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  1. Will it be me? Identity, concern and perspective.Patrick Stokes - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):206-226.
    (2013). Will it be me? Identity, concern and perspective. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 206-226.
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  • Crossing the bridge: the first-person and time.Patrick Stokes - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):295-312.
    Personal identity theory has become increasingly sensitive to the importance of the first-person perspective. However, certain ways of speaking about that perspective do not allow the full temporal aspects of first-person perspectives on the self to come into view. In this paper I consider two recent phenomenologically-informed discussions of personal identity that end up yielding metaphysically divergent views of the self: those of Barry Dainton and Galen Strawson. I argue that when we take a properly temporally indexical view of the (...)
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  • Narrative, expression and mental substance.Anthony Rudd - 2005 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):413-435.
    This paper starts from the debate between proponents of a neo-Lockean psychological continuity view of personal identity, and defenders of the idea that we are simple mental substances. Each party has valid criticisms of the other; the impasse in the debate is traced to the Lockean assumption that substance is only externally related to its attributes. This suggests the possibility that we could develop a better account of mental substance if we thought of it as having an internal relation to (...)
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  • Stanowisko nieredukcyjne w sporze o tożsamość osobową.Mariusz Grygianiec - 2018 - Diametros 57:23-38.
    In the debate on personal identity, different criteria of identity are proposed and defended. The criteria of identity have usually been taken to state the necessary and sufficient conditions of identity and are interpreted as providing truth conditions for relevant identity statements. The Simple View of personal identity is the thesis that there are no noncircular and informative metaphysical criteria of identity for persons. The paper intends to first deliver a precise and general formulation of the Simple View, and, second, (...)
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