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Sidgwick's pessimism

Philosophical Quarterly 26 (105):317-327 (1976)

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  1. The Decline of Egoism.Robert Shaver - 2022 - Utilitas 34 (3):300-316.
    Sidgwick saw egoism as important and undefeated. Not long afterward, egoism is largely ignored. Immediately after Sidgwick, many arguments were given against egoism – most poor – but one argument deserves attention as both influential and plausible. Call it the “grounds objection.” It has two strands. It objects that there are justifying reasons for action other than that an action will maximize my self-interest. It also objects that sometimes, what makes an action right is a fact other than its maximizing (...)
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  • Moore in the middle.Thomas Hurka - 2003 - Ethics 113 (3):599-628.
    The rhetoric of Principia Ethica, as of not a few philosophy books, is that of the clean break. Moore claims that the vast majority of previous writing on ethics has been misguided and that an entirely new start is needed. In its time, however, the book’s claims to novelty were widely disputed. Reviews in Mind, Ethics, and The Journal of Philosophy applauded the clarity of Moore’s criticisms of Mill, Spencer, and others, but said they were “not altogether original,” had for (...)
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  • IV—The Dualism of Practical Reason.Roger Crisp - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):53-74.
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  • A new argument for moral error theory.Christopher Cowie - 2022 - Noûs 56 (2):276-294.
    Traditional arguments for moral error theory are based on identifying a problem with the metaphysics of moral properties. I provide a new argument that is based on the inconsistency of first‐order moral judgments. I illustrate this using impossibility results in population axiology.
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  • Henry Sidgwick.Bartonn D. Schultz - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Bertrand Russell: Moral Philosopher or UnPhilosophical Moralist?Charles Pigden - 2003 - In Nicholas Griffin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell. Cambridge University Press. pp. 475-506.
    Until very recently the received wisdom on Russell’s moral philosophy was that it is uninspired and derivative, from Moore in its first phase and from Hume and the emotivists in its second. In my view this is a consensus of error. In the latter part of this essay I contend: 1) that Russell’s ‘work in moral philosophy’ had at least three, and (depending how you look at it) up to six ‘main phases’; 2) that in some of those phases, it (...)
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