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  1. Is Rational and Voluntary Constraint Possible?Joe Mintoff - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (2):339-.
    Duncan MacIntosh has argued that David Gauthier's notion of a constrained maximization disposition faces a dilemma. For if such a disposition is revocable, it is no longer rational come the time to act on it, and so acting on it is not (as Gauthier argues) rational; but if it is not revocable, acting on it is not voluntary. This paper is a response to MacIntosh's dilemma. I introduce an account of rational intention of a type which has become increasingly and (...)
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  • Is Rational and Voluntary Constraint Possible?Joe Mintoff - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (2):339-364.
    RÉSUMÉ: Duncan Macintosh a soutenu que l’idée d’une disposition à imposer des contraintes à la maximisation, qu’a défendue David Gauthier, fait face à un dilemme. Car si cette disposition est révocable, il n’est plus rationnel de s’y conformer quand vient le temps d’agir, et agir en conformité avec elle n’est donc pas un comportement rationnel; mais si elle n’est pas révocable, agir en conformité avec elle n’est pas un comportement volontaire. Cet article se veut une réponse au dilemme de Macintosh. (...)
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  • Habituation and Rational Preference Revision.Eric M. Cave - 1998 - Dialogue 37 (2):219-234.
    RÉSUMÉ: Une «situation de choix paradoxal» est une situation dans laquelle un agent connaîtrait davantage de succès en regard des préférences qu’il a effectivement, si ces préférences étaient différentes de ce qu’elles sont. Supposons que les agents rationnels ne choisissent pas à l’encontre de leurs préférences, que leur choix n’est déterminé que par ces préférences, et que leurs préférences intrinsèques ne changent pas de façon spontanée, automatique et directe sous l’influence de la critique rationnelle. Même dans de telles hypothèses, les (...)
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  • Preference-Revision and the Paradoxes of Instrumental Rationality.Duncan MacIntosh - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):503-529.
    To the normal reasons that we think can justify one in preferring something, x (namely, that x has objectively preferable properties, or has properties that one prefers things to have, or that x's obtaining would advance one's preferences), I argue that it can be a justifying reason to prefer x that one's very preferring of x would advance one's preferences. Here, one prefers x not because of the properties of x, but because of the properties of one's having the preference (...)
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  • Evolution, Altruism, and the Prisoner's Dilemma.Ishtiyaque Haji - 1992 - Biology and Philosophy 7 (2):161-175.
    I first argue against Peter Singer's exciting thesis that the Prisoner's Dilemma explains why there could be an evolutionary advantage in making reciprocal exchanges that are ultimately motivated by genuine altruism over making such exchanges on the basis of enlightened long-term self-interest. I then show that an alternative to Singer's thesis — one that is also meant to corroborate the view that natural selection favors genuine altruism, recently defended by Gregory Kavka, fails as well. Finally, I show that even granting (...)
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  • Must Constrained Maximizers Be Uncharitable?Jordan Howard Sobel - 1996 - Dialogue 35 (2):241-254.
    By his definition of them, David Gauthier's co-operative constrained maximizers are not necessarily unsharing and disposed to exclude straight maximizers from benefits of their co-operation. Here is Gauthier's full and exact account, his official account, of constrained maximization.
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  • A Defence Of Constrained Maximization.Richard Dean - 1997 - Dialogue 36 (3):453-.
  • Figuring Out How to Proceed with Evaluation After Figuring Out What Matters.Chrisoula Andreou - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (4):621-637.
    I focus on David Gauthier’s intriguing suggestion that actions are not to be evaluated directly but via an evaluation of deliberative procedures. I argue that this suggestion is misleading, since even the most direct evaluation of (intentional) actions involves the evaluation of different ways of deliberating about what to do. Relatedly, a complete picture of what an agent is or might be (intentionally) doing cannot be disentangled from a complete picture of how s/he is or might be deliberating. A more (...)
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  • The Individual Rationality of Maintaining a Sense of Justice.Eric M. Cave - 1996 - Theory and Decision 41 (3):229-256.