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Dreaming and skepticism

Philosophical Review 65 (January):14-37 (1956)

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  1. The Immersive Spatiotemporal Hallucination Model of Dreaming.Jennifer M. Windt - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):295-316.
    The paper proposes a minimal definition of dreaming in terms of immersive spatiotemporal hallucination (ISTH) occurring in sleep or during sleep–wake transitions and under the assumption of reportability. I take these conditions to be both necessary and sufficient for dreaming to arise. While empirical research results may, in the future, allow for an extension of the concept of dreaming beyond sleep and possibly even independently of reportability, ISTH is part of any possible extension of this definition and thus is a (...)
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  • The Reinterpretation of Dreams: An Evolutionary Hypothesis of the Function of Dreaming.Antti Revonsuo - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):877-901.
    Several theories claim that dreaming is a random by-product of REM sleep physiology and that it does not serve any natural function. Phenomenal dream content, however, is not as disorganized as such views imply. The form and content of dreams is not random but organized and selective: during dreaming, the brain constructs a complex model of the world in which certain types of elements, when compared to waking life, are underrepresented whereas others are over represented. Furthermore, dream content is consistently (...)
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  • What I Make Up When I Wake Up: Anti-Experience Views and Narrative Fabrication of Dreams.Melanie Rosen - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4.
    I propose a narrative fabrication thesis of dream reports, according to which dream reports are often not accurate representations of experiences that occur during sleep. I begin with an overview of anti-experience theses of Norman Malcolm and Daniel Dennett who reject the received view of dreams, that dreams are experiences we have during sleep which are reported upon waking. Although rejection of the first claim of the received view, that dreams are experiences that occur during sleep, is implausible, I evaluate (...)
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  • Solely Generic Phenomenology.Ned Block - 2015 - Open MIND 2015.
  • On the Possibility of Hallucinations.Farid Masrour - forthcoming - Mind:fzy088.
    Many take the possibility of hallucinations to imply that a relationalist account, according to which perceptual experiences are constituted by direct relations to ordinary mind-independent objects, is false. The common reaction among relationalists is to adopt a disjunctivist view that denies that hallucinations have the same nature as perceptual experiences. This paper proposes a non-disjunctivist response to the argument from hallucination by arguing that the alleged empirical and a priori evidence in support of the possibility of hallucinations is inconclusive. A (...)
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  • Dreaming: A Conceptual Framework for Philosophy of Mind and Empirical Research. [REVIEW]Doğan Erişen - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):150-154.
  • What It Means to Live in a Virtual World Generated by Our Brain.Jan Westerhoff - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):507-528.
    Recent discussions in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind have defended a theory according to which we live in a virtual world akin to a computer simulation, generated by our brain. It is argued that our brain creates a model world from a variety of stimuli; this model is perceived as if it was external and perception-independent, even though it is neither of the two. The view of the mind, brain, and world, entailed by this theory has some peculiar (...)
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  • Skeptical Arguments From Underdetermination.Ümit D. Yalçin - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (1):1 - 34.
  • Dream Experience and a Revisionist Account of Delusions of Misidentification.Philip Gerrans - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):217-227.
    Standard accounts of delusion explain them as responses to experience. Cognitive models of feature binding in the face recognition systems explain how experiences of mismatch between feelings of "familiarity" and faces can arise. Similar mismatches arise in phenomena such as déjà and jamais vu in which places and scenes are mismatched to feelings of familiarity. These cognitive models also explain similarities between the phenomenology of these delusions and some dream states which involve mismatch between faces, feelings of familiarity and identities. (...)
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  • Consciousness, Dreams and Virtual Realities.Antti Revonsuo - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):35-58.
    In this paper I develop the thesis that dreams are essential to an understanding of waking consciousness. In the first part I argue in opposition to the philosophers Malcolm and Dennett that empirical evidence now shows dreams to be real conscious experiences. In the second part, three questions concerning consciousness research are addressed. (1) How do we isolate the system to be explained (consciousness) from other systems? (2) How do we describe the system thus isolated? (3) How do we reveal (...)
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