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  1. The Concept Horse with No Name.Robert Trueman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1889-1906.
    In this paper I argue that Frege’s concept horse paradox is not easily avoided. I do so without appealing to Wright’s Reference Principle. I then use this result to show that Hale and Wright’s recent attempts to avoid this paradox by rejecting or otherwise defanging the Reference Principle are unsuccessful.
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  • Substitution in a Sense.Robert Trueman - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3069-3098.
    The Reference Principle states that co-referring expressions are everywhere intersubstitutable salva congruitate. On first glance, looks like a truism, but a truism with some bite: transforms difficult philosophical questions about co-reference into easy grammatical questions about substitutability. This has led a number of philosophers to think that we can use to make short work of certain longstanding metaphysical debates. For example, it has been suggested that all we need to do to show that the predicate ‘ is a horse’ does (...)
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  • Frege on Syntax, Ontology, and Truth's Pride of Place.Colin Johnston - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):569-588.
    Frege's strict alignment between his syntactic and ontological categories is not, as is commonly assumed, some kind of a philosophical thesis. There is no thesis that proper names refer only to objects, say, or that what refers to an object is a proper name. Rather, the alignment of categories is internal to Frege's conception of what syntax and ontology are. To understand this, we need to recognise the pride of place Frege assigns within his theorising to the notion of truth. (...)
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  • Naming the Concept Horse.Michael Price - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2727-2743.
    Frege’s rejection of singular reference to concepts is centrally implicated in his notorious paradox of the concept horse. I distinguish a number of claims in which that rejection might consist and detail the dialectical difficulties confronting the defense of several such claims. Arguably the least problematic such claim—that it is simply nonsense to say that a concept can be referred to with a singular term—has recently received a novel defense due to Robert Trueman. I set out Trueman’s argument for this (...)
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