bence Nanay & Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):569-589.
    Perceptual experiences justify beliefs. A perceptual experience of a dog justifies the belief that there is a dog present. But there is much evidence that perceptual states can occur without being conscious, as in experiments involving masked priming. Do unconscious perceptual states provide justification as well? The answer depends on one’s theory of justification. While most varieties of externalism seem compatible with unconscious perceptual justification, several theories have recently afforded to consciousness a special role in perceptual justification. We argue that (...)
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  • A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.J. Kevin O’Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
    Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of (...)
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  • Non-Local Consciousness A Concept Based on Scientific Research on Near-Death Experiences During Cardiac Arrest.Pim van Lommel - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (1-2):1-2.
    In this article a concept of non-local consciousness will be described, based on recent scientific research on near-death experiences . Since the publication of several prospective studies on NDEs in survivors of cardiac arrest, with strikingly similar results and conclusions, the phenomenon of the NDE can no longer be scientifically ignored. In the last thirty years several theories have been proposed to explain an NDE. The challenge to find a common explanation for the cause and content of an NDE is (...)
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  • Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness: Basic Evidence and a Workspace Framework.Stanislas Dehaene & Lionel Naccache - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):1-37.
    This introductory chapter attempts to clarify the philosophical, empirical, and theoretical bases on which a cognitive neuroscience approach to consciousness can be founded. We isolate three major empirical observations that any theory of consciousness should incorporate, namely (1) a considerable amount of processing is possible without consciousness, (2) attention is a prerequisite of consciousness, and (3) consciousness is required for some specific cognitive tasks, including those that require durable information maintenance, novel combinations of operations, or the spontaneous generation of intentional (...)
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  • The Legal Self: Executive Processes and Legal Theory.William Hirstein & Katrina Sifferd - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):151-176.
    When laws or legal principles mention mental states such as intentions to form a contract, knowledge of risk, or purposely causing a death, what parts of the brain are they speaking about? We argue here that these principles are tacitly directed at our prefrontal executive processes. Our current best theories of consciousness portray it as a workspace in which executive processes operate, but what is important to the law is what is done with the workspace content rather than the content (...)
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  • The Goldilocks Problem of the Specificity of Visual Phenomenal Content.Robert Schroer - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):476-495.
    Existentialist accounts maintain that visual phenomenal content takes the logical form of an existentially quantified sentence. These accounts do not make phenomenal content specific enough. Singularist accounts posit a singular content in which the seen object is a constituent. These accounts make phenomenal content too specific. My account gets the specificity of visual phenomenal content just right. My account begins with John Searle's suggestion that visual experience represents an object as seen, moves this relation outside the scope of the existential (...)
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  • Making Consciousness Safe for Neuroscience.Andrew Brook - 2005 - In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 397.
  • Do You Have Constant Tactile Experience of Your Feet in Your Shoes? Or Is Experience Limited to What’s in Attention?Eric Schwitzgebel - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (3):5-35.
    According to rich views of consciousness (e.g., James, Searle), we have a constant, complex flow of experience (or 'phenomenology') in multiple modalities simultaneously. According to thin views (e.g., Dennett, Mack and Rock), conscious experience is limited to one or a few topics, regions, objects, or modalities at a time. Existing introspective and empirical arguments on this issue (including arguments from 'inattentional blindness') generally beg the question. Participants in the present experiment wore beepers during everyday activity. When a beep sounded, they (...)
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  • The Epistemology of Geometry I: The Problem of Exactness.Anne Newstead & Franklin James - 2010 - Proceedings of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science 2009.
    We show how an epistemology informed by cognitive science promises to shed light on an ancient problem in the philosophy of mathematics: the problem of exactness. The problem of exactness arises because geometrical knowledge is thought to concern perfect geometrical forms, whereas the embodiment of such forms in the natural world may be imperfect. There thus arises an apparent mismatch between mathematical concepts and physical reality. We propose that the problem can be solved by emphasizing the ways in which the (...)
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  • Do Consciousness and Attention Have Shared Neural Correlates?Andrea Cavanna & Andrea Nani - 2008 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 14.
    Over the last few years our understanding of the brain processes underlying consciousness and attention has considerably improved, mainly thanks to the advances in functional neuroimaging techniques. However, caution is needed for the correct interpretation of empirical findings, since both research and reflection are hampered by a number of conceptual difficulties. This paper reviews some of the most relevant theoretical issues surrounding the concepts of consciousness and attention in the neuroscientific literature, and presents the implications of these reflections for a (...)
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  • First-Person Investigations of Consciousness.Brentyn Ramm - 2016 - Dissertation, The Australian National University
    This dissertation defends the reliability of first-person methods for studying consciousness, and applies first-person experiments to two philosophical problems: the experience of size and of the self. In chapter 1, I discuss the motivations for taking a first-person approach to consciousness, the background assumptions of the dissertation and some methodological preliminaries. In chapter 2, I address the claim that phenomenal judgements are far less reliable than perceptual judgements (Schwitzgebel, 2011). I argue that the main errors and limitations in making phenomenal (...)
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  • The Unreliability of Naive Introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.
    We are prone to gross error, even in favorable circumstances of extended reflection, about our own ongoing conscious experience, our current phenomenology. Even in this apparently privileged domain, our self-knowledge is faulty and untrustworthy. We are not simply fallible at the margins but broadly inept. Examples highlighted in this essay include: emotional experience (for example, is it entirely bodily; does joy have a common, distinctive phenomenological core?), peripheral vision (how broad and stable is the region of visual clarity?), and the (...)
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  • Ethical Review as a Tool for Enhancing Postgraduate Supervision and Research Outcomes in the Creative Arts.Angela Romano - 2016 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 48 (13).
    This article outlines the potential for Research Higher Degree supervisors at universities and similar institutions to use ethical review as a constructive, dynamic tool in guiding RHD students in the timely completion of effective, innovative research projects. Ethical review involves a bureaucratized process for checking that researchers apply risk management strategies when dealing with human participants. Ethical review can also be a powerful instrument for RHD supervisors in the creative arts if they use it to lead students through processes of (...)
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  • Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception.Robert Briscoe - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):423-460.
    Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the "two visual systems" hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in conscious visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver's bodily actions. In this paper, I review and assess three main sources (...)
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  • Non-Conceptual Experiential Content and Reason-Giving.Hemdat Lerman - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):1-23.
    According to John McDowell and Bill Brewer, our experiences have the type of content which can be the content of judgements - content which is the result of the actualization of specific conceptual abilities. They defend this view by arguing that our experiences must have such content in order for us to be able to think about our environment. In this paper I show that they do not provide a conclusive argument for this view. Focusing on Brewer’s version of the (...)
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  • Bounded Awareness: What You Fail to See Can Hurt You. [REVIEW]Dolly Chugh & Max H. Bazerman - 2007 - Mind and Society 6 (1):1-18.
    ObjectiveWe argue that people often fail to perceive and process stimuli easily available to them. In other words, we challenge the tacit assumption that awareness is unbounded and provide evidence that humans regularly fail to see and use stimuli and information easily available to them. We call this phenomenon “bounded awareness” (Bazerman and Chugh in Frontiers of social psychology: negotiations, Psychology Press: College Park 2005). Findings We begin by first describing perceptual mental processes in which obvious information is missed—that is, (...)
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  • Die Normativität der Erfahrung – Überlegungen zur Beziehung von Normalität und Aufmerksamkeit bei E. Husserl.Maren Wehrle - 2010 - Husserl Studies 26 (3):167-187.
    From a historico-cultural point of view the notion of normativity is closely tied to the apparently descriptive category of normality. This relation seems even tighter on the level of experience. As Husserl shows that normality, in the form of concordance and optimality, is a constitutive feature of experience itself. But in what sense can we speak of normativity in the realm of experience? Husserl himself saw no need to pose this question. But to explain the possibility of normal and coherent (...)
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  • From Embodied to Extended Cognition.John A. Teske - 2013 - Zygon 48 (3):759-787.
    Embodied cognitive science holds that cognitive processes are deeply and inescapably rooted in our bodily interactions with the world. Our finite, contingent, and mortal embodiment may be not only supportive, but in some cases even constitutive of emotions, thoughts, and experiences. My discussion here will work outward from the neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of the brain to a nervous system which extends to the boundaries of the body. It will extend to nonneural aspects of embodiment and even beyond the boundaries of (...)
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  • Representationalism, Peripheral Awareness, and the Transparency of Experience.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):39-56.
    It is often said that some kind of peripheral (or inattentional) conscious awareness accompanies our focal (attentional) consciousness. I agree that this is often the case, but clarity is needed on several fronts. In this paper, I lay out four distinct theses on peripheral awareness and show that three of them are true. However, I then argue that a fourth thesis, commonly associated with the so-called "self-representational approach to consciousness," is false. The claim here is that we have outer focal (...)
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  • Shibboleth: Some Comments on William Fish’s Perception, Hallucination & Illusion. [REVIEW]M. G. F. Martin - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):37-48.
  • Cognition and the Compassion Deficit: The Social Psychology of Helping Behaviour in Nursing.John Paley - 2014 - Nursing Philosophy 15 (4):274-287.
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  • ‘That’ Response Doesn't Work: Against a Demonstrative Defense of Conceptualism.Adina L. Roskies - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):112-134.
  • The Role of Experience in Demonstrative Thought.Michael Barkasi - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (5):648-666.
    Attention plays a role in demonstrative thought: It sets the targets. Visual experience also plays a role. I argue here that it makes visual information available for use in the voluntary control of focal attention. To do so I use both introspection and neurophysiological evidence from projections between areas of attentional control and neural correlates of consciousness. Campbell and Smithies also identify roles for experience, but they further argue that only experience can play those roles. In contrast, I argue that (...)
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  • Attention, Visual Consciousness and Indeterminacy.James Stazicker - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (2):156-184.
    I propose a new argument showing that conscious vision sometimes depends constitutively on conscious attention. I criticise traditional arguments for this constitutive connection, on the basis that they fail adequately to dissociate evidence about visual consciousness from evidence about attention. On the same basis, I criticise Ned Block's recent counterargument that conscious vision is independent of one sort of attention (‘cognitive access'). Block appears to achieve the dissociation only because he underestimates the indeterminacy of visual consciousness. I then appeal to (...)
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  • Implications of Inattentional Blindness for "Enactive" Theories of Consciousness.Ralph D. Ellis - 2001 - Brain and Mind 2 (3):297-322.
    Mack and Rock show evidence that no consciousperception occurs without a prior attentiveact. Subjects already executing attention taskstend to neglect visible elements extraneous tothe attentional task, apparently lacking evenbetter-than-chance ``implicit perception,''except in certain cases where the unattendedstimulus is a meaningful word or has uniquepre-tuned salience similar to that ofmeaningful words. This is highly consistentwith ``enactive'' notions that consciousnessrequires selective attention via emotional subcortical and limbic motivationalactivation as it influences anterior attentionmechanisms. Occipital activation withoutconsciousness suggests that motivated search,enacted through the organism's (...)
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  • Neural Mechanisms of Visual Awareness: A Linking Proposition. [REVIEW]Victor A. F. Lamme - 2001 - Brain and Mind 1 (3):385-406.
    Recent developments in psychology and neuroscience suggest away to link the mental phenomenon of visual awareness with specific neural processes. Here, it is argued that the feed-forward activation of cells in any area of the brain is not sufficient to generate awareness, but that recurrent processing, mediated by horizontal and feedback connections is necessary. In linking awareness with its neural mechanisms it is furthermore important to dissociate phenomenal awareness from visual attention or decision processes.
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  • Consciousness as Recursive, Spatiotemporal Self Location.Frederic Peters - 2010 - Psychological Research.
    At the phenomenal level, consciousness can be described as a singular, unified field of recursive self-awareness, consistently coherent in a particualr way; that of a subject located both spatially and temporally in an egocentrically-extended domain, such that conscious self-awareness is explicitly characterized by I-ness, now-ness and here-ness. The psychological mechanism underwriting this spatiotemporal self-locatedness and its recursive processing style involves an evolutionary elaboration of the basic orientative reference frame which consistently structures ongoing spatiotemporal self-location computations as i-here-now. Cognition computes action-output (...)
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  • Wilfrid Sellars, Perceptual Consciousness, and Theory of Attention.Paul Coates - 2004 - Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-25.
    The problem of the richness of visual experience is that of finding principled grounds for claims about how much of the world a person actually sees at any given moment. It is argued that there are suggestive parallels between the two-component analysis of experience defended by Wilfrid Sellars, and certain recently advanced information processing accounts of visual perception. Sellars' later account of experience is examined in detail, and it is argued that there are good reasons in support of the claim (...)
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  • Distracted Drivers and Unattended Experience.Wayne Wright - 2005 - Synthese 144 (1):41-68.
    Consider the much-discussed case of the distracted driver, who is alleged to successfully navigate his car for miles despite being completely oblivious to his visual states. Perhaps he is deeply engrossed in the music playing over the radio or in philosophical reflection, and as a result he goes about unaware of the scene unfolding before him on the road. That the distracted driver has visual experiences of which he is not aware is a possibility that first-order representationalists happily accept, but (...)
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  • Homing in on Consciousness in the Nervous System: An Action-Based Synthesis.Ezequiel Morsella, Christine A. Godwin, Tiffany K. Jantz, Stephen C. Krieger & Adam Gazzaley - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39:1-70.
    What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, (...)
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  • Consciousness and its Contents: A Response to de Quincey.Gilberto Gomes - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (3):107-112.
    'Consciousness' is used in different ways, but not all of these uses reflect clear concepts. In his target article Christian de Quincey (2006) notes that confusion about consciousness is widespread and sets out to distinguish two main meanings of the word. However, his treatment of the subject is confused and the proposed distinction misses the point. I argue that the effort to clarify the meaning of consciousness should proceed in a different direction. We should first find some empirical criterion that (...)
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  • Connecting Conscious and Unconscious Processing.Axel Cleeremans - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (6):1286-1315.
    Consciousness remains a mystery—“a phenomenon that people do not know how to think about—yet” (Dennett, , p. 21). Here, I consider how the connectionist perspective on information processing may help us progress toward the goal of understanding the computational principles through which conscious and unconscious processing differ. I begin by delineating the conceptual challenges associated with classical approaches to cognition insofar as understanding unconscious information processing is concerned, and to highlight several contrasting computational principles that are constitutive of the connectionist (...)
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  • Perceptual Content and the Content of Mental Imagery.Bence Nanay - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1723-1736.
    The aim of this paper is to argue that the phenomenal similarity between perceiving and visualizing can be explained by the similarity between the structure of the content of these two different mental states. And this puts important constraints on how we should think about perceptual content and the content of mental imagery.
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  • Attention and Perceptual Organization.Carolyn Dicey Jennings - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1265-1278.
    How does attention contribute to perceptual experience? Within cognitive science, attention is known to contribute to the organization of sensory features into perceptual objects, or “object-based organization.” The current paper tackles a different type of organization and thus suggests a different role for attention in conscious perception. Within every perceptual experience we find that more subjectively interesting percepts stand out in the foreground, whereas less subjectively interesting percepts are relegated to the background. The sight of a sycamore often gains the (...)
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  • Two Kinds of Time-Consciousness and Three Kinds of Content.Jan Almäng - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (1):61-80.
    This paper explores the distinction between perceiving an object as extended in time, and experiencing a sequence of perceptions. I argue that this distinction cannot be adequately described by any present theory of time-consciousness and that in order to solve the puzzle, we need to consider perceptual content as having three distinct constituents: Explicit content, which has a particular phenomenal character, modal content, or the kind of content that is contributed by the psychological mode, and implicit content, which lacks phenomenal (...)
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  • Confounding Factors in Contrastive Analysis.Morten Overgaard - 2004 - Synthese 141 (2):217-31.
    Several authors within psychology, neuroscience and philosophy take for granted that standard empirical research techniques are applicable when studying consciousness. In this article, it is discussed whether one of the key methods in cognitive neuroscience – the contrastive analysis – suffers from any serious confounding when applied to the field of consciousness studies; that is to say, if there are any systematic difficulties when studying consciousness with this method that make the results untrustworthy. Through an analysis of theoretical arguments in (...)
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  • Gestalt Isomorphism and the Primacy of the Subjective Perceptual Experience.Steven Lehar - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):763-764.
    The Gestalt principle of isomorphism reveals the primacy of subjective experience as a valid source of evidence for the information encoded neurophysiologically. This theory invalidates the abstractionist view that the neurophysiological representation can be of lower dimensionality than the percept to which it gives rise.
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