There have been two recent attempts to disentangle the evidence for the procedures in fourth-century Athens for the enactment and revision of nomoi, by D. M. MacDowell and by M. H. Hansen. I have learned from both, but think that further progress can be made. MacDowell distinguishes five separate measures: The Old Legislation Law, requiring action at a specified time, advance publicity for the new proposal, concurrent repeal of any existing law with which the new proposal conflicts, and a decision (...) by nomothetae who are omomokotes, men who have sworn the dicastic oath : this is described as a παλαις νόμος, and as the law καθ' ν σαν ο πρότεροι νομοθέαι. Replacing that c. 370, the New Legislation Law, no longer requiring action at a specified time, advance publicity, concurrent repeal, or that the nomothetae should be omomokotes: as a result of the change conflicting laws have been enacted, and for some time continuing to the mid 350s commissioners have had to be elected to sort out the conflicts. Still valid in the 350s, the Review Law, requiring an annual epicheirotonia of the laws in four subject divisions in the assembly on 11 Hecatombaeon , advance publicity for new proposals, and at the third assembly after 11 Hecatombaeon the appointment of nomothetae who are omomokotes to decide between the existing laws and the new proposals. (shrink)

Perhaps more than any other dialogue, Plato's Laws demands a reading that is at once historical and philosophical. This text's conception of the ‘rule of law’ is best understood in its contemporary socio-political context; its philosophical discussion of this topic, in fact, can be firmly located in the political ideologies and institutions of fourth-century Greece. In this paper, I want to focus on the written lawcode created in the Laws in the context of the Athenian conception and practice of rule (...) by written law. How are the Athenian laws authorized, disseminated, and implemented, and how does Plato's lawcode reflect and/or depart from this model? What is the status of the ‘text’ of each lawcode? How—and how well—do the citizens know the law? When and by whom can the lawcode be altered? Recent work on literacy and on rule by written law in fourth-century Athens invites a serious reconsideration of Plato's lawcode and the polity it is designed for. Certainly Plato's Laws is grounded in a serious meditation on Athenian legislative practices. But Plato adds a novel ingredient to his legislation—the ‘Egyptian’ practice of ‘doing things by the book’ exemplified by the institution of laws which compel doctors to treat patients in strict accordance with venerable and, indeed, sacred medical texts. As I will argue, the ‘Egyptian’ medical and textual practices offer a model for the rule of law quite different from that found in Athens. (shrink)

The title is unashamedly plagiarized from Stephen Todd's excellent book, The Shape of Athenian Law. The plagiarism is slightly misleading, however, since my interest is in law as enactment while Todd's title expresses his interest in law as system . The issue I wish to address is the formulation of written laws in Athens during the late archaic and classical period, specifically the balance between procedural and substantive law. Substantive law deals with rights, obligations, offences, etc. Its role is to (...) define behaviour which is required, allowed, or prohibited. These are what Hart terms ‘primary rules’. Procedural law, on the other hand, deals, as the name suggests, with the administration of justice, that is with jurisdiction, process, etc. Hart's term for these is ‘secondary rules’. The two cannot be separated quite as neatly as I have suggested, of course. A procedural law can scarcely avoid mentioning the offences or rights whose punishment or protection it regulates, while a substantive law may need to address issues such as jurisdiction. This is therefore an issue of orientation, not a simple binary division. However, as a broad basis for classification it is of value. (shrink)

The title is unashamedly plagiarized from Stephen Todd's excellent book,The Shape of Athenian Law. The plagiarism is slightly misleading, however, since my interest is in law as enactment (Gesetz) while Todd's title expresses his interest in law as system (Recht). The issue I wish to address is the formulation of written laws in Athens during the late archaic and classical period, specifically the balance between procedural and substantive law. Substantive law deals with rights, obligations, offences, etc. Its role is to (...) define behaviour which is required, allowed, or prohibited. These are what Hart terms ‘primary rules’. Procedural law, on the other hand, deals, as the name suggests, with the administration of justice, that is with jurisdiction, process, etc. Hart's term for these is ‘secondary rules’. The two cannot be separated quite as neatly as I have suggested, of course. A procedural law can scarcely avoid mentioning the offences or rights whose punishment or protection it regulates, while a substantive law may need to address issues such as jurisdiction. This is therefore an issue of orientation, not a simple binary division. However, as a broad basis for classification it is of value. (shrink)

In the fifth centuryb.c.e.the Athenians did not make any distinction between laws and decrees. The Assembly passed both kinds of measures in the same way, and both general enactments and short-term provisions held the same legal status. At the end of the fifth century, however, the Athenians decided to make a distinction between the two kinds of measures and created the rule that no decree would be superior to a law. The Assembly continued to pass decrees in the same way, (...) but a new body ofnomothetaiwas created to ratify laws. There were also two separate procedures for rescinding the two kinds of measures: one could bring agraphê paranomôn against apsêphismaand agraphê ‘nomon mê epitêdeion theinai’ against anomos. This much is clear; scholars do not agree however about the procedure for passing a new law in fourth-century Athens. (shrink)

Résumé La présente étude aborde la notion de « changement » dans le cadre de la cité grecque de l’époque classique, mais du côté opposé, celui de la continuité historique. Pour ce faire, elle examine les mots et expressions désignant le passé ancestral d’un peuple : elle étudie les significations du terme patrios et des termes apparentés dans la littérature grecque des Ve et IVe siècles, présente le cadre politique dans lequel les générations qui vivent à l’époque classique font appel (...) à leurs ancêtres et recherche, enfin, les éléments qui construisent l’identité de la cité classique. D’abord, il en ressort que les notions d’« ancestral » et de « traditionnel » sont floues et que leur connotation dépend des individus qui en font usage, ainsi que du moment historique dans lequel vivent les intéressés. Ensuite, il apparaît qu’elles sont le moyen qui permet aux Anciens d’exprimer leur réaction – positive ou négative – face aux transformations multiples que subissent les sociétés classiques. (shrink)