Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. When is Epistemic Dependence Disvaluable?Benoit Gaultier - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):178-187.
    There clearly seems to be something problematic with certain forms of epistemic dependence. However, it has proved surprisingly difficult to articulate what this problem is exactly. My aim in this paper is to make clear when it is problematic to rely on others or on artefacts and technologies that are external to us for the acquisition and maintenance of our beliefs, and why. In order to do so, I focus on the neuromedia thought experiment. After having rejected different ways in (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Scientists Are Epistemic Consequentialists About Imagination.Michael T. Stuart - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science:1-22.
    Scientists imagine for epistemic reasons, and these imaginings can be better or worse. But what does it mean for an imagining to be epistemically better or worse? There are at least three metaepistemological frameworks that present different answers to this question: epistemological consequentialism, deontic epistemology, and virtue epistemology. This paper presents empirical evidence that scientists adopt each of these different epistemic frameworks with respect to imagination, but argues that the way they do this is best explained if scientists are fundamentally (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Can Testimony Transmit Understanding?Federica I. Malfatti - 2020 - Theoria 86 (1):54-72.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Do We Deserve Credit for Everything We Understand?Federica Isabella Malfatti - forthcoming - Episteme:1-20.
    It is widely acknowledged in the literature in social epistemology that knowledge has a social dimension: we are epistemically dependent upon one another for most of what we know. Our knowledge can be, and very often is, grounded on the epistemic achievement of somebody else. But what about epistemic aims other than knowledge? What about understanding? Prominent authors argue that understanding is not social in the same way in which knowledge is. Others can put us in the position to understand, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What Do We Want From Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)? – A Stakeholder Perspective on XAI and a Conceptual Model Guiding Interdisciplinary XAI Research.Markus Langer, Daniel Oster, Timo Speith, Lena Kästner, Kevin Baum, Holger Hermanns, Eva Schmidt & Andreas Sesing - 2021 - Artificial Intelligence 296:103473.
    Previous research in Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) suggests that a main aim of explainability approaches is to satisfy specific interests, goals, expectations, needs, and demands regarding artificial systems (we call these “stakeholders' desiderata”) in a variety of contexts. However, the literature on XAI is vast, spreads out across multiple largely disconnected disciplines, and it often remains unclear how explainability approaches are supposed to achieve the goal of satisfying stakeholders' desiderata. This paper discusses the main classes of stakeholders calling for explainability (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations