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Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
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Epistemic dimensions of personhood.Simon Evnine - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Plantinga’s Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism.Branden Fitelson & Elliott Sober - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (2):115–129.details
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Non-additive degrees of belief.Rolf Haenni - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 121--159.details
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Partial Belief and Flat-out Belief.Keith Frankish - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 75--93.details
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Coming to Terms with our Human Fallibility: Christensen on the Preface.Mark Kaplan - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):1-35.details
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Policymaking under scientific uncertainty.Joe Roussos - 2020 - Dissertation, London School of Economicsdetails
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Endorsement and assertion.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):363-384.details
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On Probability and Cosmology: Inference Beyond Data?Martin Sahlen - 2017 - In K. Chamcham, J. Silk, J. D. Barrow & S. Saunders (eds.), The Philosophy of Cosmology. Cambridge, UK:details
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What can we Learn from Buridan's Ass?Ruth Weintraub - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3-4):281-301.details
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Probabilist antirealism.Igor Douven, Leon Horsten & Jan-Willem Romeijn - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):38-63.details
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Good Questions.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 123-145.details
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Finite additivity, another lottery paradox and conditionalisation.Colin Howson - 2014 - Synthese 191 (5):1-24.details
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On Uncertainty.Brian Weatherson - 1998 - Dissertation, Monash Universitydetails
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Plumbing metaphysical explanatory depth.Nicholas Emmerson - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-22.details
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The material theory of induction.John D. Norton - 2021 - Calgary, Alberta, Canada: University of Calgary Press.details
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Uncertain Values: An Axiomatic Approach to Axiological Uncertainty.Stefan Riedener - 2021 - Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter.details
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Betting on Conspiracy: A Decision Theoretic Account of the Rationality of Conspiracy Theory Belief.Melina Tsapos - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (2):1-19.details
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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Coherence as an ideal of rationality.Lyle Zynda - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):175 - 216.details
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Representation theorems and realism about degrees of belief.Lyle Zynda - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):45-69.details
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Why are good theories good? reflections on epistemic values, confirmation, and formal epistemology.Jesús Zamora-Bonilla - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1533-1553.details
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VI-BayesianExpressivism.Seth Yalcin - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):123-160.details
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Metalogical Remarks on Induction.Jan Woleński - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (6):763-777.details
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Representational Scepticism: The Bubble Puzzle.J. Robert G. Williams - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):419-442.details
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Decision theory and cognitive choice.John R. Welch - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):147-172.details
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You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
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Locating IBE in the Bayesian Framework.Jonathan Weisberg - 2009 - Synthese 167 (1):125-143.details
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Must rational intentions maximize utility?Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):73-92.details
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Practical reasoning as figuring out what is best: Against constructivism.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Topoi 21 (1-2):139-152.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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Gigerenzer's normative critique of Kahneman and Tversky.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2000 - Cognition 76 (3):179-193.details
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In the Space of Reasonable Doubt.Marion Vorms & Ulrike Hahn - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3609-3633.details
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The notion of consistency for partial belief.Susan Vineberg - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (3):281 - 296.details
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Dutch books, dutch strategies and what they show about rationality.Susan Vineberg - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 86 (2):185-201.details
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In Defence of Revealed Preference Theory.Johanna Thoma - 2021 - Economics and Philosophy 37 (2):163-187.details
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Defeasible Conditionalization.Paul D. Thorn - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):283-302.details
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Coherence: The price is right.Paul Thagard - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):42-49.details
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Intentionality and partial belief.Weng Hong Tang - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7).details
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Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
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Bayesian Confirmation Theory and The Likelihood Principle.Daniel Steel - 2007 - Synthese 156 (1):53-77.details
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A bayesian way to make stopping rules matter.Daniel Steel - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (2):213--227.details
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Higher-order preferences and the master rationality motive.Keith E. Stanovich - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (1):111 – 127.details
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Advancing the rationality debate.Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):701-717.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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Respecting Evidence: Belief Functions not Imprecise Probabilities.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2022 - Synthese 200 (475):1-30.details
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A mistake in dynamic coherence arguments?Brian Skyrms - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (2):320-328.details
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The main two arguments for probabilism are flawed.Luigi Secchi - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3):287-295.details
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Objects of Choice.Wolfgang Schwarz - forthcoming - Mind.details
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